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Abstract 
 
 
This project aims at illuminating that agents’ ideas/perceptions on their (social) 
surrounding affect their deliberative actions to improve their regional security. The 
engaging/networking agents’ main attempt is to enlarge the scope of traditional 
security to accommodate more comprehensive aspects by using regional economic 
concerns as a spearhead before extending to other fields. Familiarity and socialising 
process through conferences and workshops are both positive outcomes and structure 
for agents’ ideas/perceptions on engaging/networking activities. Yet, agents’ 
(socially) collective identity has not commonly perceived as expected by a set-up 
framework. 
 This project is conducted in a circular style which is open for revising a set-up 
framework employed here for narrating the results in a chronological fashion. The 
framework is constructed from related concepts and theories. Main concepts are 
‘active agents’, ‘intellectuals’, and ‘networks’. Main sources of theories are drawn 
mainly from constructivism, epistemic community, advocacy coalition framework, 
and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action (TCA). The TCA provides a 
useful path to fill in the gap left by the earlier theories whose concerns are grounded 
on agents’ outward-looking aspects of cooperation. Trust is a presupposition from all 
theories. Although there is a trend towards it, the research result can not apparently 
express it.  
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Introduction 
 
For those interested in East Asia, the 1990s was a fascinating decade.1 Within that 
ten-year span, there were fanfares celebrating the inception of four fora that had 
hitherto been regarded as far-fetched dreams. The first was the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), a sole, official, state-level institution dealing directly with security 
matters. The second was the Council for Security Co-operation in Asia Pacific2 
(CSCAP), which was intended to be a track II forum parallel with ARF as its 
academic counterpart. The third was the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), a forum for 
comprehensive consultations between East Asian and European Union member states. 
The last was the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC), a parallel track-II 
forum for ASEM. All were established in the first half of the 1990s. These fora have 
been active in getting involved with regional security specifically in terms of 
broadening scopes of security concern. 
As part of the existing regional security architecture, these institutions have 
made the region more appealing and challenging to both scholars and policy makers 
alike, particularly when the linkage with track II diplomacy, derived from 
engaging/networking activities in particular for this project, is taken into account. The 
core of this project lies within this realm, in which like-minded individuals, whether 
they be academics, analysts, officers, and/or policy makers acting in their ‘private 
capabilities’, gather, produce and express their efforts to make conditions in the 
region more peaceful and less uncertain. 
The mentioned fora are active within changed environments. Domestic and 
international agendas, particularly those seemingly linked to the well-being of 
domestic economic activities, and people’s migration in particular, were not as easily 
set up by states’ agents as they were in the Cold War period. Non-state actors’ 
movements were vibrant, to say the least; some have been actively involved in 
                                                 
1
 For this project the ‘East Asia Region’ geographically covers two main sub-regions. The first one is 
Northeast Asia consisting of China, Korea and Japan. Southeast Asia is the second one. It comprises 
ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
2
 Generally speaking, the Asia Pacific region refers to a broader area including Australia, New 
Zealand, the small island-states scattered within the Pacific Ocean (the southern part in particular e.g. 
Papua New guinea and Fiji) and the United States. The geographical boundary is expanded to cover 
economic territories along the Pacific-rim on the Latin American continent in the forum like an Asia-
Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC).  
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activities derived from the four fora since their inception. To those who had the 
chance to attend and report on the numerous conferences and street assemblies, the 
familiar names and faces circulating within those fora proved interesting, as they 
continue to do today. They seemed not only to know state-officers, non-governmental 
agencies, and media but also their peers, well enough to discuss serious matters and to 
make jokes among themselves. In other words, in all of these new initiatives, there 
were a small number of influential individuals.  
The interest for this thesis derived from my observations of the activities of 
these individuals. Initially, it was surprising to note that activities seemed to involve a 
small group of scholars in East Asia, ASEAN and Japan. Some literature claims that 
those scholars are essential ingredients for understanding the dynamic movements 
related to security matters in the region, and that the four fora could not have been 
established without them (Evens 1994a, Leifer 1996, Lau Teik Soon 1997, Simon 
1998, Midford 2000).  
This project set out to understand the aforementioned non-state actors as 
active agents who not only participate but also encourage activities directly (and 
indirectly) related to the four fora. The activities specifically under my observation, 
have been related to regional security, especially within the broadening concept of 
comprehensive security favouring non-military, and with a lesser state-centric aspect. 
How, in fact, could this happen in a region so dominated by strong states? Of course, 
these activities did not evolve instantly, or out of thin air. The answer to this question 
forms part of my research questions. Other interesting questions include: to what 
extent and how do scholars from different countries join hands? The most basic 
question of all is ‘who were they?’ Further questions may be posed:  when did they 
have the chance (or chances) to encourage such activities and under what condition(s) 
did said chances present themselves? Did they, in fact, create the chances? There is 
another related question: did they really have any impact on their respective 
governments’ policies, let alone regional policies?  
In other words, this project aims to answer two main research groups of 
research questions. The first group of basic questions is not only concerned with who 
those active state- and non-state agents are; it is also concerned specifically with how 
they construct and expand the networking (engaging security matters (both non- and 
traditional understanding, state-centric and military-dominant)) which may be called 
‘the East Asian Security Intellectual Networks’. 
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The second group of basic questions is about assessing both their capabilities 
and their impact(s). The former covers their abilities as changing-agents (see Chapter 
1), which particularly derives from their ideas in the specific sector of security. It also 
relates to their social function, examining whether they are independent enough to 
initiate an emancipating change, or are just part of their society and serve to reproduce 
the dominant order. The latter concerns their impact upon regional security and 
speculates whether their respective identities have changed to become more collective 
as the communicating process has progressed. Additionally, the researcher’s 
experiences from interviews initiate reflective questions related to the aforementioned 
groups of questions. They are: whether socialising processes of engaging/networking 
agents lead to agents’ collective identity or identities; and whether an elitist/exclusive 
nature of networking activities have any impact on socialising activities.  
Attempting to understand a vibrant region like East Asia is not an easy task. A 
single framework based either upon a neo-liberalist perspective or a neo-realist 
perspective (of which, more explanation later) is not enough to comprehend such a 
region. Other approaches, too, may fail to determine the status quo in this dynamic 
and energetic region, particularly when the potentiality of non-state actors is being 
realised.  
 The following sections provide brief reviews of the different perspectives for 
comprehending the role of non-state agents, whose function and activities help shed 
new light on understanding regional security.  The section will highlight the need to 
address how ideational factors could have a real impact on the establishment of such 
fora. The last section will provide key definitions and illustrate the structure of the 
thesis, before going on to explain why this project employs a qualitative methodology.  
 
East Asia: In need of a study of the security role of non-state actors 
Generally speaking, literature on East Asia has provided a Janus-faced image 
(co-operation and conflict) of the region. With a co-operative image, it is regarded as 
a prosperous region (particularly when it is viewed in a broader context including the 
Pacific-rim area), likely to be emulated. This image prevailed especially until the mid-
1990s, and can be constructed largely through a neo-liberalist lens. As a result, 
economic-related matters almost dominate the literature concerning the region. Paul 
Krugman’s ‘The Myth of Asia’s Miracle’ (1994) and John Naisbitt’s Megatrends Asia 
(1996) are cases in point.  
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Security concerns (from my observations), in both non- and traditional senses, 
were more or less discarded. It was mainly felt that they remained under the spell of 
bipolarity or the mantra of the Cold War, which classically separated the region into 
pro-West (favouring a democratic and capitalist system) and pro-East (dominated by 
communist-inspired authoritarian regimes). The literature related to security in Asia 
has been replete with concepts prioritising military and political aspects3 (Acharya 
1993, Huxley 1993, Mak 1995, McGregor 1993). It is dominated by a neo-realist 
approach.  
However, the changed atmosphere at both the global and regional levels (i.e. 
the demolishing of the Berlin Wall and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from 
Cambodia) generated more space for scholars and policy-makers to rethink regional 
situations. But has it really ended, given the problems with North Korea and the 
China/Taiwan Straits conflict, (highly divisive and conflictive areas4) derived from 
the experiences and legacy of the Cold War (in Northeast Asia in particular). At first 
glance, state-level questions appear to be keys in this era. There are two aspects to be 
considered here: on the one hand, the US leadership is in doubt. Is it trying to play 
down its regional role, and, if so, does it want to share its part with Japan or China? In 
broader terms, how is it possible for Washington to manage its triangular relationship 
with Tokyo and Beijing? (Steinbruner 1998, Hook 1998, Christensen 2003) This 
period of literature also raised questions regarding the intentions and capabilities of 
both Japan and China, assuming that they opt to venture along a leading path (Falk 
1992, Cox 1998, Hawthorn 1998, Calder 2000, Blechinger and Legewie 2000). 
Further questions have been raised as to whether and how they can co-operate 
effectively, considering their turbulent historical legacy.5  
                                                 
3
 Some literature pays attention to highly critical issues, i.e., North Korea’s perceived nuclear problem 
and tensions across the Taiwan Strait.  Others are interested in regional arms races, territorial disputes, 
especially in the South China Sea, and domestic insurgencies, whether derived from economic, 
religious and/or ideological problems (Acharya 1993, Huxley 1993, Mak 1995, McGregor 1993).  
4
 Ken Booth (1998) calls it the ‘Cold War of the mind’ He proposes that the pessimist perspective 
regarding the existing conflicts, whether they are political-territorial and/or ethnic origin in many parts 
of the world, have deteriorated the world for long time. They might be worse if the state of mind is not 
able to be changed. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have contributed to spreading such a 
mindset.  In the case of the former, the reason is blind accusation regarding a Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. For the latter, is it due to their suspect military programs and their international aid that 
prolongs their opponent’s suspicion?  (Garthoff 1998)  
5
 Due to an uneasy contemporary historical legacy (Japan’s military action in World War II (1941-45), 
many Japanese governments’ attempts to take a significant role have been viewed by its neighbouring 
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On the other hand, there are questions derived from the co-operative side of 
the region, in both political and economic terms, based loosely on a neo-liberalist 
perspective. The enlargement of ASEAN to cover all ten states geographically located 
in the region, and the inception of the ARF and ASEM suggested that co-operation 
was becoming more popular. Yet, their relevance gradually faded from academic 
coverage. So what is at stake here? Do their engaging and socialising experiences 
drive them to perceive themselves as possessing a ‘collective identity’ (identifying 
themselves with shared ideas/perceptions of their surroundings and claiming some 
commonly accepted characteristics)? The relevance of the question lies in whether 
flexible engagement in the style of the so called ‘ASEAN Spirit’ or ‘ASEAN Way’, 
with emphasis on informal consensus, and process-oriented phenomena, can engage 
with more states outside of ASEAN (Acharya 1997, 1998, 2001: chapter 2).  
For this group of scholars, it became important to understand how socialising 
processes could play a significant role in helping to intensify institutional-building 
processes (Snitwongse 1995b, Chin Kin Wah 1995). There was some suspicion that 
attempts to extend the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia or Asia Pacific Way’ 'camouflaged' 
Japan and Australia's joint bid to increase their penetration of the Asian circle. But on 
the whole, this literature was very positive about the cooperative future of the region.  
Although there is no clarification on the rise of non-state actors in helping to 
transform regional security, there is the question of whether non-governmental actors 
can play more active roles in reinforcing regional security (Hook 2000) and in 
developing regional democracy (Shuto 2000).  
 Much of this 1990s literature was concerned with speculation about conflicts 
and interests, co-operation, and even the future prospects of the regional situation 
(Ball 1999b). However, the passing of time has highlighted some of the inner 
complexities of the regional situation, and certain theoretical frameworks have been 
found wanting. As the thesis will show, an alternative approach lies in a constructivist 
framework (Archer 1988, 1995: chapters 2 and 3, Price and Reus-Smit 2000, Hay 
2002: chapter 3).  
 
Alternative Security Experiences  
                                                                                                                                            
countries as a means of returning to repressive policy. Yet, it does not mean that Tokyo has not tried. 
Any attempt can be viewed as part of the process of the ‘Internationalising Japan’ which has been 
conducted on many fronts; some of them directly engaging non-governmental actors’ activities (Hook 
and Weiner 1992).  
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As Chapter 1 will show, constructivism helps broaden the horizons of East Asian 
studies, by placing less of an emphasis on structural factors (Ikenberry and 
Mastanduno 2003b), and giving new meaning to phrases including those of identity, 
sovereignty, even institution and international governance (Adler 2003). It does so by 
digging deeper into their historical contexts and explaining how they have been 
memorised.  
From the mid-1990s onwards, literature applied this approach facilitates an 
understanding of historical memory as an essential ingredient for comprehending East 
Asian states’ foreign policies, not only as a basis, but also as a learning-and-engaging 
process, for states and non-state actors to construct and/or adapt their identities and 
norms
6(Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, Kowert and Legro 1996). Put 
differently, how they define their identities and interests is at issue (Katzenstein 
1996b, Berger 2003). One of the stumbling blocks to such a discovery is the 
geographical diffusion of learning centres and intellectual innovation in East Asia 
(Katzenstein 1996a).  
Any understanding of East Asian affairs, according to constructivist 
approaches, is to say the least complex; even the meaning of the term ‘security’ 
applied within the region is elusive. What Muthiah Alagappa (1998a, 1998b, 1998d) 
refers to as the ‘conceptual travelling’ of East Asian security depends on the interplay 
between the identity of the nation (collective-self for being a nation-state) and the 
ideology of the state (structure of political domination). Each state’s definition of its 
‘survival’ helps the prioritising of its own broadening security concept (including 
non-traditional forms, such as economic, environmental, and human security). The 
characteristics of international security systems (self-help, co-operative, or security 
community), in which states find themselves will also be taken into consideration 
(Gurtov 2002: chapter 2).  
                                                 
6
 Drawn from the Western experiences, there are three layers of exogenous factors that should be 
studied alongside their domestic counterparts. The first is whether there is an explicit institution, e.g., 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The second is whether there is an Implicit institution 
shadowing both states and non-states' actors. The last suggests international cultural patterns of ‘amity 
and enmity’ derived from historical backgrounds in each area (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 
1996). What one should be aware of is that social learning at each layer, not to mention at the domestic 
layer, is a continuous process. It is difficult to indicate precisely ‘when and where’ should be the 
starting point. Additionally, norms seem to have an omnipresent quality covering from individual level 
(actors’ identities, interests and behaviours) to structural level (normative structure) (Kowert and Legro 
1996).  
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Although to date there seems to be no clear idea of how to define the ‘Asia or 
Asia-Pacific Way’, the regional states’ experiences since the 1997 financial crisis 
seem to be of significance. The more limited the scope applied, the clearer the 
outcome presented. The establishment of the ‘ASEAN+3’, comprising China, South 
Korea, Japan and ASEAN members, and the establishment of a regional currency 
swap agreement, known as the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative,’7 are good examples.  Put 
another way, the more socialisation they have, the clearer the identity and institutional 
image they create. The enlargement of ASEAN, from six members to ten, reflects the 
significance of socialising processes. Although it may give rise to more internal 
problems, it helps construct the image of ASEAN as a reference for regional identity 
with a tendency towards intensifying institutional-building processes8 (Acharya 2001: 
chapter 6 and conclusion, Haacke 2003). 
The emergence and existence of the ARF and the CSCAP have provided more 
fertile ground for alternative security ideas and practices, as will be shown in the 
chapters that follow. As part of the existing regional security architecture, these 
institutions have made the region more appealing and challenging to both scholars and 
policy makers alike, particularly when the linkage with track II diplomacy is taken 
into account. The core of this project lies within this realm, in which like-minded 
individuals, whether they be academics, analysts, officers, and/or policy makers 
acting in their ‘private capabilities’, gather, produce, and express their efforts to make 
conditions in the region more peaceful and less uncertain (Evans 1994a, Kerr 1994, 
Ball 1999a, Simon 2002).  
It would be interesting to discern whether this dynamic area of open space in 
which non-state actors can play creative roles, implicitly democratising security 
matters for the ARF and explicitly for the CSCAP, involves more frequently those 
                                                 
7
 The Initiative can be regarded as a result of intensified communication among countries, whose 
shared feeling and future (or common destiny) has been transformed by active agents’ efforts and 
actions. It is the case that the relationship between institutionalized-monetary agreements (as a 
structure) and agents’ ideas and behaviours is clearly discernible (Nabers 2003).  
8
 Discernible examples are to adopt a concept of ‘Troika’ for continuous and quick responses to 
preventive diplomacy, and to brush up a significance of an ASEAN High Council as dispute-settlement 
mechanism. Additionally, what used to be taboo topics related to members’ domestic concerns (i.e. 
money laundering and arms trafficking) have found their places in ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMMs) sessions as a better way to cope with new intra-regional disputes. Interestingly, military 
presence from ASEAN members in East Timor, albeit receiving an invitation from Indonesia, 
presented a question on its cardinal principle called ‘non-intervention’; whether it should be more 
flexibly engaged (Acharya 2001: chapter 6 and conclusion, Haacke 2003, Snitwongse 2003).  
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who are affected by changes to the status quo. Logically, if this interactive area plays 
a significant part, the positively broadening impact of the spill-over effect facilitating 
the development of regional democracy may not be beyond reach. In other words, 
these questions, derived as they are from the changed atmosphere, help to confirm 
that regional prospects for non-state actors’ active roles are on the move (Ball 1999b, 
Hook 2000, Shuto 2000) However, as will be shown to be the case in this thesis, the 
longer time passes, the more complicated and complex situations and questions have 
become.   
Tracing back through regional experiences, the expected spill-over effect from 
effective economic co-operation to other co-operative aspects, is not new. Within this 
sphere, apparent efforts forged between state and non-state actors (from ASEAN and 
Japan in particular) have been discernible since the mid-1960s. The existence and 
function of international economic fora at both state and non-state levels are cases in 
point. With regard to the former, examples are APEC and ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). The latter include the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and Pacific 
Economic Co-operation Council (PECC). Their overlapping activities nurture an 
image of complex regional multilateralism, although they are apparently based on 
states’ activities (Gilson 2004). The nature of this complexity will be mainly explored 
in Chapters 3 and 4.  
It is already an accepted fact that economists, especially within Japan, 
Australia and ASEAN, played an important part in the inception of the previous fora 
(PBEC, PECC and APEC). Their attempts paved the way for the extension of the 
'getting-to-know-each-other' process and related matters in the political field 
(Soesastro 1995a, Morrison 1997, PECC 2005). Their efforts have helped create and 
nurture a ‘we-feeling’ or ‘we-ness’ among active participants in tandem with the 
experience ASEAN has gained through the years through their diplomatic and 
political co-operation (Acharya 1997, 1998, 2001, Emmers 2003). The above 
mentioned feeling and co-operative activities have come to frame the sense of 
community which is identified in this thesis as a 'communicative community,' in 
which members accept their shared backgrounds and prospects for their community.  
However, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R Smith (2001, 2002, and 2006) 
question whether the successive image for co-operative community is really the 
region-grown experience. Contemporary regional history full of implicit and explicit 
conflicts makes them sceptical. They point out that such an image should be regarded 
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as the regional self-delusive image initiated and nurtured by scholars, within and 
without the region, who rush to imitate a co-operative trend from the mid-1980s of the 
Western world. This delusive community of ‘we-ness’ itself breeds imitating scholars 
who nurture this regional delusive process in return. So, the process goes on. This is 
the reason why regional scholars cannot act (and/or react) in times of crisis, not to 
mention forecast it. The 1997 financial crisis is a case in point. According to them, 
this failure should not be a surprise case provided that regional scholars’ source of 
imitation (due to their close academic background), specifically the one-sided 
perspective of the way most American scholars see the world, is taken into account. 
Ironically, Jones and Smith also accentuate that whilst American scholars have too 
realistic a perspective regarding the Soviet Union to perceive a positive change, Asia-
Pacific scholars have too idealistic perspective about their own co-operative region to 
perceive a negative change.  
Alan Collins (2007, 2008) also questions on a similar point about constructing 
a regional community, ASEAN Community specifically, based on the ‘we-ness’ 
feeling of the people. For him, ASEAN Charter which is a foundational document to 
form the aforementioned community emphasises too little on the side of people-
oriented agendas supported by civil society organisations (CSOs) in the region. The 
Charter reflects only concerns voiced by agents from track I and track II. Unless 
regional CSOs receive more serious attention by enlarging socialising norms to cover 
people-driven agendas, ASEAN Charter could not be materialised effectively. Both 
non-governmental and governmental agents in the region accept that civil society is 
important as a nurturing area for humans to learn to be themselves through interactive 
processes with others, and to learn to participate in the political arena. Yet, engaging 
agents from CSOs receive less attention than those of track I and track II. Even 
ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) has not been able to draw wholeheartedly support 
from participating agents of track I and track II, though it acts as one of the important 
mechanics for regional economic security (Caballero-Anthony 2004). In other words, 
APA and regional CSOs do not receive support to act as essential and appropriate 
means to regional security in general. 
What is hard to deny is that the existence and activities of participating agents, 
particularly as they are perceived to be indispensable ingredients in the creation of the 
aforementioned fora. The main component here is the overlapping membership of 
participants, who are elites in their respective countries, such as leaders and/or 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Introduction  
10 
members of intellectual institutions concerning security studies. These actors have 
been comprehensively acknowledged particularly in ASEAN and Japan, and 
seemingly utilise formal and informal channels for proposing and implementing their 
ideas (Adler and Barnett 1998a, Harris 1994b). As mentioned earlier, parts of 
networking agents are those who work for their respective governments, so it is not 
difficult for them to find and employ the formal channels. They seem to emulate and 
apply what they have learned during the processes (in terms of engaging ideas and 
networking-models), to help establish the aforementioned security fora (Evans 1994a, 
Kerr 1994, Simon 1998).  
Some aspects have to some degree been overlooked; namely, the significance 
of ideational factors as driving motives for these non-state actors’ intentions and 
activities. Although it is difficult to totally separate out state- and non-state agents 
from each other within the scope of this study (see the discussions and examples in 
Parts 2 and 3), the intention is to highlight the significance of the latter. There has 
been little attempt to try to fill the gap. Richard Higgott (1994) emphasises that an 
idea is important for identity formation and policy learning among elite’s networks 
(academic and policy-makers in his study). Together, they help to generate agents’ 
perceptions of interests, which are likely to change throughout the learning processes. 
For him, it is the idea that makes such networks as PECC, APEC, ARF, CSCAP, 
ASEM, and CAEC materialise. It is the intellectual-cum-policy elites who constitute 
the energetic motor behind the scenes (see Chapter 1). Yet, we still have no 
knowledge of how such intellectual networks could be possible in the first place, 
especially across national boundaries.  
Attempts have been made to shed more light on these non-state actors and 
their activities. A few studies provide the information that they are mostly civil 
servants, under the aegis of their respective governments, whose educational and 
training backgrounds affect their activities, including research, multilateral dialogues 
and institutional developments (Kerr 1994). In other words, their existence and 
activities cannot be totally separated from their governments’ support, for the latter 
are their resource channels in terms of funding, provision and implementation of their 
ideas (Morimoto and Kikuchi 1994). Charles E Morrison (2004) calls this close co-
operation between track I and track II ‘track 1/track 2 symbiosis’, which is essential 
for track II in Asia-Pacific to be relevant to international policy networks. These 
networks, comprising PECC, PBEC, CSCAP and APEC Business Advisory Council 
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(ABAC), are fertile space for track II’s contribution to regional economic security. 
For him, participating agents from track II achieve the aforesaid contribution by 
providing novel ideas and approaches to their track I counterparts and international 
organisations on how to advance regional economic liberalisation. The ASEAN 
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) is included in his study. 
Tadashi Yamamoto (1996) and Makiko Noda (1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 
1996e, 1996f), the first to present an overall picture of the emerging track-II networks 
in the region, provide some details about academic institutions (mostly concerning 
economic aspects), including the influential ASEAN-ISIS. The ASEAN-ISIS 
comprises nine research institutions9and is based in ASEAN members’ countries, 
apart from Myanmar (see further discussion in Parts 2). They also provide 
information of the more independently policy-oriented nature of their activities, 
compared with other institutions; and reiterate their relationship with governments (as 
sources of funds in particular). In addition, they also mention these institutions’ 
relationships with each other within or beyond their respective country’s boundaries. 
Yet, they tend to disregard the significance of these intellectuals’ ideas and intentions, 
which are necessary ingredients when constructing social networks. These neglected 
factors represent an important focus of this current study. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
Unfortunately, these individuals have never been significantly studied in their own 
right, although these elite intellectuals have been part and parcel of numerous 
dialogue-fora. They are not only members of academic institutions, but are also those 
who apply their intellectual capabilities to engage and expand networks, act as idea-
carriers and are supporters of inclusive communication. Within these processes, they 
may also diffuse the concept of comprehensive security, which involves a focus on 
people and their surroundings, whether ecological or social. All of these factors will 
be developed in Chapter 1. 
                                                 
9
 The ASEAN Institute of Security and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), comprising eight 
institutes across the Southeast Asia region:1) Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic 
Studies (BDIPSS); 2) Cambodian Institute for Co-operation and Peace (CICP); 3) Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia; 4) Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Laos; 5) Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; 6) Institute for Strategic and Development Studies 
(ISDS), Philippines; 7) Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA); 8) Institute of Security and 
International Studies (ISIS), Thailand; and 9) Institute for International Relations (IIR), Vietnam.  
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This project aims to study in particular people in ASEAN and Japan, who 
seem to have successfully persuaded their governments to establish the ARF in 1993 
and have, since 1994, encouraged others (like-minded and non like-minded alike) to 
join in the expanded network. As regards those in ASEAN, most are members of their 
countries’ security-and-related-topic research institutions (which are mainly members 
of ASEAN-ISIS). In the case of those in Japan, it seems that the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs (JIIA), the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), and 
the ASEAN-Japan Forum are their shelters (Noda 1996e). These will all be studied in 
depth throughout this work.     
By summarising their activities (mostly through an analysis of international-
dialogue fora and publications), it will be revealed that the engaging agents are both 
state- and non-state agents. The latter include academics and business people, as well 
as members of media organisations. Although they have different origins, they 
possess some shared backgrounds, particularly in terms of socio-economic status and 
educational backgrounds (see Chapter 3).  
Put simply, they could be regarded as members of privileged groups in their 
own societies.  Interestingly, what they have in common is their ideas/perceptions and 
intention/deliberation to improve their region from the high period of the Cold War 
(in the 1960s) up till the present time. The fixed shared perception is that economic 
development, and its spill-over effects, will culminate in domestic and regional 
resilience. This concept is the foundation for their preferred ‘comprehensive security’ 
concept. The way the concept has developed in the region is quite opposite from that 
of the European experience. Here, in East Asia, the concept of comprehensive 
security (initially emphasising the broad sense of non-traditional security) has been 
reinterpreted to focus more on the traditional dimension of security concept, which is 
state-centric and focuses on military and political aspects). These points are developed 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Suffice to say that their capability to influence domestic and regional policies 
is not straightforward. They might not directly influence state policy but they could be 
influential by encouraging high-ranking state-officers to participate in their numerous 
conferences and workshops. In this way they could transmit their ideas and/or 
proposals to socialise those from the governmental side. Although the final policy 
output side of agents’ ideational influence is not the main concern here, it is helpful to 
stress the point that participation might have a side effect; that is, it might result in 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Introduction  
13 
non-state agents being less independent. It is fair to point out that the collectiveness of 
this ability (not a collective identity) helps them to fulfil their social functions 
(creating venues for criticising, transmitting and/or transplanting alternative ideas and 
actions and making them available to a broader society). However, this does not mean 
that they produce only alternative concepts and proposals: as fund-receivers they are 
sometimes constrained to reproduce dominant state ideologies.  
In order to present the study procedures and the research result(s) in an 
accessible organised style, the whole structure is divided into three parts: Part I: the 
background/state of the problem, the framework and the method; Part II:  constructing 
and sustaining East Asian security intellectual networks; Part III: analysis and 
conclusion. Part I provides the narration for the other two chapters. Chapter 1 
illustrates the connections of the three groups of theoretical concepts, in order to 
highlight the significance of the principal unit of analysis, namely 'intellectual agents'. 
It commences with definitions of ‘being agent’ and ‘being intellectual’. It also 
provides definitions covering intellectuals’ properties and characters as knowledge-
generators/bearers/transmitters and, of course, their social functions. The latter 
particularly means criticising global, regional, and domestic (security) well-being and 
generating alternative venues that will encourage an atmosphere for a trust culture by 
establishing and connecting networks.  
All aforementioned concepts are connected and employed as a core theme to 
analyse who those active agents are and to what extent they are chosen to be studied 
as main engaging/networking agents of track II’s activities for this project. These 
questions are at the centre for the first group of my research questions. In other words, 
these concepts are applied as the backbone for Part II and Part III in order to illustrate 
to what extent, and how they can form and sustain numerous fora for regional security 
architecture, specifically those four fora under investigation here. 
The following section scrutinises concepts currently applied to studying 
intellectuals’ activities and networking. It concentrates on the more popular concepts, 
which include ‘epistemic community’, ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF), and 
co-operation based on a constructivist approach. The aim is to illustrate the degree to 
which they emphasise the means-ends paradigm (specifically the former two) - that 
they miss the internal logic of cooperation. Based on their emphasis, they cannot 
provide a satisfying answer as to what extent diversifying agents can cooperate in the 
first place. 
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The last section indicates the extent to which Jurgen Habermas’s Theory of 
Communicative Action (TCA) can be integrated, especially to fill the crucial missing 
gaps. In order to achieve this, cooperative mutual understanding should come before 
strategic action, although the two cannot be totally separated. The thesis will show 
that being strategic agents is acceptable as long as those involved aim to reach a 
mutual understanding. Viewed in an introverted fashion, the relationship (between 
communicative and strategic actions) can be comprehended as applying strategic 
action to achieve particular gains, as they are accepted as part and parcel of absolute 
gain.  
Following connected logic from sections 2 and 3 of Chapter 1, my analysis 
regarding activities of engaging/networking agents is that they favour engaging 
activities towards a direction of communicative action. They prefer this direction 
rather than emphasis on having a legally precise solution for every regional conflict, 
which requires strategic movement as shown in Chapters 3 and 4. By preferring 
communicative action, I mean, they pay more attention on constructing mutual 
understanding that to create and help (mostly track I) to construct  positive regional 
atmosphere is essential. This kind of atmosphere is expected to nurture chances 
leading to more stable and peaceful regional security. Put differently, avoiding 
discussion about apparent conflicts, and looking into shared visions to better the 
region is their guiding ways to reach mutual understanding.  
The focus of Chapter 2 is on the research design and methodology. Qualitative 
methodology is the basis of this project, which is constructed in a circular fashion (see 
Chapter 2). Apart from historical illustration, this involves content analysis using 
ASEAN-ISIS and its Japanese counterparts’ primary documents, their leading 
members’ articles published elsewhere, along with secondary sources. These show the 
two primary problematics of the thesis:  how agents perceive their surroundings 
(specifically global and regional); and their intention/deliberation to change and/or 
better their regional surroundings, which might be expressed via their observations, 
critiques of global and regional phenomena, and/or concrete proposals.  
Interviewing (active interview/conversation) will help this project to collect 
more precise data, specifically the ways in which engaging/networking agents reflect 
on their experiences. This will prove valuable for observing and criticising their 
networking activities. Agents’ own reflections will help the researcher reduce an 
illusion based on placing too much emphasis on theoretical logic. The reflections also 
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help the researcher concentrate more on questions whether socialising processes over 
long periods of time positively lead to closer co-operation and a collective identity as 
expected specifically by constructivism. Answers received from many interviewing 
sessions urge the researcher to present in Chapter 5 and Conclusion that outcomes 
from socialising processes can appear varied, apart from being only positive. 
Additionally, they also shed light on a related question as to whether an 
elitist/exclusive nature of engaging activities does affect theoretically expected 
socialising processes. 
Together they (documents and interviews) will not only provide information 
on how they construct and expand their networks, but will also prove a source of 
reflection on the successes and obstacles associated with constructing, transmitting, 
and applying their ideas (particularly alternatives for alteration) on regional security. 
In other words, these resources will be compiled, analysed and employed to set up the 
result for the core narration of Part II by reconstructing agents’ social environments 
(global and regional specifically) regarded here as their structure for thoughts, 
intention/deliberation, and action/interaction.  
The anticipation is that by tracing back agents’ actions and interactions, and 
their intentions/deliberations to expand and sustain their networks, it will be possible 
to discern how they overcome their difficulties due to enlarging networks and more 
diversifying agents. Part II's focus is on ‘constructing and sustaining East Asian 
security intellectual networks’: it consists of two chapters. Chapter 3 emphasises the 
essential content starting from the 1960s when economists laid the ground for further 
co-operation amidst many uncertainties in the Cold War period. To a great extent, it 
led to the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS in 1984. Also within this time span, the 
Japanese launched the concept of ‘comprehensive security’. The chapter concludes 
with the initially ascending period of networking between 1984-1991 leading to the 
inception of both the ARF and CSCAP. In order to effectively present the picture of 
engaging agents’ activities, figures (see annex) charting their connections, and brief 
content reflecting their concerns at that moment, will be presented and explained to 
accompany each period of the study. 
Chapter 4 continues on from the previous chapter with a similar pattern of 
presenting figures to accompany each period of the study. The first section will 
illustrate to what extent, and in what way, ASEAN-ISIS had to engage its Japanese 
counterparts. As well, it demonstrates how they were successful in persuading 
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ASEAN governments and other non/like-minded individuals to come on board. This 
section also includes a discussion of how both state- and non-state agents from 
Europe and East Asia formed themselves into groups, specifically derived from the 
long period of co-operation between Japanese and European intellectuals with links to 
Indonesian CSIS and their ASEAN-ISIS counterparts. The second section deals with 
the slow progress the networks exhibited until they found some revitalising projects, 
such as the promotion of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and ‘East Asia Community’. This 
part aims to establish that these two projects are not only compatible but well 
connected due to the intentions and efforts of those networks engaging agents, who 
seem to share experiences, ideas and visions about their region(s).  
Part III comprises two chapters: Chapter 5 and Conclusion. Chapter 5 consists 
of three sections. The first section will analyse and reflect on whether the existing 
networking has been as it was meant to be. In order to effectively present the picture, 
eight figures charting their connections, and brief content reflecting their concerns at 
that moment, will be presented and explained. The main concern is whether their 
expanded networks have had any impact upon their function and status, particularly 
whether they are independent enough to take a critical leading role in bringing about 
change in security concepts and activities (for this project). The idea behind this 
concern is that the group may have to face more complex and difficult learning 
processes stemming from their own achievements. How they can manage the 
extension, and what lessons they learned during their first decade of interaction are 
guiding questions for this chapter. The second section aims to parallel what has been 
constructed thus far in Chapter 1, as a way to assess the set up framework as 
explained in Chapter 3. This section will demonstrate to what extent the set up 
framework needs flexible alteration to embrace a concept of trust that is not 
automatically cultivated along social processes derived from agents’ 
engaging/networking activities as anticipated by literature reviewed in Chapter 1. The 
last section presents that although engaging agents show no clear signs of actualised 
trust, the research result, empirically and theoretically, indicates that engaging 
activities generate familiarity that creates friendship, which could be regarded as an 
essential social quality towards constructing trust. Conclusion is the last chapter for 
this project.  
In summary, this thesis sets out to answer two main research groups of 
research questions. The first group of research questions is essential as a guiding 
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foundation to comprehend the given nature of regional security architectures inspiring 
the set-up of this project which focuses on regional activities in the 1990s. This group 
of questions is not only concerned with who those active state- and non-state agents 
are; it is also concerned specifically with how they construct and expand the 
networking (engaging security matters, both non- and traditional understanding, state-
centric and military-dominant) which may be called ‘the East Asian Security 
Intellectual Networks’.  
The second group of basic questions is about assessing both their capabilities 
and their impact(s). The former covers their abilities as changing-agents which 
particularly derive from their ideas in the specific sector of security. It also relates to 
their social function, examining whether they are independent enough to initiate an 
emancipating change, or are just part of their society and serve to reproduce the 
dominant order. The latter concerns their impact upon regional security and speculates 
whether their respective identities have changed to become more collective as the 
communicating process has progressed. Additionally, the researcher’s experiences 
from interviews initiates reflective questions related to the aforementioned groups of 
questions. They are whether socialising processes of engaging/networking agents lead 
to agents’ collective identity or identities, and whether an elitist/exclusive nature of 
networking activities has any impact on socialising activities.  
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Chapter 1 
A Fabricated Framework: 
Comprehending Intellectuals, their Function, 
and their Networking Activities 
 
As may be observed from the research questions outlined in the Introduction, the  
concept of ‘ideas’ and their bearers/transmitters needs to be clarified in order to 
construct a definition of ‘being intellectual’. The essence of definition, including 
intellectuals’ social function, will pave the way for comprehending to what extent 
they construct, sustain, and expand their networking activities. This is the primary 
thrust of the first section. 
 In order to achieve these aims, the second section illustrates that although the 
present literature concerning knowledge-bound networking is insufficient, it 
nevertheless provides some degree of understanding. Its main shortcoming is that it 
lacks an internal logic of networking for better understanding. Finally, this chapter 
proposes that Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) may be 
considered a better complementary means due to its dialogical approach, given that 
TCA provides a sense of (socially) critical missions of criticising and unmasking the 
dominant concept of engaging/networking activities concerning security. In sum, this 
chapter constructs a framework aimed at comprehending the way in which the ‘idea’ 
(critical ideas on (regional) security for this project) plays a significant part in 
constructing and/or providing an alternative way of illustrating better regional 
security. In so doing, it does not ignore the importance of the idea-bearers, whose 
social function is not only to criticise, but also to assist others to emancipate 
themselves from distorted communication. In the case of this project, the focus 
remains throughout on security matters. 
 
What makes the ‘intellectual’ become an appropriate and effective agent? 
Before defining the concept of ‘intellectual’, this section will attempt to show on what 
basis it nominates 'intellectual' as a capable changing agent. Here, constructivism 
plays a significant role in constructing an understanding: it helps to construct the 
concept of being agents which helps this project nominates ‘intellectuals’ as effective 
agents. Margaret Archer (1988, 1995) points out that the constructivism provides a 
way of comprehending the vexatious fact of society based on dialectical dualism. It 
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criticises one-sided emphases, either those who emphasise human beings or those who 
emphasise their surroundings. At the same time, it highlights the relationship or 
‘interplay’ between the two narrations1, as Colin Hay (2002) describes the concepts 
of ‘conduct’ and ‘context’ in comprehending the agent-structure problem. Yet, there 
is no a 50-50 blending formula. Anthony Giddens (1984) theory of ‘structuration’ 
places greater emphasis on the subtle structure of an agent’s memory based on her or 
his everyday life experiences.2 His approach, however, fails to explain to what extent 
and how constructed society can be changed or reproduced. Roy Bhaskar’s (1989, 
1994) concept of ‘transformational model of social activity’ (TMSA), which signifies 
more assertive agents, illustrates their interwoven relationships with the ever-present 
social structure (inter-/intra subjective, personal actions and social relations) and its 
material nature. The combination of an agent’s (un)acknowledged motivation, 
(un)acknowledged condition and tacit/explicit skills will reveal whether consequences 
are unintended (reproduction) or intended (transformation). Bhaskar maintains that 
agents have of necessity to possess both opportunity and disposition to achieve their 
real interests.  
Comprehension of Archer's more elaborate concept of ‘Time and Space’ 
(regarded here as an historically social background) is essential to any understanding 
of agents’ ‘emergent properties’, and of the shaping of the interaction process. She 
contends that the disjunction or conjunction of the three domains of cultural, 
structural, and individual properties at the intersection of time and space, frames the 
                                                        
1
 Archer suggests that these approaches, which emphasise human being (such as individualism, 
intentionalism, idealism, subjectivism and rationalism), reduce the significance of structure to agents’ 
phenomena or ‘upward conflation’, as she terms it. Approaches emphasising human being’s 
surroundings (holism, structuralism, materialism, realism, objectivism and relativism) reduce agents to 
being merely properties of the structure, what she terms ‘downward conflation’ (Archer 1988, 1995).  
2
 Giddens argues that ‘agent’ and ‘structure’ cannot be separated as each constitutes the other as part of 
an on-going process. On the one hand, the knowledgeable agent (an actor possessing the capability to 
do things) is the key to understanding the social world. On the other  the structure (rules/resources 
enabling and constraining agents’ action whether intended or unintended, mostly the latter) should 
receive equal attention, albeit in terms of a ‘virtual order’ detected in agents’ memory traces and 
expressed via the process of praxis within day-to-day activities. As a result, the structural properties of 
social system, being marked by the ‘absence of the subject’, as both medium and outcome of the 
practices, generate the ‘duality of structure’. While this logic overlooks agents’ intentions, it 
acknowledges the importance of their consciousness in ‘self-creating’ and ‘social-encountering’ 
processes (Giddens 1984).  
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status of the structure.3 Although she recognises the significance of the pre- and post-
dated structure, her agents are more autonomous and opportunistic (Archer 1988, 
1995). David Dessler's (1989) proposal is less complicated. For him, the processes of 
interplay, 4 including among agents, between them and their surroundings, determines 
whether structure can be transformed or reproduced. Expressed another way, it is 
essential to clarify the process of how a collective matters, and how it is constructed 
(Price and Reus-Smit 2000: 1784-1816).5 Colin Wight (1999) proposes that viewing 
agents from a multi-layered perspective, linking agent’s intentions and capabilities 
through a socio-cultural system to their positional practices, is helpful.6  In essence, 
then, capably changing agents are those who know and accept that they are both 
enabled and constrained by their surroundings, which are dynamic and not static. 
They also know and intend to take part in - even lead - activities that will help to 
maintain, shift, change and/or totally construct their surroundings. 
In order to proceed, two main concepts need clarification: ideas, including 
closely related topics/ideologies; and intellectuals. With regard to the concept of 
ideas, the main questions posed here are as follows: what is the source of these 
notions; how have they impacted upon agents (their actions and interactions) and their 
surroundings; and by which method can they adequately be studied? Apropos of these 
queries, the primary questions are: who should be defined as 'intellectuals' and to what 
                                                        
3
 The cultural domain comprises the knowing subjects including individual agents and parts or groups 
that can be noticed from their socio-cultural interaction. For Archer, the structural domain signifies part 
of the structural conditions derived from the long-dead construction. In other words, they have no clear 
knowing subjects. The last domain is the agents’ ‘emergent properties’, meaning their capability to 
change things – their dispositions in particular (for further detail see Archer (1988, 1995). Walter 
Carlsnaes, who accepts the significance of this concept, proposes that it should be applied when one 
wants to analyse foreign policy effectively; structural factors are cognitively mediated by actors. 
Agents’ intentions and dispositions, which are expressed via their behaviour and bound by time/frame, 
should not be overlooked (Carlsnaes 1994).  
4
 Harry D Gould (1998) states that the significance of the interplay process is to indicate that the 
structure is both a medium for social activity and its outcome; it is a product and a by-product of the 
social action. Yet the same process of practices also generates multiple meanings based on different 
agents’ intersubjective understandings and practices that allow agents to comprehend ‘anarchy as an 
imagined community’ (Hopf 2000: 1758-1762). With the same logical understanding, Alexander 
Wendt (2000b) argues that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Alexander Wendt (2000b). 
5
 On this point, Roxanne Lynne Doty (1997) suggests that they should pay more attention to the close 
intertwining of power, truth, and knowledge.  
6
 This perspective proposes that there are three closely connected layers. The first, called ‘agency 1’, 
possesses the power to act in accord with its intention. The second, called ‘agency 2’ refers to the 
socio-cultural systems that helped agency 1 to become an agent. The last, ‘agency 3’, means those 
‘positional-practice-places’ which agent 1 inhibits on behalf of agent 2 (Wight 1999).  
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extent should attention be paid to them? In other words, what are their social 
functions? 
 
The significance of ideas: more than an aspiration 
Individuals own perceptions of themselves and their surroundings, including their 
relationships with others, may be the main sources of their ideas. While Edmund 
Husserl (1958) emphasises the human experience as the kernel of human perceptions, 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1960) place more emphasis on human ideas and/or 
consciousness. For Husserl, perceptions are grounded in experiences, which, he 
claims, are the absolute beginning (or principium, particularly for pre-philosophical) 
of knowledge. These are discursive areas where cogito learns the difference between 
‘my natural world-about-me’ and the ‘ideal world-about-me’. The particular 
interpretation of them signifies the intentionally related modification of consciousness 
of agents (Husserl 1958: 87-91, 103, 109).  
Husserl contends that the relationship between the intersubjectivity of agents 
and their acceptance of objective reality is the basis for phenomenological 
transcendental idealism. He further states that transcendental logic is possible only on 
a phenomenological basis. What he does not explain clearly is how the intentions of 
agents and their constitutive phenomena can provide for the constitution of meaning 
formation (Husserl 1958: 31-33). Husserl’s phenomenology is an elaborate procedure 
in which one is distinguished according to his/her perceptions of the way things 
appear to be rather than of what they think things really are. It is an epistemology 
that aims to deal with the problem of clarifying the relationship between the act of 
knowing and the object known. In this way, agents gain a more precise understanding 
of the conceptual foundations of knowledge (Wight 2006: 236).  
Marx and Engels emphasise the notion that human ideas and/or consciousness 
are social products based variously upon their sensuous environment, their 
connections with other persons, and beast-like human nature – determined by society 
and society determined by it (Marx and Engels 1960: 19). Together, the two thinkers 
founded the concept of practical philosophy or the ‘philosophy of praxis’ (Gramsci 
2003: 343-357), which is the essential basis of this study, given that it signifies the 
active intertwining process of social learning. Their expressed forms, understood as 
‘cultural self-prescribing’ according to Jorge Larran, can be regarded as the identities 
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of agents7, particularly their categorising references, including ‘I’ (active-self towards 
others’ attitudes) and ‘me’ (passive-self derived from others’ perceptions) (Larran 
1993: 144-146). But it is difficult to separate the inward and outward aspects of 
human perceptions from the processes8 of social change. In effect, this intertwining 
reflection of ‘I’ and ‘me’ is the basic concept of defining the social learning process.  
According to Larran (1993), the Humean and Nietzschean views of an 
imaginative self9 are a crucial point of diversion from regarding illusion as a cause of 
the human’s misrecognised ‘self’, as a reference to human ideas or perceptions.10 
Marx and Engels stress clearly that this kind of perception which they term idealists, 
particularly the Young Hegelians, should be replaced by practical materialists.11 They 
propose that practical materialists should base their analyses on real-life (material) 
conditions determining both the existence and activities of human-beings: life is not 
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life (Marx and Engels 1960: 
                                                        
7
 Piotr Sztompka’s work addresses their effects. As regards positive effects, he cites Max Weber’s 
work about the relationship between the Protestant (Calvinist) ethos and capitalist development. He 
claims that the Polish negative attitudes towards the state-system generated both the ‘structure of 
organised lying’ and the ‘grab-and-run’ capitalist development in their own society (Sztompka 1993: 
chapter 6).  
8
 Mark Goldie (1989) suggests that the philosophical critique of knowledge and the evangelical 
critique of popery should be a starting point, especially when Feuerbach overstepped Francis Bacon’s 
destruction of ‘idols’, aiming at only popery supremacy, and proposing that philosophy should address 
humanity, not God (Goldie 1989: 266-282). This process went on simultaneously with another process 
of ‘discovering’ the New World, which generated the still active discourse (defined as a way of 
representing and providing a particular kind of knowledge about a topic) of ‘the West and the Rest’ 
based on secular reasoning processes both defining themselves and excluding the ‘Other’ (Hall 2000: 
185-255). 
9
 David Hume proposes that ‘self’ is nothing but a consciously fictitious conclusion of continuity of 
perception. Friedrich Nietzsche offers a more pragmatic (or relativist) notion. A habitual sense, which 
is indispensable from the condition of life, is an organic self. Though Nietzche does not make clear 
how one may escape the many profound concepts of ‘pure reason’,  ‘absolute spirituality’, and 
‘knowledge-in-itself’, he makes it easier for those following suit by stressing that reason and 
knowledge are camouflaged shields of (cunning) ‘will to power’ (Larran 1993: chapter 2) 
10
 According to Larran, Vilfredo Pareto points out the exogenous aspects of how to study ideas, stating 
that ‘science’ will re-correct the false beliefs about ‘residues’ (ingrained habits) and ‘derivations’ 
(actions derived from the conjuncture between purely instinctive behaviours and experimental science) 
(Jorge Larran 1993: 147-150). 
11
 They argue that Feuerbach’s attempt to hand philosophy to humanity is not enough, because of 
being based on an abstract idea, albeit secularized, and limited to only a (German) civil society. They 
proposed that the philosophers, like themselves, should understand the revolutionary practice on human 
activities so that they can interpret the world in order to change it (Marx and Engels 1960: ‘These on 
Feuerbach’).  
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15).12 Put differently, social structure (perceived from the global, regional and 
domestic surroundings of agents) is the main source of an agent’s practical 
perception. What is important here is the interaction between their ideas (ideational 
factors) and their surroundings (material conditions). It is this interaction that drives 
engaging/networking agents studied for this project to propose and generate useful 
fora, initially in an economic field, that pave co-operative ways for a more stable 
regime. What should not be forgotten is that this interactive space has been positively 
employed by the mentioned agents since the 1960s, a period in which the Cold War 
was in top gear, as shown in Chapter 3.  
 John Torrance (1995) points out that Marx’s theory of ideas, that is, the basis 
of his perceptions regarding the emancipation of the human being, resulted from a 
dialectic process of his internal thinking: it reacts to the external environment but not 
necessarily in a linear fashion.13 A non-linear intertwining process of thinking 
provides a fertile ground for understanding ‘ideology’ as a means of deception 
exercised by the ruling classes, or deceptive beliefs arising from the material structure 
of society as a whole. There is no clear controlling power in the process.14   
Marxist ideas have not uniquely been produced in a scientific way as Marx 
intended. They have also been produced in a more humanistic way through the 
highlighting of the significance of subjectivity and psychological analysis, particularly 
for those classified as post-structuralists and post-modernists (Barrett 1991: chapter 
5). This means that an endogenous view is welcomed back by socially concerned 
                                                        
12
 For them, economic determinism, based on mode of production should be a key to decipher the real 
basis of ideology (of the ruling class as they criticised) consisting of three bases: the intercourse and 
productive power as an origin of class; the relation of state and law, the former regarded as a separate 
entity outside civil society; and natural and civilised instruments of production and forms of property 
which is related back to the first base (Marx and Engels 1960: 43-69).  
13
 Marx bases his theory leading to the conclusion that ‘base’ determines ‘super-structure’ or 
‘materials’ determine ‘ideas’ on two steps. The first one is to understanding ‘social being’ by treating a 
society as a whole. The second is to reflecting the surface appearance of a capitalist economy which is 
constructed by two related ideas: personal dependence (buyers depends on basic producers such as 
proletariats); and the fetishism of the market (used-values should be more valued than exchange-
values) (Torrance 1995: chapters 2-5). 
14
 This process generates various related meanings of ideology ranging from the broadest concept (a 
cultural signifying sign and a process of political power) to narrower concepts (ideas and beliefs drawn 
from the experiences of groups or classes in general). It can also be defined in more specific terms as a 
means to legitimise or promote the earlier mentioned groups’ interests or to oppress those of other 
groups. Herein lies a connected concept of the reproduction of social power which is related to the 
dominant classes’ activities of both imposing ideas and creating social unity (for further advantage) via 
their social powers (Eagleton 1991: Chapter 1). 
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agents, who anticipate that their concern may be a more helpful means of 
understanding to what extent an epoch of revolution could not be materialised as 
Marx expected. Agents’ perception does play a significant part in this failure for 
which George Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci were famous for their explanation.15    
It is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the ideas of an individual as 
products of interactive processes out of their surroundings, including the political 
arena. Philosophy, history and politics, especially when understood through 
sociological analysis, are not the sole sources for studying ideas. They are also 
expressed forms of agents’ ideas/perception, particularly when politics is viewed as 
related to every aspect of life (Mouffe 1979: 1-18, Hobsbawm 1989: 20-36). Yet, the 
words ‘idea’ and ‘knowledge’ in this project are viewed as social products of an 
earlier mentioned process, which is universal within the realm of the human learning 
process. An idea is not only a substantive knowledge of any particular discipline, 
which is relatively produced in keeping with the aforementioned process with the 
expectation of expertise. The characteristics of an agent’s interests may or may not be 
changed along with the interactive processes. Moreover, these changing perceptions 
depend on how agents’ interests and surroundings are defined.  
Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ is a good point of departure for such a 
process. It signifies an ability to represent the ‘universal’ interests of the whole 
society to unite as a group of allies through self-organisation, aiming to gain the 
active consent of the masses in order to succeed.16 Hegemony can be viewed as an 
ideological struggle through which to articulate a neutralised or universal interest. 
Within this constantly negotiated and constructed process of articulation and re-
articulation, an interest is not definitely fixed (Mouffe 1979: 168-204, 1981: 219-234, 
                                                        
15
 While George Lukacs indicates that the problems lay in the lack of revolutionary class-
consciousness of the proletariat, Antonio Gramsci seems to point out similar causes to those of Marx, 
particularly those derived from the mental labours (religious men for Marx, more diversified groups of 
people whom Gramsci called 'intellectuals' who create and establish an inverted world (Goldie 1989: 
280-286, Torrance 1995: chapters 6-7). 
16
 There are two kinds of wars that need to be won in order to revolutionise society (by dethroning an 
existing hegemony and constructing a new one). The first is ‘war of the position’ on non-frontal 
grounds, e.g., economic and cultural aspects. The second is ‘war of the manoeuvre’ in the military field 
(Sassoon 1982a: 94-115).  
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 1: A Fabricated Framework  
25 
Laclau 1988: 249-257). Indeed, it is a source of producing a practical subject.17 The 
process is rather similar to that which Habermas explains in his concept of 
individuation through socialisation (Habermas 1995: chapter 6).  
However, Habermas’s agent is less calculating in her manoeuvres. If Kantian 
epistemology presupposes intersubjectivity, the Habermasian interactive process is a 
source of reflection based on the condition of knowing as such, and the ‘critique’ of 
unconsciously produced constraints (Hesse 1982). This reflection not only provides 
critical understanding, down to human knowledge of comprehending themselves and 
their surroundings, It also encourages humans to overcome the distorted 
communication that blocks their true interests as agents who are free and capable to-
do-good (McCarthy 1978, Ottmann 1982: 84). Only in this way can emancipation 
flourish. Emancipation here is understood as a stage at which human-beings become 
free from the distorted perceptions that they are not capable of liberating themselves 
from socially oppressed surroundings. Following this logic, emancipating agents can 
be regarded as initially engaging/networking agents who tried their best to overcome 
the ideologically divided world by constructing regional cooperation across 
ideologically and politically systemic differences. The many types of support they 
gave to the establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the extension of 
ASEAN members are explicit cases in point as shown in Chapter 4.  
 
To what extent and how can ideas be observed and studied? 
The main reason for the returning to the realm of ideas comes from an inability of the 
rational interest-based model to explain policy outcomes in an era of profound socio-
economic change. It is not easy to study ideas in their own right as they can be treated 
as independent variables through which information about the external environment 
must pass. But, it is possible to find a middle ground, ‘programmatic beliefs’ as Sheri 
Berman (1998: chapter 2) terms them, to solve the problem. This middle ground not 
                                                        
17
 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe propose that the struggle to achieve ‘hegemonic’ status is a 
rather contingent process within a discursive space. There is perpetual conflict within society but not 
necessarily between particular classes: it stems from the desire to co-operate (albeit mostly turning out 
to be against, at worst, or to compromise, at best) the dichotomous logics. The first is the logics of 
difference (particularity); the second is the logics of equivalence (universality). The above two authors 
emphasise that how this process is defined depends on internal frontiers within society; that means 
showing the limit of objectivity. Yet, what should not be overlooked is that if this process can be 
applied thoroughly, it could be regarded as having a universal quality, although the contents within the 
process may vary depending on time and space. (Laclau and Mouffe 2001).  
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only provides a referential guideline for the practical activities of everyday life, but 
also creates a reference for defining interests themselves (Jacobson 1995). In simple 
terms, ideas and practices should not be separated: they should be regarded as having 
intersubjective meanings (Bieler 2001). These meanings are derived from the 
aforementioned process of social engagement.  
Within the economic realm, the study of ideas and their impact is more easily 
discernible. It is understandable that historical contingencies due to the long impacts 
of numerous wars (such as two world wars and the cold war) led scholars to study 
apparent cases as economic well-being and its derivatives, as these events directly 
affected the well-being of the people, specifically those who reside in the northern 
hemisphere . The logical case is the study of the impact of economic ideas (Keynesian 
and Thatcherism18) upon economic and political policies generated by the helping 
hands of intellectuals from the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA), specifically for 
the aforesaid policies (Hall 1989). Another example is the study of how economic 
ideas led the French leaders to forge the European Union in the first place (Parsons 
2002). 
As regards international relations (IR) literature, as Judith Goldstein and 
Robert O. Keohane (1993) suggest, ideas can be considered a road-map for 
formulating and implementing foreign policies.19 The study of ideas also sheds new 
light on traditional realism, particularly Hans J. Morgenthau’s concept of ‘power 
politics,’ which offered a blended product of ideas concerning political theory, 
historical sociology, the relationship between social construction of political action 
and questions of political responsibility. Considered from this perspective, 
Morgenthau’s power politics aims to create a (probably) moral and political project 
                                                        
18
 Stuart Hall (1988) provides a critical study of how hegemonic Thatcherism (free market plus strong 
state) emerged and operated successfully. It is a good example for those whose concerns are with how 
alternative ideas (Thatcherism in this case) or ideologies can win. According to Hall, Gramsci’s 
concept of ‘historic bloc’, the success derived from the capability to enter into a struggle and win space 
in civil society (previously preferred Keynesianism) was the key to understanding the phenomenon 
(Stuart Hall 1988). 
19
 Goldstein and Keohane (1993) classify ideas, sometimes casual beliefs into three categories. The 
first is ‘world view’, deeply ingrained in cultures affecting modes of thought and discourse. Religious 
thoughts are regarded within this group. The second is ‘principled beliefs’ comprising normative ideas 
setting criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust. The last group is ‘casual 
belief’ regarded as shared principled beliefs and values. It is the last group that authority mostly applies 
when making a decision, since it acts as a road-map rationally clarifying goals or means-ends 
relationships for actors. More importantly, for them, ideas not only act as a ‘compass’ when an 
equilibrium of the situation is absent; they also serve as ‘glue’ connecting shared solutions. 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 1: A Fabricated Framework  
27 
(Williams 2004). Cases in point that illustrate this linkage include the social impact of 
Max Weber’s Protestant ethics, which created a new concept of ‘a new world of 
rationality of Protestantism’,20 and the movement towards decolonisation post World 
War II.21 Both can be regarded as products of the efforts of intellectuals. 
However, studying ideas within IR is not a straightforward business, as 
Thomas Diez (1999, 2001) attempts to show in his work on EU integration based on 
analysing integration discourses. His point of interest is centred on two kinds of 
transformation. The first one is that the European Economic Community has been 
transformed from the liberal to the social democratic version. The second one is that 
English policies concerning European integration have been transformed from the 
perceived insular English (less interest in European Continental’s affairs) to the more 
Continental English.22  
The differences in norm acceptance within ASEAN countries are also useful 
examples. Amitav Acharya (2004) insists that the key is the localisation of norms, by 
which he means commonly accepted values, perceptions, and behaviours. It helps one 
understand the relative success of a co-operative idea of security focused on state-
based co-operative activities related to traditional rather than non-traditional security. 
Conversely, the promotion of the idea of flexible engagement, or constructive 
intervention, which implies sub-state level engagement, ultimately failed.23   
                                                        
20
 John A. Hall (1993) indicates that those intellectuals possessing power in co-operative style (non-
zero sum distribution of power) to bring change to their societies and are aware of their moral destinies 
play a significant part here. They regard Weber’s Protestant ethics as a means to construct their social 
identities which in turn are references for articulating their social interests.  
21
 Robert H. Jackson (1993) points out that it resulted from the spread of humanitarian concerns 
(accentuating equality and condemning discriminatory governance). It was rooted in and derived from 
within Western civilisation, having the French Revolution in 1789 as its starting point. It benefited 
Developing World intellectuals and politicians campaigning for decolonisation. 
22
 Diez (1999, 2001) suggests that integration campaigns (policies where language can be observed 
but cannot exist apart from discourse) are open areas for political practising where power is constituted 
and the contestedness of certain concepts can be observed. No matter how discursive they are, they can 
be stabilised by tying similar meanings of other discourses together or creating a meta-narrative which 
is presented as natural and unquestioned. The discursive nodal points of subject position articulate the 
meta-narrative which is (in the European case) an intertwined relationship between political ideas and 
(national) economic interests; both are regarded as meta-narratives per se. 
23
 The localisation of norms is a process in which local agents adapt imported ideas or norms that will 
be compatible with their existing (whether or not prominent) norms, mostly related to agents’ ideas 
(Acharya 2004). 
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Although they share, as Albert Yee (1996) concludes, a perception of treating 
an ideational factor as a causal mechanism, the rationalist and interpretivist methods 
remain at odds with each other. While the former ignores the need to clarify 
fundamental ideas (namely, capabilities, power, and mechanisms), the latter is overly 
replete with discursive language. John Kurt Jacobsen (2003) argues that critical 
constructivism that offers to unmask and demystify identity formation, provides not 
only a conceptual bridge but also a useful context to investigate relationships between 
cognitive and socio-economic processes. Indeed, Louis Althusser (1993) mentioned 
the linkage over a conceptual bridge between an agent’s cognitive and her material 
conditions (socio-economic structures) several decades ago. According to Althusser, 
agent’s cognitive condition, deeply implanted by ideological state apparatuses such as 
educational and religious institutions, makes agents inert and able to accept a false 
consciousness, praising the extant ideology of the capitalist dominant class24 (Payne 
1997).  
 Researchers can study ideas by regarding them as symbolic and 
representational, based on a perception that they are fundamentally social and inter-
subjective rather than collective or shared. Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (1997) use 
the term ‘symbolic technologies’ to describe this phenomenon, the entangling of ideas 
with a broader set of linguistic and symbolic practices. In other words, ideas can be 
studied by incorporating two paths: emphasising the mechanism of meaning-building 
and emphasising the power aspect of language. For this project, the ways in which the 
concepts of comprehensive security have been condensed in the region (observed 
through numerous workshops and conferences, particularly the Asia Pacific 
                                                        
24
 Robert Gray (1989) provides a good example of ‘Bourgeois hegemony in Victorian Britain’, 
explaining that the bourgeois capability to forge a collaborative historic bloc aided by gifted protégés 
(intellectuals who have enough funds and time to create and organise such a project) is critical. The 
more landowning representatives (the aristocrat) were drawn to share political party leadership, the 
lesser forces were expressed against the bourgeoisie. There were some antagonisms between them but 
not enough to break their co-operative interests (liberal hegemony over the masses). As a result, there 
were no theoretically articulated alternatives. Although there were bourgeois evangelistic reforms 
aimed at defending and helping the disadvantage, actually, Gray claims, they caused reverse effects: 
fostering the cohesion and moral of the ruling class itself; and producing ‘subaltern intellectuals – more 
or less helping the ruling elites to secure their places by transmitting both elements ideology adopted 
from above and innovative ideologies which might be imposed on the hegemonic class itself. Tony 
Davies (1989), who uses Britain in the same period as a case study, points out that the ‘Oxford English 
Dictionary’, created by the support of the ruling class, and aiming at producing the ideological unity of 
‘standard English’ (foundation of English literature) is a reflection of the imaginary unity of the social 
formation of ‘nation’ directly derived from ideas of a hegemonic class. 
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Roundtable – APT, the longest and continually organised forum for 
engaging/networking agents under investigation here, is an example of meaning-
building. Encouragement for the broadening acceptance of the concept is an example 
of the power aspect of the term ‘comprehensive security’ (see chapters 3-4).  
 In sum, ideas possessed by agents are social products derived either explicitly 
or implicitly from interactive processes among agents and their surroundings, 
particularly the social. By using agents as foci, they can be studied from the 
perspective of two incorporated and on-going-processes. The first is to scrutinise how 
the interactions of agents with their surroundings are generated and the second is to 
understand how the actions of agents towards their surroundings are expressed, 
whether through critical comment or proposed policies. A useful means is to mark 
their expressions through their applied language.  
 
The significance of ideas-bearers: Intellectuals as inspiring-changing agents 
Two main questions will be addressed in order to clarify the significance of 
intellectuals as appropriate agents: how can people be regarded as intellectuals? And 
what is their social contribution?   
An ability to think in an abstract and/or practical fashion, either passively or 
actively, may not be a sufficient gauge to judge whether one is intellectual or not. 
Social activities directly or indirectly derived from observed social intercourse should 
also be taken into consideration, particularly their directive aspects. How one defines 
these activities varies across time and space, given that defining them is a politically 
debated activity25 (Leonard 1996). An understanding of the social context of the 
chosen periods is important because they represent the ‘spirit of the age’, or Zeitgeist 
(derived from a specific, historical and sociological context of the period). It also 
signifies people of the period, their occupations and social situations, explicates their 
emotional-psychological standpoints and indicates if and how their modes of thinking 
differ from those of other educated persons (Feuer 1976, Ludz 1976). Building upon 
this reflection, two main periods were chosen and set up for this project (see the 
Introduction and Chapters 3 and 4).  
                                                        
25
 Stephen T. Leonard (1996) describes how those who engaged in such activities changed from 
heavenly angels (aiming to achieve abstract values such as truth and good) to political agents (aiming 
to change their societies as they deemed fit). 
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Gramsci, who is more precise about the social function (directing activities) of 
the learned, said words to the effect that: All men are intellectuals but not all men in 
society have the function of intellectuals (Gramsci 2003: 9). The word ‘intellectual’ 
appeared after the nineteenth century. Tibor Huszar (1976) observes that before the 
nineteenth century, the use of the Latin term ‘intelligentsia’, expressing the level of 
cognition and the degree of philosophical and psychological comprehension, was not 
associated with persons of letters.26 Its new meaning signified them as a group of an 
independent social stratum constituting the better educated, people, who shared 
certain attitudes and accepted a cultural heritage, involving a specific combination of 
psychological characteristics, manners, life style and classical-values system. Those 
fitting this description were evident in Russia (until the October Revolution) and in 
Poland (until the communist upheaval of 1945). Aleksander Gella (1976) argues that 
'intellectual' has a broader meaning, and links it to the generally educated people who 
emerged in the twentieth century, particularly in industrial societies. 
 This second meaning is worth pursuing and elaborating. It refers to active 
agents developing and disseminating a (rather Western-dominated) cosmopolitan 
culture, with an emphasis on universally humanistic values (such as equality and self-
determination). The expansion of opportunities for personal contacts plays a crucial 
role, first with charismatic and cultured leading members of society, then extending to 
wider groups and the general public (Hodges 1976, Lopata 1976). Jurgen Habermas 
(1979, 2005), exploring the same social process, claims that it resulted in the 
construction of the public sphere. The communication established during the process 
nurtured the evolution of society. 
                                                        
26
 Edward Shils (1990) extends this argument, drawing mostly from Western European history (since 
the 18th century). The intellectuals are categorised into three groups. The first comprises those who 
taught in schools and universities (interpreting and transmitting the results of past intellectual activities) 
under state control. The second consists of beneficiaries of private and princely patronage, persons not 
holding official positions and those who followed other occupations (practical intellectuals – judges, 
lawyers, journalists, civil servants and scribes, librarians, physicians, astrologers, etc.). The third 
comprises religious intellectuals (monks, priests, ecclesiastical administration) under the patronage of 
the church. Those who wanted more autonomy but less secure money, leading to (possibly) less 
respectability in the marriage institution (bringing more spending and responsibility) often became 
members of the ‘Bohemian’ society. 
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 What made the latter meaning so appealing was the occurrence of the so-
called ‘Dreyfus affair’27 in France in 1898.  Clemenceau coined the term 
'intellectuals' to refer to those who supported Dreyfus. 'Clemenceau's  intellectuals' 
used their brains to uncover the truth of the affair (Gella 1976: 19, Williams 2001), 
the impact of which was so interesting that it entangled the word ‘intellectual’ (both 
as a noun and an adjective) with public affairs, particularly the moral and political 
aspects. Julien Benda (1969)’s The Treason of the Intellectuals (Le Trahison Des 
Clercs)28 is a very good case in point.  
Benda maintains that it was their social condition that made these intellectuals 
become more humanised, and less purely ideal types. On the one hand, they accepted 
the changing way of thought, by praising particularity and practicality and denouncing 
universality and spirituality. On the other, they exploited the abovementioned thought 
through publishing and dispersing, in order to advance their personal careers because 
they were more appreciated by the bourgeoisie, which creates fame and sources of 
honour. In fact, they themselves became more and more bourgeois. In his conclusion, 
                                                        
27
 The affair was started in 1894 when papers discovered in a waste-bin in the office of the German 
military attaché made it appear that a French military officer was providing secret information to the 
German government. French Captain Alfred Dreyfus (came from a Jewish family migrating from 
Alsace when the German annexed the province in 1871) was tried for high treason and sentenced to life 
imprisonment on Devil’s Island, off coast of the French Guiana, by a secret military court, despite his 
protestation of innocence. Two year later when Lieutenant Colonel Georges Picquart, the then chief of 
army intelligent discovered that the guilty officer was actually a high-ranking officer and wanted to 
reopen the Dreyfus Case, he found that the military concerned more about preserving its image than 
rectifying its error. In return for his effort, he was transferred to Tunisia. The case reappeared in a 
wider society in 1898 when Emile Zola published his denunciation of the military cover-up in the 
newspaper. At this point public sentiment became more aroused and then the Catholic Church stepped 
in to declare that the affair was a conspiracy of Jews and Freemasons designed to damage the prestige 
of the army and thereby destroy France. Though Dreyfus was exonerated of the charges in 1906, 
French society has never been the same. Apart from passing legislation separating the church and the 
state, the controversy unleashed political issues (nationalism, socialism, anticlericalism, antimilitarism, 
etc.) as well as the moral ones (civic and human rights versus anti-Semitism and intolerance, 
manipulation of public opinion, responsibility of the press, etc.) (for more information please access at 
www.dreyfuscase.com/html/dreyfus-affair.html and www.wfu.edu/sinclair/dreyfus.html accessed on 
January 28th, 2005). 
28
 Benda (1969) argues that intellectuals who deserted their classically humanistic values (e.g., 
seeking truth in a philosophical fashion – no matter how abstract it was, and muddling themselves with 
clearly practical political agendas) committed treason. He clarifies in his The Treason of the 
Intellectuals (first published in the French language in the 1920s) that their political passions (the 
movement against the Jews, the movement of the possessing classes against the proletariat, and the 
movement of the champions of authority against the democrats) are explicit causes (chapters 1-2).  
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Benda advocates the return of ‘universal fraternity', namely, the love for humanity as 
a whole.29   
 Although Ray Nichols (1978) accuses Benda of not having a concrete 
proposal and of applying an incoherent philosophy,30 Benda’s insight depicts quite 
clearly the (potentially eternal) state of the intellectuals and their public affairs. The 
relationship is complicated. It generates questions in both philosophical and practical 
terms: how to define the state of being intellectual, depending on human conscience, 
or their ability to perform their function as experts, or both; and how to define the 
intellectual’s public responsibility, especially within the political realm. 
 
What is the intellectuals’ social contribution?  
Before attempting an answer, a broader understanding of their social function would 
be helpful. Gramsci divided intellectuals, whose emergence coincided with concrete 
traditional historical processes, into two groups. First, there was the ‘traditional’ 
professional (rural-type), whose function was to link the masses of rural people to the 
(small) town petite bourgeoisie and to local and state administration. Second, there 
was the ‘organic’, represented as an urban-type group developed along the lines of the 
bourgeoisie, who mainly articulated the relationship between entrepreneurs and the 
instrumental masses (Gramsci 2003: 2-23). Their operations inclined to favour those 
in power: they created popular consent for them through cultural and social means 
(Vacca 1982). They were the real organisers of hegemony, creating popular consent 
dominated by the ruling class’s concept of reality framing social intellects including 
morality. Due to their subjugated conscience, according to the aforementioned logic, 
                                                        
29
 Benda accuses the wide spread of realism (emphasising the negative aspects of human nature – 
unsocial and bloody) and romanticism (paying more attention to contingent feelings than to universally 
abstract thought). Together they were preached, extolling the virtues of courage and honour (leading 
men to risk their lives for no practical reason i.e., glory), harshness and scorn for human love (pity, 
charity and benevolence), and the cult of success (Benda 1969: chapters 3 and 4). 
30
 Nichols (1978) criticises two points, the first being that Benda placed too much emphasis on 
‘idealisation’ (was more concerned with abstract and purified principles based on his paradigm 
(accepting the distinction between thought and action) than with the detailed texture of the actual 
events) of the kingdom of the clerc, which is a model for intellectual action, not a terrestrial realm 
(chapter 5). In other words, his methodology is problematic. The second, point is that Benda’s failure 
also resulted from his philosophical incoherence, particularly his pronouncement about the relation of 
men and civilisation. He failed to recognize that civilisation comprised not only morals founded on a 
mingled basis of abstraction (articulated conceptual, intellectualised art, science, law, and justice) but 
that it also had a practical side (where actual actions take place; they can be observed via speeches and 
actions) within which human’s actualisation had been planted (Ray Nichols 1978: chapters 5 and 8).    
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at best they created a passive revolution, a gradual alteration in order to prolong the 
status quo, rather than a real revolution (Sassoon 1982b) 
A particular case in point was the bureaucracy, particularly the technicians 
(intellectuals as experts of substantive knowledge) the ingrained division of state 
power and its principle of representation (Migliaro and Misuraca 1982). In this sense, 
the intellectuals acted as a form of 'mobile glue' that would bind an ‘historic bloc’.31  
Gramsci states that without them the ‘Modern Prince’ will meet with difficulty. The 
prince is characterized as the political party, whose aim is not only to revolutionise 
society but also to create a ‘synergic entity’ by developing, uniting, and universalising 
its members (Buci-Gluckman 1982, Sassoon 1980: 109-128, 146-161, Gramsci 2003: 
24-43).  
However, the relations among intellectuals themselves were also interesting. 
Gramsci suggests that their psychological attitudes towards the fundamental classes, 
the leading and the led, should be examined. Three questions should be carefully 
posed: did they have a ‘paternalistic’ attitude towards the led; did they see themselves 
as an organic expression of them; and did they adopt a ‘servile’ attitude towards the 
leading or did they think of themselves as leaders, an integral part of the leading? 
(Gramsci 2003: 97) Gramsci also points out the tendency of the intellectuals of the 
historically progressive class to subjugate the intellectuals of other social groups, by 
creating a system of solidarity between all of the intellectuals, and based on a 
psychological nature of a caste character32 (Gramsci 2003: 60). It is not clear whether 
or not the intellectuals are power-seeking. George Konard and Ivan Szlenyi (1979) 
subscribe to the notion that they are, particularly the socialist-economic intellectuals 
of Eastern Europe, with regard to controlling the central socio-politico-economic 
plans and their implementation. Yet, it is not a general phenomenon. Fortunately, not 
                                                        
31
 A complicated set of interwoven relationships created by the revolutionary class – for an historically 
concrete example see Stuart Hall (1988). 
32
 On this point, Renate Holub (1992) illustrates more by magnifying the emergence of an intellectual 
community of capitalism, which comprised three kinds of intellectuals: traditional (because they passed 
on the transcending predominant values and ways of the predominant class); organic (because they 
were created alongside the development of capitalism (in order to serve it)); and new (because they 
were also agents of new culture, in terms of organising and managing it. In other words, they were 
cultural elites (chapter 6). There seems to be some inclination within this group to follow Tibor Huzar 
(1976) when the ranks were revealed, i.e., the differences of income levels, ranks and social authorities; 
they may have accentuated the political and spiritual divisions among them. The events of the Russian 
October Revolution provide an example. 
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much evidence points in this direction. This suggests that intellectuals can be viewed 
as harbouring hope for helping to improve their own society for the benefit of the 
general populous.  
This chapter will now pursue further the contribution of intellectuals directly 
derived from their roles and functions, which are closely related to each other. 
Generally speaking, they were recognized either as experts that develop and preserve 
the socio-politico-economic status quo, or as critics, who bring change to society.33 
Elenor Townsley (2000) argues that the experts, with their substantive knowledge 
based in the main upon ‘natural sciences and technology’,34 and who were viewed as 
the 'helping hands' in the economy and administration35, were more successful in 
being recruited and holding top official positions than the critics, most of whom 
possessed humanity and social science knowledge and who were seen as rather 
critical. She maintains that the real influence of the intellectuals upon society, using 
American society in the 1960s as a case study, was to create an ‘academic technical 
discourse’, enclosing society with their academic language, their technical expertise, 
and traditions.  
Although Habermas does not clearly delineate whom this ‘technical discourse’ 
serves, he argues that the tendency to accept technology and science as a sole 
ideology is dangerous.36 Paying more attention to the communicative processes, 
                                                        
33
 Tracing back to the legacy of the Enlightenment intellectuals, Lloyd Kramer (1996) states that 
Rousseau can be regarded as a representative of the critics, who point out the negative side of the 
intellectuals’ activities.  Voltaire seems to support the significance of the experts, specifically their 
roles in creating and maintaining society’s development. In contemporary times, he regards Foucault as 
representative of the critics (highly critical) whereas Habermas’s works are categorized as less 
criticized and (even rather) praised by the experts (emphasising the universal aspect of knowledge).  
34
 Habermas argues that mentioned knowledge provides an essential foundation for creating what is 
understood as scientifically rationalised control of objectified processes expressing the system in which 
research and technology are coupled with feedback from the economy and administration (Habermas 
1997: 5, for further detail see ‘Theory of Communicative Action Vol.1: Reason and Rationalisation of 
Society’).  
35
 Daniel Lee Kleinman and Steven P. Vallas (2001) clearly demonstrate the relationship between the 
academics and the (capitalist) economy. Although they are convergent (as shown in the 
industrialization of the academy – not only having close contacts with commercial and industrial 
enterprises but also adopting business-like concepts of managing academic affairs, and in the 
collegiatisation of industrial research by adopting academic methods, including language and 
traditions), the economy has the upper hand when it comes to shaping agendas. Research projects 
within biological science are good cases in point.  
36
 This ideology penetrates into the conscious of the depoliticised masses. The highly praised 
technical means, in which Habermas termed ‘purposive rational action’, consist of two interrelated 
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rooted in social interests and in the value-orientation of a given social-life world, 
between the experts and the agencies of political decision -making should lessen the 
problem.37 The agencies should play significant roles in directing or at least helping 
the experts to determine the direction of technical progress on the basis of the 
traditionally-bound self-understanding of practical needs. In this way, the solution 
will show its practical consequences when it is transmitted into the totality of the 
historical situation (Habermas 1979: chapter 5).  David J. Levy (1990) proposes that it 
should be the responsibility of intellectuals to attempt to relate the spheres of thought 
and activity not on the basis of technical expertise but on the application of the 
common sense of an educated citizenry, as derived from practical philosophy. 
Edward W. Said (1994) insists that the concept of professionalism, namely 
working for a living, not daring to stray outside accepted paradigms, and making 
oneself marketable and presentable, hence uncontroversial and ‘objective’, is in itself 
a problem. The way out is to think and do things as amateurs and to know how to 
keep one's distance as an exile.38 Yet, such a free and clearly un-entangled spirit is 
not enough. Intellectuals should be on the same side as the weak and unrepresented39, 
                                                                                                                                                               
parts. The first is the ‘instrumental action’ (technical rules based on empirical knowledge, ignoring 
social framework in which they are embedded). The second is the ‘rational decision’ (expressing a 
growing of technical control in terms of strategies based on analytical knowledge) (Habermas 1997: 
chapter 6). 
37
 Habermas (1997: 79-80) hopes that together, agents’ political wills and the potential of technology 
should be more helpful: ‘Political rationalization occurs through the enlightenment of political will, 
correlated with instruction about its technical potential’. Therefore, what should receive more attention 
from the public is ‘whether a productive body of knowledge is merely transmitted to men engaged in 
technical manipulation for purposes of control or is simultaneously appropriated as the linguistic 
possession of communicating individuals. A sciencticised society constitutes itself as a rational one 
only to the extent that science and technology are mediated with the conduct of life through the minds 
of its citizens’. 
38
 The meaning is that being amateurs provide opportunities that care and affection are emphasized 
instead of seeking profit, and expressing selfish narrow specialization: they should lead intellectuals to 
ask (rather philosophical and moral) questions in dept – e.g. to what extent they do what they do, who 
benefit from their works). For being an exile means being part of the host society but not totally being 
embedded with any particular interests from whatever groups (Said 1994: chapters 3&4). 
39
 On the point, Robert S Goizueta (1996) proposes that liberation theology should be a helpful mean 
by stressing the preferential option for the poor. It should defend the Christian faith against the 
practical atheist, who may proclaim belief in Jesus Christ but whose life denies the belief. He also 
states that the major challenge to global peace, from the perspective of the poor, has been not the rife 
between the Christian West and the atheistic East but the rife between the imperialist power of the 
North and the dependent nations of the South. Active scholars from the South also highly mark the 
latter point: Walden Bello’s criticising the unjust economic relations and their impacts in Asian 
countries (Bello and Rosenfeld 1992, Bello, Cunningham and Li Poh Khen 1998), Samir Amin 
(1997)’s indicating at African and the Third World problems, and Vadana Shiva (2002)’s argument 
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should be the ones who ‘speak truth to power’,40 by weighting the alternative, 
choosing the right one, and then intelligently representing it where it can do the most 
good and cause the right change (Said 1996: chapter 5).  
Peter Winch (1990) is more precise about the moral demands, or moral 
calling, of intellectuals, although he presents a philosophical argument: intellectuals 
are those who have chosen certain lives involving a commitment to certain values, 
which demand that they be defended if they are threatened by socio-political forces.41 
But the precise nature of the responsibility that intellectuals should take is 
controversial.  Alan Montefiore (1990) argues that finding and presenting truthfulness 
and validity for their own sake42 seems to be the main responsibility of intellectuals. 
For him, it is rooted in the human capacity for rational reflection and the capacity for 
language and discourse, for reflective awareness of oneself and one’s state at the same 
time as communicating with the other. Fritz Ringer (1990) places more emphasis on 
coherence and clarification when expressing one’s beliefs, as based on reliable 
observation and sound reasoning.43  
                                                                                                                                                               
about their impacts on natural and social disasters (derived from the dams’ construction) are good cases 
in point.  
40
 Sulak Sivalaksa (1994) also accentuates these messages, claiming that the intellectuals should speak 
out on behalf of the less fortunate, articulate their aspirations, remind the rest of the world that they 
really exist and deserve better. They should remind those in power that they, including the intellectuals 
themselves, are often ‘robbers’ who should reexamine their life-styles thoroughly and develop their 
critical self-awareness to be less greedy, less hateful and less deluded. They must have enough moral 
courage to speak out, although they may have to do it at the expense of their own peaceful lives (as 
Puey Ungpakorn – the former Governor of the Bank of Thailand and the former Rector of Thammasat 
University did in the 1970s when authoritarian power ruled Thailand).  
41
 On this point, Elemer Hankiss (1990), using Hungarian society after 1948 as a test case, concludes 
that they can be significant sources of social irresponsibility and expressed signs of the broader crises 
of social values. They emerged from three elements: destruction of the traditional value system, 
dysfunction of the new official value system, and obstruction of the social generation of new values. 
Because the responsibility is produced and reproduced by society, the intellectuals should help, using 
all possible means, to recover this process.  
42
 Dick Pels (1995), following Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘corporatism’, points out that the 
intellectuals may present universal values (though they should be regarded as a multiplicity of 
viewpoints based on agents’ strategic self-interests) and truth as their camouflaging shields to 
depoliticise intellectuals, who cast their peers descending into the political marketplace as traitors to the 
Spirit (like Benda, as I have already mentioned). On the other hand, by doing so, they also defend their 
corporatist privileges whilst others may think that they defend the social condition of possibility of 
rational thought. In other words, they are cunning enough to play a Knight-Templar role: as a priest 
(guardian of the truth, or at least pathway to truth) and a knight (guardian of interests- both of their 
masters and their own). 
43
 What should not be overlooked is that Ringer’s chosen language seems contradict to each other: the 
reliable observation seems to be universally accepted process (positivist aspect) whilst it is difficult to 
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  This section would like now to briefly conceptualise intellectuals by saying 
that apart from their moral obligations, how they construct and present their works 
can be regarded as their responsibility. They construct their work by raising problems 
and finding appropriate means to address them, and they present it to different people 
in a variety of ways. 
It is difficult to deny that how they construct and present is contingent upon 
how they apply and master their languages. J.G.A. Pocock (1985) warns that if they 
are not aware that language through text does not take an innocent form, they may 
easily be trapped by the author’s speech act. Therefore, they should not interpret texts 
by ignoring - and/or separating them from - their historical context, particularly from 
the community in which the language is created.44 J.J. Lecercle (1990) calls it ‘textual 
responsibility’.45 In addition, they should also ask themselves: what are the purposes 
of the interpretation? Adopting this process helps to scope this work and to 
concentrate more on materials produced by ASEAN-ISIS and its Japanese 
counterparts and the scholars engaging them, particularly in the form of papers and 
monographs presented at workshops and conferences. How they can be utilised for 
this project will be explained in Chapter 2. 
Gramsci proposes that the essential way of helping intellectuals to keep on the 
right track is to socialise them with humanistic values. The education system should 
play a significant role by not only supporting schools for training expertise in 
particular subjects, but also schools for general/classical knowledge (Gramsci 2003: 
26-43). In return, intellectuals who are trained through this process should not ignore 
their own society: they should educate the masses (regarded as the 'feeling ones') in 
                                                                                                                                                               
deny that the sound reasoning regarded as essential content may be derived from historical context. 
Martin Jay (1990) even points out that reason perhaps possesses a definition bound by cultural aspects. 
Though he accepts that communicative rationality (universal aspect of reasoning) helps us paraphrases 
and reproaches ideas from other eras and cultures, normative aspects of the field of humanities and arts 
are controversial issues in which intellectual-beings and their roles reside. 
44
 He means the messages may penetrate into their minds without their consents (effective way of 
‘verbal rape’) and articulate their states of mind rather than perform an act of communication (Pocock 
1985). 
45
 Also on this point
, 
Ian Maclean (1990) clearly points out that it should be the most important thing 
for interpreting the law: by adopting this process the interpreter may find the true intention of the law, 
to what extent it is created and passed.  Jerry Jedlicki (1990) proposes that textual responsibility may 
have to be reinforced by moral and political responsibility, because their words, particularly those of 
historians, may inspire or extinguish hatred, may contribute to the shaping of an open or closed 
xenophobic society. Their conscious or subconscious choices of topics and interpretation may make 
people remember what ought to be remembered, or help them to forget the events they do not like to 
think about. 
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both general knowledge and particular expertise (Sassoon 1986). Grahame Lock 
(1990) stresses that these agents of classical philosophical values, in search of truth 
and good, should lead the masses on the right path, no matter how hard the path is, so 
as not to intimidate but liberate them.  
The intellectuals’ ultimate aim, ideally and ironically, should be to eliminate 
themselves, because they are remnants of social distinction based on knowledge, by 
turning the entire society into a society of intellectuals (Eder 1994). Seymour Martin 
Lipset and Asoke Basu (1976) advocate less idealistic solutions as the ultimate aim. 
The fulfillment of their functions and roles lies in their capacity to provide a creative 
and critical dimension of their own legitimacy to their societies. In order to achieve 
this aim, intellectuals cannot play only one role (critical or expert) at a time:  they 
have to know how to blend them together.46  
Paul Williams, observing the roles and functions of intellectuals, proposes that 
they engage in a process of reflection that can lead them to change what they take to 
be common sense; produce interpretations of the political world and construct visions 
of the possible or (un)desirable. They should also devise strategies and tactics to bring 
about their preferred vision and engage with a variety of individuals and groups 
whom they consider to be politically significant, in order to persuade them to take 
action in support of their preferred interpretation and visions (Williams 2001: 82-83). 
In other words, intellectuals should play a double role: the role of expert or specialist 
in one or another field of intellectual work (such as writer, scientist, professor, and 
philologist) and the role of one who feels the call to actively participate, even assume 
leadership (Szacki 1990). They should dare to dream the different and/or impossible 
                                                        
46
 Lipset and Basu (1976) categorise the intellectuals into four functioning groups: a gatekeeper of the 
classical philosophical values; a moralist, who is quite similar to the previous one about their values but 
expresses more political concerns and activities; a preserver, who prefers preserving the social status 
quo particularly concerning the state’s bureaucracy system but accepts if necessary; and a caretaker, 
who prefers the status of expertise closely engaged with the bureaucracy, sometimes does not regard 
herself or himself as intellectuals. Regarding the blending role, Farhang Rajaee (1994) indicates the 
same point for the Third world intellectuals. Although it may seem that they have four main tasks 
(explanation, innovation, distinction, and selection), in deed they are closely related. They are the ones 
who provide an explanation and interpretation (after selecting and distinguishing some values and 
events) of the world to their societies, which may make their citizens feel that they will preserve their 
traditions as well as make possible any change. In sum, they are both the guardians of traditions and 
vanguards of development. What should not be overlooked is that they may emphasise their roles and 
functions differently according to societies’ needs which vary across time and space. Selo Soemardjan 
(1994) writes about the performance of Indonesian intellectuals in their national development. 
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dream, as Elise Boulding (1994) proposes: they are the futurists being skilled in social 
day dreaming, skilled to disperse their positive dreams in their communities. 
In sum, the intellectuals involved in this project are not only those who 
possess the ability to think, whether in a creatively abstract sense, including 
philosophical ideas generating their social consciences, and/or in a practical sense, 
whereby they are more or less being trained to be a specialist in a particular area. 
They also intentionally engage in transforming that ability into concrete social activity 
by participating (directly or indirectly as mediators) in public affairs. They may do so 
by criticising society, by organising their peers and/or other people to forge networks 
or groups, since they may not effectively travel this path alone. And by directing and 
producing change they may bring better conditions to their societies (although it 
seems that they themselves define the meaning of the word ‘better’).  
Following the aforementioned definition, intellectuals for this project are 
engaging/networking agents who perform two functions. As experts who have 
academic backgrounds in economic and/or political-science disciplines, they employ 
their substantive knowledge to facilitate networking activities in a concrete form. The 
establishment of PBEC and PECC (at the initial stage) which lead to APEC are 
explicit examples. Lessons derived from the success of economic (networking 
activities) partially make these agents together with those who have more concerns 
regarding regional security, specifically in the Cold War period, perform a function as 
critics. They not only criticise regional situations specifically in terms of economic 
well-being that expanded to cover the concept of comprehensive security, but also 
encourage each other (whether they are non- or governmental agents) to forge 
concrete and materialised networks as shown in Chapters 3 and 4. Their functions as 
experts and critics reinforce each other and help them to shape regional security 
architectures as they are today. Yet, how they may generate their networks and 
accepted possible means will be addressed in the next section.  
 
Knowledge-activity bound intellectual networking 
In order to provide an appropriate concept for studying intellectual networks derived 
from both capabilities and intentions of the intellectuals as defined earlier, it is useful 
to review literature concerning knowledge-bound networking. Although not much 
literature in the field covering East Asia is reviewed due to its availability, literature 
concerning the Western experiences is useful as a guiding perspective to shed light on 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 1: A Fabricated Framework  
40 
to what extent and how East Asian experiences should be perceived. The intention is 
not to deny the usefulness of concepts currently applied to studying the activities of 
intellectuals and networking. Rather, it is to clarify that they will be able to provide a 
better framework and understanding if they magnify the basis for generating 
intellectual networks, which is referred to here as 'internal logic'. This section would 
like to propose that the internal logic acts as an a priori (universal) understanding that 
helps engaging processes and dialogues to materialise and flourish. This section 
further proposes that Habermas’s TCA can serve that function. The next section 
explains to what extent and how TCA is capable of doing that.  
 
To what extent can international collaboration be forged?  
Drawing on inter-state co-operation, particularly from the United Nations and its 
special agencies, Ernst B. Haas (1980) argues that reducing the cost of international 
communication is a main priority. He emphasises that it is useful, specifically for the 
weaker states whose asymmetrical interdependence is obvious. Their engaging 
activities create substantive linkages, gradually bringing consensual knowledge to the 
fore, whether or not that is the intention of participants.47 In other words, their 
learning process or processes, based on the experiences of their engaging activities, 
lead to the creation of an international regime, helping participants to realise their 
differences through persuasion and compromise48 (Haas 1990). An international 
regime here is understood as agreed norms, rules and procedures regulating an issue 
area.  
Playing down any economic aspects (as well as the role of the states) and 
advocating more social concern for non-state actors, Peter M. Haas (1992) argues that 
non-state actors can initiate effective international co-operation based on their 
knowledge, which he terms an ‘epistemic community’. For him, it is a network of 
professionals with recognised expertise. It can be established because they 
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 Applying a cognitive perspective, he accentuates that three kinds of issue-linkage can occur. Apart 
from the substantive linkage (as discussed in the main text), the other two are based on states’ tangible 
interests, albeit expected; ‘technical linkage’ aiming at enlarging groups for bargaining power, and 
‘fragmented linkage’ consolidating groups for a specific issue which is not technical (Haas 1980).    
48
 Unfortunately, the learning process here means only learning within the context of regime 
construction, housed by international organisations in which the cumulative recognition of knowledge 
(specifically limited to scientific knowledge) is perceived as necessary for realising gains which are 
rather flexible according to self-designing being occurred and shifted along the process (Haas 1990).    
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acknowledge four commonly accepted principles: a shared set of normative and 
principled beliefs; shared casual beliefs; shared notions of validity (intersubjectively 
validating knowledge); and a common policy enterprise.  
The concept flourished from the impact of internationally cooperative lessons   
by ecologists and scientists helping to lessen pollution in the Mediterranean and its 
surroundings. It was concluded that collaboration among these individuals provided 
functional public good and open information and fora benefiting all participants and 
led to calls for state cooperation49 (Haas 1989). Yet, it would not have materialised 
without suitable international settings: modern administrative states and complex 
decision-making processes. Put simply, the epistemic communities’ knowledge and 
actions will be effective as transmission belts when the authorities see that their 
networks can provide them with useable knowledge that is accurate, accessible, and 
contributes to collective goals50 (Haas 2004). What should not be overlooked here is 
that the agents’ capabilities related substantive knowledge and their intention to 
encourage change are not enough to emancipate the people (in terms of the populated 
environment and the way they perceived the problem). According to this logic, agents 
need to possess persuasive abilities, specifically towards the responsible authority. 
Jerome Karabel (1996) emphasises the significance of usable knowledge for 
the relationship between the authorities and the intellectuals, claiming that technical 
intellectuals (scientists) possessing technical capital are more easily accepted by the 
authorities, particularly those relating to the military and economy. The authorities 
will accept creative intellectuals possessing interpretive resources that emphasise a 
value-oriented end, as long as they comply with state policy.51  
However, unexpected consequences may emerge during the process, 
particularly derived from the attempts of creative intellectuals. A renowned case is the 
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 The impacts affected both the international and domestic domains. As regards the former, 
governments committed to new environmental regimes; for the latter, there was pre-emption of 
decision-making by environmental ministries of participating countries (Haas 1989).     
50
 The administrative state is defined here as an expansive professionalisation and having deference to 
the ‘knowledge elite’ ( rather being technocrats in his meaning). A knowledge-bound community 
(particularly concerning sustainable development and environmental programmes for his case studies) 
within such a state can make its voice heard and act as transmission belts (transmitted its developed 
knowledge to decision-makers) (Haas 2004).  
51
 Ironically, the relationship is a paradoxical one. The more the authority suppresses the defying 
intellectual, the more they gain ‘moral capital’ lessening the states’ legitimacy (Karabel 1996).  
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collaborative network of Soviet/Russian, American, and Western European peace 
researchers and policy-makers helping to bring an end to the Cold War52 (Risse-
Kappen 1994). Adler (1992) argues that the inception of the anti-ballistic missile arms 
control treaty in 1972 was an essential starting point. The scientists and policy-
analysts in America did their best to package diversified concepts of the matter, so 
that they would be readily presentable when launching their ideas and efforts, not to 
mention diffusing them to a wider audience.53   
What should not be overlooked here is that although the concept provides a 
sound understanding of how the perceptions, intentions, and social learning of agents 
generate public policy, both at the domestic and international levels, there is still 
something missing. James K. Sebenius (1992) argues that there is no clear distinction 
between conflictive concepts and cooperative ones of social learning. An overarching 
co-operative concept also neglects the broader contextual analysis of the logic of 
bargaining and negotiation by placing too much emphasis on its dynamic aspects of 
cooperation.  
It is useful to add that the success of this concept lies in the apparently 
accepted scientific knowledge, which is less, if at all, controversial and easier to be 
shared, particularly among peers, than controversial social-and-normative knowledge. 
This last form of knowledge requires more politicised forms of co-operation, which 
the scientific-knowledge concept rarely touches upon, but the social and normative 
concept tries to address. The overarching co-operative concept presupposes the 
intentions and capacities of agents to co-operate positively. This presupposition 
allows agents to cooperate without giving any clear explanation of what is behind 
their four commonly accepted principles: a shared set of normative and principled 
beliefs; shared casual beliefs; shared notion of validity (inter-subjectively validating 
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 These networks mainly comprised members of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and the 
Space Research Institute from Soviet/Russia, numerous members of the liberal arms control 
communities from the US, Western European peace researchers and European policy-makers within 
arms reach of Social Democratic and Labour Parties (Risse-Kappen 1994).  
53
 Most of them were members of the RAND Corporation, the Presidential Science Advisory 
Committee (PSAC) – mostly comprising research agencies from the White House, the Pentagon, and 
the State Department. There were also scholars from either Harvard or Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) – together, they are sometimes called ‘Charles River gang’ and excreta. In order to 
effectively spread their ideas, they joined or set up numerous conferences (i.e. Surprise Attack 
Conference, Pugwash, and those set up by the ‘Doty’, ‘Dartmouth’, and ‘Panofsky’ groups) and 
frequently published their proposals in journals and newspaper (Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, 
and the Washington Post) (Adler 1992).    
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knowledge); and a common policy enterprise. Put simply, what makes these 
principles possible in the first place?   
A primary concern of the ‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’ (ACF) is to 
understand to what extent and how public policy appears as it does. It presents a 
dynamic picture of public policy as a discursive area in which agents (whether 
individuals or groups at sub-, inter-, and state-levels) come to negotiate and co-
operate on matters based on their common beliefs. The advocacy coalition framework 
proposes that the period of study has to be at least a decade or more. Otherwise, it will 
not allow researchers to observe the movements likely to be established. The policy-
subsystem (as interaction of agents from different institutions seeking to exert 
influence over policy) is a prime area, for it is here that the dynamic interplay between 
the policy-oriented learning process and a belief system (a blending ground of self-
interests and organisational interests) can be observed (Sabatier 1993: 16, 23-24, 
Jenkin-Smith and Sabatier 1993b: 5).  
Paul A. Sabatier observes that a belief system is organised around a set of core 
values and policy strategies alongside implementing activities. This means that it 
assumes some psychological predilection for instrumental rationality and cognitive 
consistency on the part of policy elite. It is also grounded in a capacity for reasoned 
discourse involving major issues relevant to the elite’s favoured policy subsystems 
(Sabatier 1993: 33). Yet, it is not static: it can be shifted and/or changed along the 
policy-oriented learning process through which one identifies, refines and improves 
one’s understanding of how to pursue her/his interests54 (Jenkin-Smith and Sabatier 
1993a: 40-44).   
Richard P. Barke (1993) supports the notion that the advocacy coalition 
framework is useful for understanding to what extent the advisory groups have 
gradually worked well, particularly when success is defined in terms of congruence 
with political force, stability over time, and lack of legal challenge. The 
characteristics of advisory groups also matter. The material groups, emphasising the 
more concrete interests, are more attentive to their groups’ bottom-line position than 
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 For precise information, they indicate that a policy-oriented learning process provides channel for 
three missions. The first is to improve one’s understanding of the status of goals and other variables 
identified as important by one’s belief system. The second is to help refine one’s understanding of local 
and causal relationships internal to a belief system. The last is to identify and respond to challenges to 
one’s belief system (Jenkin-Smith and Sabatier 1993a: 42-45).  
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the purposive groups, highlighting the more commonly accepted values (Jenkin-Smith 
and St. Clair 1993). In other words, the latter show relatively greater constraint over a 
wider range of issues, since commonly accepted values are so broad that they cannot 
easily signify concrete interests, let alone co-operative programmes.   
When applied to numerous case studies55, the ACF displays both its strengths 
and weaknesses as shown in the following discussion. Yet, it also effectively helps us 
to observe how dynamic exogenous events have impacted on policy change. The 
efforts of an advocacy coalition and the impact of exogenous factors should be 
regarded as highly intertwined (Mawhinney 1993). Otherwise, at best, a coalition can 
produce only what Anthony E. Brown and Joseph Stewart Jr. call a ‘dialogue of the 
deaf’, meaning without an explicit impact on policy alteration (Brown and Stewart, Jr. 
1993). The ACF is limited by its lack of attention to the role of sectarian extremists 
within advocacy coalitions. John F. Munro (1993) proposes that it should give a more 
prominent role to differences between sectarians and pragmatists in many coalitions, 
as well as focus more on the differences between political crisis and stalemate as a 
primary cause of policy learning and change. 
 In their revision, Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkin-Smith (1993) accept that 
fundamental normative precepts are essential, due to their function of identifying and 
prioritising the basic values of social groups. In addition, they point out that more 
empirical components are needed, particularly those that help to balance a proper 
distribution of authority between government and market, and among different levels 
of governance. In sum, their revision emphasises the significance of historical data. 
Sabatier and Anne M. Brasher (1993) sum up this point concisely, stating that the 
more precisely one views a situation in broad contextual terms; the more likely one is 
to see variations in the general pattern of events. Significantly, the role of theory is to 
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 Hanne B. Mawhinney (1993) applied the framework to Canadian educational policy in the late 
nineteenth century when Ontario tried to preserve and enlarge its favoured French-speaking system 
(Mawhinney 1993). Anthony E. Brown and Joseph Stewart Jr. (1993) tried the framework during their 
long period of study of the US Airline Deregulation. Their work provides the scenario of competing 
advocacy coalitions and policy evolution from the late 1950s up to the late 1970s (Brown and Stewart, 
Jr. 1993). John F. Munro (1993) studied the changing policy of California water politics dating back to 
the mid-1960s whilst Barke (1993) applied the framework to the significant role of industrial advisory 
groups in managing technological change in Federal Communication Policy. Hank C. Jenkins-Smith 
and Gilbert K. St. Clair (1993) tested the framework during their empirical study of the politics of the 
US’s offshore energy (Jenkin-Smith St. Clair 1993). Sabatier and Anne M. Brasher (1993) applied the 
approach to the long period between 1964 and 1985 in order to get a clearer picture of how the 
environmental policy at Lake Tahoe changed from a favoured commercialised policy to a more 
environmental-aware policy. 
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separate the critical variations from the merely curious. That is why theory plays a 
significant role in demarcating the critical variations from the merely curious.  
The time frame of this study covers the period from early 1960s to 1990s 
because it was the period in which political movements from states’ cooperation and 
economic movements led to political and security movements in the later periods. By 
covering this period, it is possible to scrutinise more the policy-oriented learning 
process specifically relating to the establishment of ARF and attempts to realise an 
‘ASEAN Community’ and an ‘East Asia Community’. Unfortunately, no matter how 
interesting advocacy coalition framework is, it does not explicitly investigate the 
learning process itself in depth, nor does it uncover the bases for policy bargaining or 
negotiations. Although the ACF well explains how such values and belief systems can 
be commonly accepted in the first place, particularly by those who have different 
cultural backgrounds, something is still missing. The reason is that it is not clear 
whether the framework can produce overtly promising results when applied at an 
international level; the level of study here.  
 There appear to be two principal ways to remedy the difficulty. On the one 
hand, the basis of what is the capacity of individuals to calculate their interests and 
strategic movements, in order to pursue their goals. An individual’s logic of 
consequences is the crux of rationalism. Agents choose or choose not to do something 
based on their expectation of what they will benefit from by making a particular 
decision and/or taking particular action. A good case in point is Robert D. Putnam 
(1988)’s notion of ‘synergic linkage’. For him, the chief negotiator has to be a good 
strategist knowing both how to bargain to create a tentative agreement, and how to 
separate discussion within each group, or coalition. He or she does this in order to 
generate acceptance and/or ratification. What is relevant here is that power, in terms 
of distribution and setting preferences, is at the heart of the game.  
At the international level, negotiators also have to know how to balance their 
‘double-edge diplomacy’ without hurting themselves. That means they have to make 
synergistic-issue linkages at three different levels: their own preferences; the 
specifications of their domestic politics; and the international negotiating environment 
of the time56 (Evans 1993, Moravcsik 1993). Yet, it is difficult to deny that this 
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 For more precise information, the first level is the statesmen’s preferences (or acceptability-set), 
ranging from preserving or increasing domestic status, responding to international imperative to 
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approach cannot deal well with problems related to the formation of preferences and 
the constitution of subjectivity, particularly with such controversial concepts as 
justice, appropriateness and autonomy (Fearson and Wendt 2003). Although the scope 
of this study is less relevant in these aspects of power-play games, the awareness of 
preference formation in terms of concepts and proposals is a principal concern.  
On the other hand, constructivism can provide another remedy by implanting a 
deeper understanding of agents’ decision making into the interactive activities of 
agents. Unfortunately, constructivist interactive way of thinking is not as clearly 
presented as that of Habermas. Jeffrey T. Checkel (1998) argues that ‘only bringing 
agency back in’ is not enough; more attention should be paid to systematically 
exploring how norms connect with agency. To remedy this, he suggests, researchers 
should carefully scrutinise how different characteristics of domestic politics impact 
upon compliance with international norms and how they come to be diffused 
domestically57 (Checkel 1997, 1991, 2004).   
Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr (1997) also emphasise this linkage, although 
they base their argument on the significance of the decision-making elite; that is, 
exercising the power of choice. Decision-making elite are the centre of interaction 
within and between multi-level systems ranging from individual circles to global 
ones. For Friedman and Starr, the transformation of decision-making will occur when 
the political elite need change, not when they are compelled by external factors, as 
suggested by advocacy coalition framework. Yet, it is not practical enough to help us 
understand why these agents create or reject common international agenda (Dessler 
1999). 
What has been discussed thus far has not yet strayed beyond the importance of 
what is in the ‘hearts and heads’ of agents, in terms of their ideas and intentions, and 
their approaches and strategies. The significance of the discussion is that it sheds light 
                                                                                                                                                               
pursuing personal ideational. The second is about specifications of domestic politics (meaning the 
nature of the ‘win-sets’) and statesmen’s characteristics and their relationships with their constituencies 
(whether they are ‘dove’- be constrained, or ‘hawks’- be autonomous). Yet, it should not be forgotten 
that domestic politics could be reshaped both by uncertainty and misinformation of the involved agents 
and by international events. The last is the international negotiating environment (the determinant of 
interstate bargaining outcomes) such as coercive bargaining as appearing in many cases concerning 
North-South relations (Evans 1993, Moravcsik 1993). 
57
 Checkel points out that in a more democratic (or open) society, agents’ communicatively persuading 
skills and their socialisation will be able to create societal pressure forcing elite to accept norms. On the 
contrary, elite have to be effectively changing agents (elite learning dynamic) to diffuse their accepted 
norms in a statist and/or authoritarian regime (Checkel 1997, 1999, 2004).   
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on an interesting debate surrounding how to understand an agent’s logic, based on 
more interactive terms with their surroundings (Snidal 2003). It should be added that 
this interactive process also helps individuals to perceive who they are (Habermas 
1995: chapter 7). In other words, rules and norms and shared principles are important. 
They provide the basic sense for agents to understand how they can, and/or should, 
proceed in given social circumstances (Dessler 1989).  
Drawing on Wittegenstein’s theory of language, Ronen Palan (2000) proposes 
that the power of language represents the power of society: the real source of life is 
society expressing itself in words or sentences.58 Following this logic, Nicholas Onuf 
(2002) suggests that there are two kinds of rules on functional grounds: regulative 
rules, which are a medium of social control; and constitutive rules, which are a 
medium of social construction providing the operating ground for the former.59 The 
latter are comparable to Habermas’s validity claims for universal pragmatics. Suffice 
to say that ‘rules’ are products of intentional agents, who not only ameliorate natural 
constraints but also make their lives better by acquiring ‘common purpose(s)’.60 Onuf 
fails to present a clear picture of the extent to which a specific form of social 
inequality forces itself as the rule at a specific historical juncture.  
Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton (2001), following the Gramscian concept of 
‘organic intellectual’, point out that Onuf’s notion implies that the professional helps 
to define, (re)produce and/or transform the boundaries of rules or social forces. In 
other words, studying these effective agents and their activities can be a short-cut to a 
better understanding of the social world and how to change it. This project proposes 
that studying engaging/networking agents activities is a short-cut to understanding the 
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 It helps to identify that the power of language represents the power of society or the real source of 
life is society expressing itself via words or sentences (Palan 2000).  
59
 Dessler following Searle comes to a similar definition when he describes public claims backed by 
sanctions as the regulative rules and convention being a stock of meaningful actions or signs for 
unchanging practices as the constitutive rules (Dessler 1989).    
60
 Nicholas Onuf explains that these rules are closely intertwined with the concept of ‘speech act’. It is 
defined as speaking in a form that gets anyone who is listening to respond to what a speaker is saying. 
It reflexes the effective power of rules in three forms. The assertive or principles provide useful 
information for agents’ decision making. The directive or imperative can be seen in a chain of 
command as organisations. The commissive or commitment rules are about rights and duties. An agent 
who successfully indoctrinates the contents of these rules, the directive in particular, is hegemonic. Yet, 
at the international level, Onuf proposes the word ‘heteronomy’ to describe the form of rule in which 
agents intend that they be ruled by what seems to be the unintended consequences of exercising their 
rights (Onuf 1998: 77).  
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social world of how the concepts of regional security have been perceived and 
transformed since the 1960s to become more comprehensive in terms of aspects 
(and/or dimensions) and to be more inclusive in terms of effectively engaging agents, 
specifically those proposed to be studied here. 
Adler (1997) proposes employing the tracing back of an agent’s ‘cognitive 
evolution’ as a means of revealing what is hidden in the perspectives of an agent. This 
process can lead to a comprehension of how agents successfully introduce innovations 
to help, transform, even constitute, a collective understanding of how they institute 
internationalise ‘taken-for-granted’ facts whilst competing ideas and practices are de-
legitimised. Martha Finnemore (1996) examines the more interactive aspect of an 
agent’s cultural environment, whilst at the same time not overlooking the fact that 
Western culture dominates sociological institutionalisation at all levels.61 For her, 
‘force and faith’ cannot be separated, particularly where concepts of rationality, 
purposive action, individualism, and even bureaucratic systems and capitalism are 
concerned. It is important to stress that ‘force’ does not necessarily mean simply 
explicit force, but also includes implicit force. 
Finnemore and Katheryn Sikkink (1998) argue further that an agent’s cultural 
norms are rich sources of their ‘logic of appropriateness’. This helps researchers to 
understand how norm entrepreneurs can fulfil the ideational commitments they call a 
‘Norm Life cycle’. The cycle starts from the stage of emergence, then cascades. The 
last stage is the internationalisation of norms. However, it may be suggested that it is 
not enough to illustrate how the existing cycle can be broken, leading to the creation 
of a new cycle. It over simplifies and focuses only on positive aspects of engaging 
activities, in a similar fashion to epistemic communities. Due to oversimplification, it 
overlooks the possible movement of negative aspects without giving a clear 
explanation. Ole Jacob Sending (2002), who questions whether the communitarian 
base is a proper action-theoretical foundation for social matters, contends that the 
logic of arguing is more appropriate. He states that the logic of arguing is an inclusive 
concept of casual power of norms with normative authority and reasoning process 
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 Latha Varadarajan (2004)’s work on Indian identity and security seems to reaffirm Finnamore’s 
idea. It used Indian nuclear test of 1998 as a case study. In this case, Indian (elite) perceptions about 
their post-colonial identity, to some extent depressed by their weakness in capitalist terms, and their 
quest for an equal status and regaining their ‘shakti’ (strength) do play significant parts. In other words, 
constructivists cannot absolutely cut off economic material conditions as long as capitalism can be 
viewed as ideational inspiration.   
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explaining the argumentation and reflexive action of agents. Sending's approach 
differs from that of Habermas when he points out that agents are strategic social 
constructivists, who know how to calculate, persuade, bargain, and win games. 
 The three main approaches to how one should study and comprehend 
intellectual networking reviewed thus far are useful for providing a helpful framework 
for comprehending engaging activities, specifically how socialising or learning 
processes based on shared norms, or principles, or belief system can lead to co-
operation at both domestic and international levels. They all accept that it is essential 
to study the subject’s historical context to understand interactively socialising 
processes. Only the constructivist approach addresses to what extent agents should 
receive more attention as units of analysis, however, by not totally ignoring the 
structural side. The other two approaches fail to delineate their basis clearly. In other 
words, they overlook the process-makers and go straight to the process-making. For a 
project like this one, that overlooking generates the question of to what extent the 
engaging/networking agents bothered themselves, essentially in an initial period of 
cooperation at the height of the Cold War, to try to change their environment. 
Understanding only this process-making cannot help to find an appropriate answer 
regarding who these agents are. 
 In fact, even constructivism does not offer sufficient insight into how such 
processes can occur in different places and times, given that they are not totally alike. 
The processes per se are not totally different, provided that they are regarded as 
virtual places in which different agents can engage and make networks to achieve 
their shared norms, principles, or belief systems. But, it is worth reiterating, there are 
further difficulties to overcome.  
The previously mentioned framework placed too much emphasis on the 
means-end paradigm, or purposive rational action as Habermas calls it, based on the 
mono-logical philosophy of the subject (Habermas 1972, Outhwaite 2003: 39). They 
fail to provide a means of comprehending how the aforesaid agents form perceptions 
and intentions that are not influenced by their social frames alone. A more co-
operative view is likely to emerge if participants regard each other as partners instead 
of opponents (Eriksen and Weigard 2003: 23), as intellectuals studied in this project 
have done. It is worth scrutinising in greater detail their internal logic, which acts like 
an a priori understanding that helps their engaging processes and dialogues 
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materialise and flourish within such a discursive sphere as a socialising process. The 
following section proposes that Habermas’s TAC can fill this gap.  
 
Logic of arguing and ‘Theory of Communicative Action-TCA’: 
A complementary way of understanding intellectual networking 
Within a virtually discursive space like socialising processes, particularly at the 
regional and international levels in which the social backgrounds of agents tend to 
differ, what can be observed thus far from previous illustrations is that agents do not 
overtly choose either a logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness. Risse 
(2000), drawing on Habermas’s TCA, argues that they compromise both logics within 
the logic of arguing. His study of the international spread and acceptance of human 
rights provides a more elaborate understanding of the concept. The topic generates 
arguments and mobilises international public opinion, by which he means only those 
intentionally well-informed and closely connected with those who share similar 
concerns. It does this through the interactive sphere in which the ‘spiral model’62 of 
socialisation can be significantly developed. Socialisation in terms of human rights 
has become more important with the passing of time, even in many developing states 
whose records regarding this matter are not exactly exemplary (Risse 1992).  
Harold Muller (2004), who affirms this point, contends that the logic of 
appropriateness itself is culturally bound and needs to refer back to the intersubjective 
understanding embedded within the interactive sphere of communicative action.63 
The significance of the interactive is that its discursive character provides ample 
opportunities for constructing and/or consolidating ‘will formation’ through a 
‘struggle for recognition’ as equal partners or participants (Haacke 2005).  
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 The model signifies the concept of ‘self-entrapment’ of those states not possessing good records 
(e.g., Kenya, Indonesia and Morocco) once the five-step model started. First, repression stemming from 
international concern tries to persuade these states to step into the argumentative sphere. Second, most 
states persistently deny the argument. Third, their previous actions lead them to make tactical 
concessions through their own domestic pressures on matters. Fourth, they are coerced into complying 
with their ‘prescriptive status’ which leads them to the last step. Finally, they express rule-consistent 
behaviours on the matter (Risse 1999: 538).  
63
 A good example to magnify this point is the relationship between Beijing and Washington. Only 
through this lens can it be effectively deciphered. Marc Lynch (2002) argues that conflicts occur 
because their interpretation of engaging relations are not the same; while Beijing looked for reaching 
an understanding, Washington seemed to aim at strategic and short-sighted movements. 
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To date, the logic of arguing has not yet been popularised, although many 
scholars agree that it could provide a good foundation for establishing an international 
civil society, based on cosmopolitanism. It provides both sphere and opportunity for 
mediating differences and difficulties that are contingent when looked at through 
functionalist/rationalist perspectives (Lloyd Jones 2001, Diez and Steans 2005, Weber 
2005). It is difficult to deny that an awareness of the complexity of the changing 
world,64 comprising more than just states and the market, but also including the 
activities of intellectuals from various organisations at various levels, makes the logic 
more appealing. The reason for being so attractive is that the logic of arguing 
carefully paves the way for scrutinising an interactively covert world, presenting 
existing positions and power relations. In other words, the mission of the logic of 
arguing is to unmask and/or eliminate if possible, the existing domination of interests 
and ideas by the powerful and/or the elite in terms of both structural and intellectual 
constraints. The end of the Cold War provided one such opportunity. This was 
particularly evident within IR, some of whose theorists questioned what had gone 
wrong with their understanding, let alone predictions, through the so-called ‘fourth 
debate’ (Diez and Steans 2005: 128-130).   
Richard K. Ashley (1981) tries to persuade us that John H. Herz’s views of 
world politics could be regarded as an earlier attempt - even before the end of the 
Cold War - to empower humans as active agents capable of making their own futures. 
There appear to be traces of Habermas’s knowledge-constitutive interest in Herz’s 
thesis. Yet Herz (1981) rejected Ashley’s attempt to classify his idea, arguing that he 
did not preach altruistic moral principles but was in favour of substituting 
enlightened, long-range universal interests for unselfish moral principles. No-one 
knows for sure what his ideas on the matter would have been had he pursued them 
further; most likely, it may be suggested, they would have differed little from 
Habermas’s universal pragmatics (this will be discussed in more detail later in the last 
section).  
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 Robert W. Cox (2001) suggests that the ‘real world’ in the twenty-first century consists of four 
aspects: the changing structure of the world due to globalisation; states and state systems both serving 
and against the previous aspect; the emerging and increasing veto power of the global environment 
(inspiring questions on the existing economic systems); and the increasing (re)emergence and 
importance of intersubjectivity, to a great extent based on religious-civilisation. 
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An emphasis on an interactive sphere does not only lift the veil obscuring 
capable and active agents but also sheds light on the characteristics of their interactive 
activities. On the one hand, it helps signify that the democratic organisation of politics 
based on a dynamic discursive sphere will help reconstruct world politics (Brown 
2001). On the other hand, looking into the discursively interactive sphere reveals that 
bridging a universal philosophy and normative concerns will broaden the scope 
covering active agents who have access to speech communities possessing potential to 
become universal (Linklater 2001). It is this bridging area that the logic of arguing 
actualised and flourished. Yet, there has been no widely accepted blending formula to 
decipher the sphere, namely to find ways to empower the weak and to enlist the help 
and co-operation of the strong, including states. The careful balancing of utopian 
ideas (projecting a desirable future) and attempts to empirically solve the problems of 
steering media (administrative power and money) in systems transformation should be 
more seriously considered (Wendt 2001), particularly beyond national boundaries. 
Otherwise, the logic of arguing based on TCA is nothing but a theoretical paradise 
empirically 'lost' (Deitelhoff and Muller 2005).  
There is, however, a proposal to mitigate the uneasy blended formula; that is, 
that individual instrumental rationality can be more helpful when considered as 
complementary to universal communicative rationality (Baynes 2001, Rengger 2001). 
Nevertheless, the way in which logic engages both individual rationality and 
culturally normative bonds tell us that the capacity of the logic of arguing, mixed with 
historical, social, economic and political forces, makes it more appealing and gives it 
more potential (Hutchings 2001, Deitelhoff and Muller 2005).   
In essence, what we have learnt from the many attempts to find a way to 
comprehend what happens within a discursively interactive sphere is that it is based 
on compromise. The engaging/networking agents for this project have performed their 
functions according to this basis. Otherwise they could not achieve wide-ranging 
cooperation initially regarding economic issues since the 1960s, a period in which 
levels of economic development and different systems of political inclination did 
matter much (as shown in Chapter 3). The socialising experiences based on a 
compromising basis are essential for their cooperation to extend to political (and even 
military) aspects in later periods as illustrated in Chapter 4.  At the very least, it needs 
to be logically open and dynamic enough to encompass not only the concerns of 
individuals, but those of groups and/or societies. This logic should also signify a 
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potential for universality. The encompassing quality of the logic would guide it 
through the tangled web of cultural differences within the discursive ground of 
engaging activities.  
Habermas’s concept of communicative action is vital here as a bridge linking 
individuality and intersubjective plurality. His argument, based on the interactive 
sphere between the two ends of individual and intersubjective concerns can be 
regarded as a reconstitutive approach drawn from the development of linguistic and 
cognitive psychology. It helps agents to master their communication and interact with 
a meaningful symbolic configuration which has emerged and circulated within this 
interactive sphere (McCarthy 1982: 60). Agents’ capacity to master meaningful 
communication is the key for the logic of arguing to be successful. Within this 
process, there emerges the concept of a ‘generalised other’, which signifies a change 
from a general principle for human action to abstract morality led by principles 
(Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 55-57). In Diana Coole (1997)’s interpretation, this is 
Habermas’ meaning of modernity. Modernity should be regarded as the process of 
struggle, not between reason and non-reason, but between communicative and 
instrumental reason, lifeworld and system, emancipation and reification. It is a 
struggle between different forms of reason and modes of rationalisation. In this sense, 
a universal community is essential for moral self-determination and ethical self-
realisation. The normalisation within this logic theoretically leads to a growing 
‘toleration’ of other forms of life (Hogengarten 1995).  
This bridge should be able to act as a potential means for comprehending an 
intellectual’s critical and moral concerns.65 It is useful to emphasise here that the 
intellectuals’ critical and moral concerns means their interest in human emancipation 
– read here as liberating human beings realising their own ability to know and to 
become enlightened, and caring for the less fortunate by destroying their 
delusions/illusions of self-impotence through distorted communication. Studying the 
intellectuals’ critical and moral concerns should also provide an understanding of an 
intellectual’s social functions and responsibilities. Richard Wyn Jones suggests a 
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 For Thomas Risse (1999) and Richard Wyn Jones (2001), the constructivist inadequacy of critical 
and moral concerns, security studies in particular for Jones and the international institutionalization of 
human rights norms for Risse, is an essential question vis-à-vis to what extent Habermasian critical 
theory should be engaged as an illumination, though adjustment might be needed in order to make it 
less utopian.  
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pioneering proposal that intellectuals might be effective agents who not only bring 
light into societies but also make and provide routes for emancipation (Wyn Jones 
1999: chapter 6). For this project, the emancipation refers to engaging/networking 
agents’ attempts to liberate a concept of security at a regional level. They do that by 
realising their own capabilities to destroy delusions/illusions that they are subservient 
to given regional securities. On the contrary, they are capable enough to encourage 
the broadening concept of regional security to be more comprehensive in scope (as 
expressed in Chapters 3 and 4) and to be more focus on used-to-be-taboo topics when 
the regional environment facilitated as shown in Chapter 4.  
The following sections illustrate how Habermas’s TCA can shed light on the 
entangled discursive area of interaction in which potential networking has been 
cocooned and hatched. This section, therefore, will proceed by trying to link together 
all concepts mentioned thus far with the anticipation that this more compound 
‘critically logical constellation’ might facilitate a comprehension of the activities of 
security intellectuals in East Asia, particularly when ‘reaching mutual understanding’ 
in the region is not only a means for generating, sustaining, and expanding networks, 
but also a goal in itself.  
The chapter will proceed with a brief chronological overview of Habermas’s 
project to unite human knowledge and interests aimed at empowering and 
emancipating humans themselves. It is necessary to accentuate the place and 
significance of theory of communicative action, emphasising how agents coordinate 
their actions rather than their motives because this emphasis can lead to potential 
concrete results (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 45). The significance of the agents’ 
coordination has already been alluded to in the earlier definitions of ideas and of 
being intellectuals.  
 
Critical Theory and Habermas’s Communicative Action 
Habermas has been regarded to some extent as an heir of the renowned Frankfurt 
Institute of Social Research (hereafter referred to as the Frankfurt School). Tracing 
the School’s origins may provide some clues to its complicated theories, which have 
covered not only apparent social and political problems, but also less apparent areas, 
such as cultural industries including constructing and mastering knowledge. The 
Frankfurt School’s first generation placed more emphasis on constructing and 
mastering knowledge (Jay 1973, Held 1980/2004). This emphasis could be regarded 
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as a strong foundation for Habermas’s concepts of universal rationality and 
communication.  
‘Critical Reflection’ seems to be an appropriate phrase to summarise the 
constellation of theories that appeared in the turbulent period between the two wars 
(World Wars I and II), and which mainly comprised concepts from political economy, 
cultural criticism and psychoanalysis (Thompson and Held 1982: 3-4). It is, of course, 
derived from the reflexive ideas of agents, as they tried to understand complex 
situations and to leave critical messages for the next generations to decipher. It 
includes, in Habermasian terms, the deliberation of agents in encouraging and 
proposing an ideal logical programme for the creation of emancipatory societies, free 
from the distorted communication mentioned earlier (Jay 1973, Geuss 1981: 
Introduction, Wyn Jones 1989L Part I).    
What should not be overlooked is that rather than downplaying structure, 
critical theory seeks to examine the interplay between structure and social practice 
through particular social phenomena (Held 1980/2004: 362). Because of this, critical 
theory not only seems compatible with constructivism at an ontological level, but also 
provides a clearer picture for normative concerns. All in all, it can be regarded as a 
theoretical weapon designed to unmask the elite’s way of establishing massive 
cultural apparatuses (Roderick 1986: chapter 5).  Of course, producing and providing 
knowledge about security is part of this.  It is also an encouraging means of helping 
agents realise that their form of consciousness may be ideologically false, and that the 
coercion from which they suffer is actually self-imposed by distorted communication 
(Geuss 1981: 61).  
Although the Frankfurt School’s scholars are questioned about regarding 
themselves as Marxist descendents, as a result of paying less attention to direct 
economic determinants and the revolutionary role of the proletariat, they are keen to 
employ the dialectical process of Marxist thought. Additionally, they all reflect the 
transcendental character of critical knowledge, to a great extent basing their concepts 
on an historical understanding (Jay 1973: 43). For them, universality and particularity 
can in no way be separated. Only by regarding them as complementary to each other 
can critical knowledge find its true meaning. This complementary nature is a delicate 
blend of a transcendental Kant and an historical Marx through a dialectical Hegel, in 
the process of the dialogical reflection of an agent on self-formation and self-
assessment (Habermas 1972: 231, Roderick 1986: chapter 1). What is interesting is 
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that although the self-formation process derives from interest-constitutive knowledge, 
signalling strategic rationality based on a symbolically structural phenomenon, it can 
be regarded as a dynamic-elusive middle-ground for nourishing and expanding 
knowledge-constitutive interests, provided that collectively institutional aims can 
overcome social constraints (McCarthy 1978: chapters 2.1 and 3.2). Put otherwise, 
dialogical knowledge-constitutive interests derived from interactive processes of self-
formation are more significant than mono-logical interest-constitutive knowledge. 
The significance of the knowledge-constitutive interests is not only as the key to 
decipher the path for human emancipation but also as the expressed form of human 
intention to do good things.   
The formulae that explain how to blend knowledge and interests in order to 
serve human emancipation vary. The first generation of the Frankfurt School favoured 
the philosophy of human despair, which appeared in the negative dialectic; Adorno, 
for example, prefers to keep an autonomous distance from a pressurised 
intersubjectivity (Coles 1995: 39). Habermas, who plays that side down along with 
the romantic element of Marxism, tries to add a more collectively systemic element, 
in a way presented as less humanised and too mechanical, with the expectancy of 
illustrating what a critical and rational enlightenment might do for humankind.66 
George Myerson argues differently, stating that Habermas’s project is more humane 
than its distinctive form suggests; the substance is often personal and addresses us 
individually in what must be a dialogue of imagination generated by participation in 
an argument that leads towards agreement. The point is that not only do we resolve 
the specific dispute; we also affirm a sense of sharing a world. Myerson emphasises 
that, according to the process, we share two worlds: a world out there and a world 
inside. The key result of this exchange is ‘unity’ (Myerson 1994: chapter 3).  
Habermas’s attempt can be regarded as closely following in Marx’s footsteps 
in terms of knowing in order to change. Communication based on psychoanalysis 
aimed at re-symbolising the de-symbolised motive plays a significant part, casting 
unconsciousness back into the realm of normal interaction with oneself and the others 
(McCarthy 1978: chapter 3.4). In other words, the task of critical theory is to identify 
the formal conditions that make emancipation possible by presenting truth as an 
                                                        
66
 On this point Agnes Heller (1982) argues that Habermasian man has no body, no feeling.  Rudiger 
Bubner (1982) complains that his praxis loses its original individual factor. 
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emancipated form of life, as expressed in communication (McCarthy 1997: xviii). Put 
simply, it should block liberal individualists from finding good excuses for being in 
exile in their own societies, not only the capitalists in the developed world but also 
those elsewhere affected by those dominant capitalists (Love 1995). In order to 
achieve their task, social scientists need to understand the ideologically distorted 
subjective situation of some individuals or groups, and explore the forces causing the 
situation. They need to be aware of ideologically distorting forces and take part in 
overcoming them on behalf of oppressed individuals or groups (Dryzek 1995: 99).    
Habermas refers to private individuals acting as bourgeois and ‘homme’ as the  
'educated public', namely, those sufficiently educated to share their fortunes at times 
by actively engaging in matters not only related to them but also to others.67 He 
regards the public as the good and potential blending area for an emancipatory 
mission (Habermas 2005: Part I and II). Though possessing little sense of liberal 
fashion, Habermas’s communicative action signifies no clear preference for pre-
defined issues; they are internal to the process of discursive will-formation. The 
radical proceduralism of Habermas’s TCA may not only be regarded as a powerful 
criterion for demystifying discourses of power, but also as a crucial category for the 
critical examination of a given situation (Benhabib 1992: 95, Hohendahl 1992: 102). 
This means that norm-forming processes and public debate shaping identity and 
generating solidarity take place within the public sphere (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 
55-57). Expressed differently, the enlightenment of political will, and the self-
conscious of its potential, not only proceeds from the public sphere but also through 
it, by effectively empowering the communication of citizens (McCarthy 1978: 15).  
The increasing commoditisation of - and intervention by state power into - 
private (economic-based) and intimate (family-based) spheres have blurred the lines 
                                                        
67
 Many critics regard Habermas’s concept as too rigid to cover diversified groups, who are members 
of stratified societies. They point out that his historical reading follows the Orthodox Marxist too 
closely on an economic dominant aspect. Multiplicity of publics in which those groups can engage is 
more preferable and can help lessen the image of ‘the bourgeois masculinist ideology label’ of the 
concept (Fraser 1992: 116, 137).  For the French case, it is difficult to deny that the chaos of the terror 
after the 1789 Revolution also helped shape the French public sphere, not only the rather organised and 
calm salons (Baker 1992: 189-211). David Zaret (1992) suggests that the English Reformation, the 
favouring of science as a revelation and with printing helping to spread the discoveries were rather 
neglected by Habermas as a strong foundation for rational society in England. Michael Schudson 
(1992) questions whether Habermas’s concept can be applied to the origin of the American public 
sphere, not to mention for the same period as he did to England and continental Europe. The longing 
for the nineteenth-century political style is an illusion of a bygone day formulated only on the funeral 
pyre of participatory, communal and ritualistic politics composed by the hands of the elite. 
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and the significance of the public as an arena of political discussion (Habermas 2005: 
5-6). It is an area constituted through ‘communication networks,’ or structures of 
linguistically produced intersubjectivity. These networks of cultural industries, such 
as the press and electronic media, were first circulated around nuclear families 
(Schmid 1982: 63, Baxter 1987: 66). This ‘colonisation of the life-world’, as 
Habermas refers to it in his later work, not only determines the public sphere, but also 
renders it inadequate as a direct model for today’s democracy, especially in the sense 
of social integration (Habermas 1987: chapter 6, Calhoun 1992: 6, Postone 1992: 
165). In other words, the life-world cannot express its true potential as a resourceful 
connecting space between structural components and the social sphere (Eriksen and 
Weigard 2004: 46-47). 
Though there are critiques urging Habermas to magnify his scope, it is 
difficult to deny the emancipatory potential of his concepts, particularly when he 
moved on to more transcendental steps. These steps enquire about universally valid 
claims in all speech as an important ingredient for the democratic will formation of 
the communicative community. They offer a way to decipher unsolved riddles in the 
public sphere (Calhoun 1992: 30-31). Henning Ottmann (1982) maintains that they 
can be evident on three levels: in freedom anticipated through an ‘ideal situation’; as 
‘enlighteningly’ organising liberation from ideologies and the distortion of 
communication; and as ‘strategic action’, taking refuge in political strife.  Put 
otherwise, agents enlightening about their distorted communication and aim at 
achieving an ideal situation of communication can participate effectively and 
deliberately in the public sphere by not being lost by the short-sightedness of strategic 
action.  
A human being’s capacity for freedom depends not only on theoretical but 
also on practical activities. The ideal speech situation plays a role not only as a 
connecting sphere but also as a meta-norm, serving to delineate those aspects of the 
argumentation process that would lead to a rationally motivated consensus. According 
to Seyla Benhabib (1986: 282-297), the ideal speech situation, comprising three main 
characteristics that are rationality, justice and freedom, describes a set of rules that 
participants in a given discourse have to follow (the symmetry condition), and a set of 
relations (the reciprocity condition) that would have to be obtained between them. 
Without the ideal speech situation, communicative action is prima facie neither 
genuine nor rational.  
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Nevertheless, the practical sense of Habermas’ aforementioned concepts 
should not be forgotten, particularly when applied to reality. Habermas’s praxis is 
composed of two key parts: work, or instrumental action, purposive-rational action; 
and communicative interaction. David Held points out that sometimes there is an in-
between type: strategic action, aimed at social integration, which is both instrumental 
and bound to a context of interaction (McCarthy 1978: chapter 1-2, Held 1982: 257). 
His intention to recover a potential for reason, encapsulated in the forms of social 
production, may seem like that of Marx, in terms of combining empirical philosophy 
of history with practical intent through methodological rigour (McCarthy 1978: ix). 
He emphasises interaction between an agent’s ideas and her surroundings. Yet, he 
cannot avoid critiques as to whether it is appropriate to reduce interaction to action, 
then to communicative action based on norms. What is more, finding a common 
ground for norms may be no different to compromises among warring gods and 
demons (Giddens 1982, Lukes 1982, Meadwell 1994: 720). 
Despite the previous critiques, it is difficult to deny that social action depends 
on an agent’s definition of the situation, and not solely as a matter of subjectivity. The 
meanings to which social action is oriented are primarily intersubjective and 
constitutive of the socio-cultural matrix in which individuals find themselves and act 
(McCarthy 1979: xi). The intention and potential of Habermas’s attempts to decipher 
and chart this complex and dynamic area, particularly through the theory of 
communicative action, have been important for those who want to understand 
activities happening in the discursive area in which no leadership is clearly prioritised. 
It is within this social area that the current study follows Habermas, to determine the 
perceptions and intentions of key agents through their interaction.  
Social evolution takes place through interaction, by having language as a 
threefold mechanism. First, language arrives at a mutual understanding of an issue. 
Second, it coordinates action, in order to establish a relation of solidarity. Finally, it 
acts as a medium through which socialisation takes place (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 
87-90). Similarly, social evolution emerges in three developmental stages. The first is 
the ontogenesis of individuals, or the forming of being individuals. This stage is based 
on the cognitive, moral and interaction spheres: the cognitive sphere holds the 
capacity for formal thought; the moral reflects moral judgement; and the sphere of 
interaction corresponds to the interactive competence of agents (Schmid 1982: 164). 
Laced together, these elements construct social spheres of learning: those of 
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productive force; those of identity-securing interpretive systems; and those of 
institutional steering capacities (Arato 1982). 
What should not be overlooked here is the internal logic of interaction. The 
possibility of creating and maintaining successful mutual interaction between two or 
more individuals depends on a ‘bridgehead’ of shared expectations, linguistic skills, 
and the possibility of understanding. Thus, communicative structures lie at the heart 
of successful social action, or humankind’s practical interests, as Habermas regards it 
(Held 1980/2004: 310). It is this communicative structure based on the internal logic 
of interaction in which this researcher is interested. It not only shed light on 
theoretically comprehending to what extent engaging/networking agents attempt to 
forge regional networks, but also generates practical understanding on how, and in 
what way their networks appear as they are. What these engaging/networking agents 
have in common is shared expectations to better their regional-security environment. 
Their incrementally socialising experiences based on their communicatively linguistic 
skills through English, albeit not having English as their first language, made 
successful social action happen.  
Michael Schmid (1982) argues that although emancipation and liberation have 
to come from a commitment to justice, derived from the last developmental stage, 
they cannot be sought in historical processes reconstructed through developmental 
logic. They lie only in us. Habermas, according to Held, does not clearly appoint his 
agency so as to promote a form of enlightenment, nor does he clarify to whom his 
critical theory is addressed (Held 1980/2004, 1982). Yet, this lack of information 
leaves room for experimentation, and this thesis applies intellectuals working on 
security matters as a test case. The aforementioned lack of information can be 
considered a ‘form of non-representational foundation’, or a ‘decentred perception of 
reality’; forming the interactive process; and blending the performative attitudes of 
participants and neutral attitudes of observers. It is the key structural element for 
identity transitions through so-called ‘universal pragmatics’ (McCarthy 1978). 
Borrowing heavily from linguistics, particularly Austin’s theory of speech act 
constituting the cognitive and interactive use of language and Searle’s principle of 
expressivity regarding an agent’s sincerity, the basic universal pragmatic is expressed 
in the fact that it thematises the elementary units of speech utterances. Expressed 
differently, language houses universal validity claims leading to the comprehensibility 
of a given participant. This interactive process seeks to elucidate the performative 
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aspects of speech, which are mutually presupposed on the basis of the pre-theoretical 
knowledge of one another’s communicative competence. They are revealed by the 
ability to utter, by uncovering them through an analysis of the speech act in the 
‘standard form’ (Habermas 1982: 255, Thompson 1982: 120). Within this framework, 
it is anticipated that systematic answers can be given to questions concerning a 
human’s capability to instigate and sustain the interactive process (Habermas 1979: 1-
50, Held 1980/2004: 278). 
Habermas illustrates that these claims are based on practical functions of 
utterances and the relations to their stages of origin, or ‘world’ as he calls it, in a 
trinity fashion. The first is a representational function, or truth, relating to the 
‘external (or objective) world’. The argumentation proper to this dimension is 
theoretical discourse. The second is an established conformity, or rightness, 
connecting to ‘our social world’, legitimating normatively regulated interpersonal 
relations in the society within which the actual interaction takes place. Practical 
discourse or practical interest is (are) appropriate forms for this function. This is the 
foundation for understanding life-world, or ‘superstructure’, in Marxist terminology. 
Unfortunately, ‘our social world’ has been dominated by steering media (specifically 
money and power), covering social systems directed by theoretical discourse. The 
third is a sincerity of expression directed to ‘a particular inner world’ of the speakers 
or their subjective world. Discourse is not a mode of argument here. The more 
appropriate modes are aesthetic criticism for evaluating, and therapeutic critique, for 
clarifying systemic self-deception (Habermas 1979: 1-68, Roderick 1986: chapter 4). 
The degrees of significance and outward expression vary according to the way an 
agent balances the three worlds.  
For this project, emphasis is placed more on an agent’s ‘social world’ and 
particular inner world, in order to fill the gap left behind by other network literature. 
The social world in which practical discourse reign is the main focus, due to the fact 
that it provides the way to comprehend an agent’s action in his/her interactive social 
sphere, through conferences and workshops related to his/her preferred concept of 
comprehensive security. Their particular inner world is employed here as a main 
source of understanding how they have embarked on the route of cooperation, 
irrespective of what global, regional and domestic circumstances might occur. 
Rationality is the key to all the processes and stages; it should be understood 
as a basic stock of communicative rules of competence (Schudadellbach 1990: 281). 
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Its ultimate aim is to reach an ‘understanding’, at least in terms of linguistic 
expression, which is not only based on negotiations over common definitions of the 
situation, but also on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims. 
The latter leaves space for moral practical insights, partly embedded in worldviews 
(Habermas 1984: chapter 1). Communication for Habermas is the human's attempt to 
create a good life. Although its end point seems oppressive, Habermas’s emphasis on 
the process is democratic, ensuring that everyone has the same right to be heard in the 
argument about truth, which he terms ‘discourse ethics’ (Myerson 1994: 72-90). 
On this point, Erik Oddvar Eriksen and Jarle Weigard claim that an agent’s 
communicative rationality means not only choosing efficient norms to obtain goals 
but justifying that choice and defending it against criticism. These are the main 
characteristics of the so-called ‘deliberative practitioners’, whose rational manners are 
interpreted as being based on dialogical consensus (Eriksen and Weigard 2004: 121, 
123, Wellner 1990: 311). Seyla Benhabib (1990) proposes that this type of consent 
should be perceived as the rationality of the procedure for attaining agreement. It is 
the core idea behind communicative ethics – the procedural generation of reasonable 
agreement about moral principles through an open-ended moral conversation.  It goes 
without saying that the presupposition of an ‘ideal speech situation’, referring to a 
situation of absolute un-coerced and unlimited discussion between completely free 
and equal human agents, plays a significant part (Geuss 1981: 65).  
 However, everything does not necessarily proceed smoothly.  There may be 
difficulties in the process of exchange. Norms have to pass the test of time; otherwise, 
norms as objects of agreement can turn into procedural constraints. Joseph Heath 
points out that this is the area in which Habermas errs; truth and assertion should go 
hand in hand whilst assertion acts as ‘truth - falsifying’ (Heath 2001: 193, 217). 
Additionally, Coole warns us that there are two dimensions of power that might 
obstruct Habermas’s concept. The first concerns the translation of meaning from the 
pre-reflective life-world into a discursive form. The second relates to processes that 
remain pre-discursive. This means that the communicative process may not reduce the 
pre-discursive circuits of power because they are continually reproduced within 
discourse itself (Coole 1997: 238). Hans-Peter Kruger (1991) emphasises that pre-
linguistically motivated activities of life, the development of communication and 
cognition, cannot be totally submerged into the specific activities of linguistic 
communication and discursive thought. As a result, a question of whether group-
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specific ways of life can be reproduced socially leads to an expansion of the content 
of activities of life to include the prerequisites, conditions, and consequences of this 
reproduction in society as a whole. 
  What should be noticeable is that the development of communication and 
cognition is not only considered as a presupposed discourse providing a moral-
practical foundation for undistorted communication. It is also anticipated that 
communicative rationalisation, the widening over time with the unfolding of the 
linguistic possibilities of reason, will lead to ethical progress (McCarthy 1978: chapter 
4.3, Brand 1990: ix-x). It is this convention that serves the institutionalisation of 
discourse, namely, the convention that helps to actualise the ideal content of the 
presupposition of argumentation under empirical conditions (Habermas 1990: 89-90). 
This progress is a procedure of moral judgement; normative justification is 
tied to a reasoned agreement among those subject to the norms in question. Norm 
validation is based on a commonly accepted satisfaction of consequences that are 
complementary ingredients of the human learning process (McCarthy 1990: viii). 
Communicative ethics, confining their task to reconstructing moral points of view, 
play a role as a built-in normative principle of practical discourse, which is the basis 
of universal pragmatics (McCarthy 1978: ix). They demand willingness and ability to 
consider normative questions from the universalist standpoint of participants, and to 
regard every being as an equal, regardless of the actual constellation of relations in 
real life (Benhabib 1986: 320). In turn, this process leaves room for more encouraging 
progress of communicative ethics, which is regarded as a non-constrained access to a 
process of discursive will-formation; a process understood as a rational discourse of 
generalising interests, which are communicatively shared. It is within the realm of 
communication, the community of practical discourse, that reason plays it part in 
helping participants accept the proposed norms as righteous (Habermas 1997a: 89, 
105, 108, 140).  
Nevertheless, the application is not always smooth. Sometimes there are 
difficulties. The distinction between justification and contextualisation shows the 
limits of a rationalistic interpretation of communicative ethics and creates questions 
regarding the methodology of moral-developmental psychology and universalist 
ethical theory (Benhabib 1986). This prompts Karl-Otto Apel to regard discourse 
ethics as a regulative idea/principle of a long-term strategy of the realisation of the 
formal preconditions for an ideal community of communication at all levels of human 
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interaction (Apel 1990: 46, 54). His notion may well be compatible with that of 
Otfried Hoffe, who comprehends ethics as the way participants in discourses pledge 
responsibility for each other (Hoffe 1990: 212).    
Philosophy, both transcendental and culturally-bound, as a stand-in and 
interpreter for the life-world, is always in discursive interaction. It is a reference for a 
participant’s consensual co-ordination, and the argument reached can at any point be 
evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims. The key 
concept is the ‘equalisation of power’, meaning a normative quality of discourse 
neutralising any imbalance of power and providing equal opportunities for realising 
one’s interests (Habermas 1990b: 1-20, 59, 72). Following this process, a commonly 
accepted moral universalisation emerges. The prudent application of universal moral 
insights and the support of motivations for translating insights into moral actions are 
possible.  
However, at best it may only be to reach equal satisfaction, as Gunter Dex 
observes, based on an agent’s own understanding of moral aspects acquired through 
TCA (Dex 1991: 74-76). In other words, practical discourse ethics offer a procedure 
for testing the validity of hypothetical norms, not for producing justified norms. The 
reason is that discourse ethics derived from discursively interactive processes 
consistently oppose sceptical objection (Habermas 1990b: 108-109, 122, 127, and 
177). Hans Joas insists that TCA, as understood on the level of theory of action, can 
produce only a social order founded on discursively reached agreement. It is still 
impossible to make any assertion about the normative precedence of this type over 
other types of social order (Joas 1991: 114). Thomas McCarthy argues that this should 
not diminish the significance of what Habermas develops as a notion of historically 
oriented theory of society with a practical intent retaining an intrinsic relation to 
practice. McCarthy insists that the gist of Habermas’s theory is that it is guided by 
emancipatory interests. Social analysis is undertaken from the standpoint of realising 
a form of organisation based on unrestricted and undistorted communication 
(McCarthy 1991: 139).  
In sum, downplaying purposive-instrumental action may effectively help 
increase intersubjective cognition of reason, which should be regarded as the basis for 
a critical theory of society. The reason behind such a result is that the action not only 
aims at exercising control and manipulation, but also achieves efficiency and success, 
as embodied in technology and social systems, particularly economic ones (Habermas 
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1984: chapter 3-4, Roderick 1986: 100-101). It is this procedural rationality that 
forms a necessary condition for individuals to reach an understanding among 
themselves. They do that without coercion. The procedure also encourages them to 
understand and/or construct their identities without force (Habermas 1992: 228, 265, 
Brand 1990: 10).  
What should not be forgotten, however, is that purposive-instrumental action 
and communicative action cannot be totally separated. Habermas clearly states that 
communicative and strategic actions do not differ primarily in terms of the attitudes of 
the actors, but rather with respect to structural characteristics. This is because the 
structure of language usage in communicative action, oriented towards reaching 
understanding, is superimposed on the underlying teleological structure of action. 
Interaction mediated through acts of reaching understanding exhibits both richer and 
more strictly limiting structures than does strategic action (Habermas 1991: 242).  
Eriksen and Weigard argue that within the realm of their discursive practices 
there are three kinds of agreements that help diverse agents reach mutual 
understandings. The first is a ‘working agreement’ based on different but mutually 
acceptable reasons for support among agents. The second is a ‘mini-consensus’: 
agents simply exclude fundamental points of disagreement from the agenda. The last 
is a ‘quasi-consensus’:  agents have analysed the conflict and been able to ascertain 
why they disagree, thereby establishing a platform for further cooperation (Eriksen 
and Weigard 2004: 222-224).  
For Joseph Heath, compromise is the key to blending instrumental action with 
communicative action. Yet, it has to be based on interests and rational insight; the 
interests are what make the compromise reasonable, while rational insight makes 
compromise reasonable for agents to accept (Heath 2001: 242-253). James Bohman 
(1997) argues that such blending formula cannot totally camouflage plural views.  
Thus far, suffice to say a theory of communicative action based on universal 
pragmatics can be regarded as a foundation for Habermas’s programme of 
reconstruction at both the individual and societal levels (McCarthy 1979: xvii, Held 
1980/2004: 328). As regards the last mentioned level, Habermas concludes that 
language serves three functions: reproducing culture and keeping tradition alive; 
social integration or co-ordination of the ideas of different actors; and the socialisation 
of the cultural interpretation of need. Together, they are anticipated to reorganise the 
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fundamental socio-cognitive concepts available at the preceding stage of interaction 
(Habermas 1990b: 25, 162).  
To be more precise, communicative competence has three related concerns: to 
develop a concept of rationality; to construct a two-level concept of society, by 
integrating the lifeworld and systems paradigm; and to sketch out a critical theory of 
modernity, analysing its pathology in order to redirect rather than abandon the project 
of enlightenment (McCarthy 1984: v-vii). It contains the ability to follow commonly 
accepted rules, but not rules for the production of systems (Brand 1990: 19).    
What Habermas offers is a theory directed not only at the explication of the 
nature of understanding through a mastery of the ideal speech situation and the 
structure of human reason. It is also directed at the conditions of discourse, by 
transforming Hegel’s dialectic into a process of real dialogue with others (Held 
1980/2004: 397). It is a process in which mutual recognition, a prerequisite for self-
identity, is procured through argumentative justification of claims to truth, moral 
rightness and sincerity that accompany every genuine speech act (Ingram 1997: 276). 
He also clarifies four presuppositions involved in discourse for rational 
communication: a genuine discourse aims at a rational consensus; attaining a rational 
consensus is possible; a true consensus can be distinguished from a false one; and 
only such a consensus can lay the truth claims as ‘objective’ (Roderick 1980: 82).  
However, there are some difficulties surrounding the concept of rationality 
itself. Jon Elster and Ole-Jorgen Skog (1999) question whether there is the 
transcendental rationality that Habermas tries to present. According to their study, 
which is related to psycho-analysis, rationality and desire are closely related: the latter 
cannot be classified systematically. For them, social influences, plus a desire to be 
rational, are the key to understanding human behaviour, meaning that human desire to 
be rational is another form of desire. Eliot L. Gardner and James David (1999) regard 
it as focusing the mind on one's intention to do things. For example, Skog (1999) 
argues that it is logically possible for drug-abusers to become rational addictive 
persons, particularly when we comprehend the situation from their surroundings and 
perspectives. For Elster (1999), the human desire to win, particularly begetting the 
‘near-win’ concept is regarded as the rationale for gamblers who persist with their 
gambling habit. 
Nevertheless, Habermas’s theory of communicative action presents not only a 
procedural view of rationality based on an agent’s subjective, objective and social 
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worlds. It also presents the possibility of uniting knowledge and interests for the sake 
of humankind in the name of emancipation, by energising intellectual and practical 
bases for public discussion and effective control of public policy (Habermas 1972: 
chapter 3, White 1995: 6, Outhwaite 1996: 10, Eriksen and Weigard 2003: 4, 31). 
This quality, that is, procedural openness with no clear a priori prioritised 
norms/values, prompts this study to propose theory of communicative action as a 
complementary internal logic to previous frameworks for networking activities. Of 
course, on the surface it seems to be only a subjective quality. Yet, the dialogical 
aspect of it, its relationship with objective and social worlds, makes it an appropriate 
starting point from which to understand how agents from different backgrounds can 
co-operate, engage, and create networks to achieve their shared norms, principles, or 
belief systems. In other words, the universal quality of Habermas’s proposals vis-à-vis 
universal pragmatics helps one understand what those agents commonly possess 
within themselves in order to overcome their differences.  
 
Summary 
This chapter set out a framework for the case study to follow. It started with a 
definition of being an agent based on constructivist ontology. It then provided 
definitions of the terms ‘idea’ and ‘knowledge’, as social products crystallised from 
the interactive processes between agents and their surroundings. These two definitions 
are essential in that they helped to present ‘intellectuals’ as the capable changing 
agents at the heart of this study. In order to clarify who should be nominated as 
intellectuals, it also provided a further definition; that is, the sense of their social 
function of engaging with public affairs. Networking for bettering and influencing 
their societies are crucial missions.  
All of the definitions presented in the first section set the core theme for 
Chapters 3 and 4. They help illustrate the ways in which agents perceive and interpret 
their surroundings; they also help elucidate what it is that drives them to construct 
regional networks, in terms of this project. In other words, to what extent and how 
they perceive their surroundings not only inspires their actions inwardly, actions 
derived from and concerned with themselves as capable engaging agents, but may 
also be construed as their structure for taking their particular forms of social action. 
The second and the third sections directly dealt with concepts of networking. 
First, the section reviewed three approaches often applied to studying knowledge-
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bound networking activities: an ‘epistemic community’; a ‘coalition advocacy 
framework’; and studies based on constructivism. It points out that they are helpful 
frameworks for comprehending engaging activities; specifically how socialising or 
learning processes based on shared norms, principles or belief systems can lead to co-
operation at both the domestic and international levels. Knowledge-bound networking 
literature accepts that the historical context of the enquired subject is essential for 
studying interactively socialising processes.  
Unfortunately, even constructivism has not offered more insight into how such 
processes can occur in different places and at different times, particularly when they 
are not totally alike. Processes per se are not that different, provided that they are 
regarded as virtual places in which different agents can engage and construct 
networks to achieve their shared norms, principles, or belief systems. But what makes 
them possess such qualities is not clearly delineated. 
The chapter then proposed that Habermas’s theory of communicative action 
(TCA) can remedy the difficulty attributable to an inclination to place too much 
emphasis on the means-end paradigm. Knowledge-bound networking literature lacks 
enough provision for comprehending how agents form the perceptions and intentions 
that lead them to co-operate with each other on an equal basis. For this study, 
Habermas’s TCA offers a way to scrutinise their internal logic, which acts like an a 
priori (universally) understanding that helps their engaging processes and dialogues 
materialise and flourish within such a discursive sphere as a socialising process.  It 
accepts that TCA presents not only a procedural view of human rationality but also 
the possibility of uniting knowledge and interests for the sake of humankind. The 
latter is the crux of the interest of this project.  
However, the framework presented here should not be regarded as a one-way 
guiding framework (see Chapter 2), as this project set out to be interactive. It will be 
reconsidered in line with the study’s findings, once it has been applied to the activities 
of East Asian security intellectuals. In other words, reflection on the said activities 
will set the theme for the final part (the analysing part) of this project. The next 
chapter now goes on to the applied methods in Chapter 2. They were selected and 
combined not only to suit the set up framework but also to reflect the on-going social 
learning processes on which this project places emphasis.  
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Chapter 2: Qualitative Methodology 
A Compatible Framework 
  
The introductory chapter explained that this project was set up to investigate to 
what extent and how agents’ ideas/perceptions, particularly regarding their regional 
security, drive them to forge and sustain intellectual networks. The previous chapter 
sought to construct a framework by which to ascertain whether the process of 
engagement has had any impact on the engaging agents, in terms of their ideas, 
perceptions or activities. However, as it is based on an on-going-social-learning 
process the framework requires a qualitative rather than a quantitative methodology. 
This enables it to emphasise a means of inductive standardisation for constructing the 
particular kinds of questions asked at the outset. It is proposed here that a more 
appropriate way of conducting a research project should be to balance the relationship 
between theoretical concepts and the research methodology in an interactive way. By 
so doing, researchers (including this one) will be less likely to be lured into either a 
trap of ‘methodolatry’ (placing more emphasis on methods or means than ends) or a 
trap of ‘theoretical arrogance’ (ignoring empirical work) (Cooper 2001). 
 Engagement with such an interactive process will allow one to appear as a 
more reflexive agent. Reflexivity, as proposed by Jennifer Mason (2002: 5), is a 
highly creative process that encourages researchers to think critically about what they 
are (and/or have been) doing, and why. It not only confronts and challenges their 
personal assumptions but also makes them recognise the extent to which their 
thoughts, actions and decisions shape how they research and what they see.  
 Put differently, both deductive and inductive methods are needed. As Nigel 
Gilbert (2001) points out, these may intertwine during research, particularly within 
the social realm in which current concerns dwell. This combined and interactive path 
may well prove compatible with the constructivist standpoint upon which the original 
ontology was based (Burnham, Gilbert, Grant and Layton-Henry 2004: 22-20).1
 Pursuing this interactive logical track leads one to set a research design that 
favours a ‘research wheel’. This is because it not only highlights the essentiality of 
                                                        
1
 According to Peter Burnham, Karim Gilbert, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry (2004: 22-29), this 
path is classified as the third category (critical realism) of criticising positivism (which is mostly 
favoured by those appreciating quantitative method); the others are Popperian neo-positivism and a 
group of conventionalist, humanist, or hermeneutic.   
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dynamic and on-going-process procedures, but also gives researchers an opportunity 
to redefine their ideas and techniques until they become less ambiguous. In other 
words, this circularity forces them to permanently reflect on the whole process and to 
view every step with critical eyes. It also grants them a chance ‘not only to ask the 
following questions repeatedly but also to answer [them] ...: how far the methods, 
categories, and theories that are used do justice to the subject and the data?’ (Flick 
1998: 43) Yet, this process may prove unable to express its real capability unless it is 
effectively supplemented at some stage by the introduction of a linear style (Burnham 
et al. 2004: chapter 2, Gilbert 2001: 20-21).   
 Indeed, a cycle of specifying-collecting-analysing data supplemented by a 
linear style, either at the beginning (setting up, modifying, or simplifying hypotheses), 
the middle (collecting and analysing data) and/or at the end (modifying or simplifying 
theory or conceptual framework) could prove useful for a researcher’s process of 
internal falsification. It would provide opportunities for researchers to take their 
value-judgements and normative concerns into consideration at every step (Mason 
2002: chapter 3). In sum, this is how the current project has been constructed. At this 
point, it is useful to be reminded of the significance of the middle and end of the 
cycle. This not only helps one to modify and allocate more space for those collected 
data that were initially ignored; it also makes one rethink the original framework, in 
order to shape it to be less abstract and more applicable to reality. 
 As far as this project is concerned, the term 'qualitative research' refers to 
research methods grounded in a philosophical notion of how social reality is 
understood, interpreted, experienced, produced and constituted by agents. As already 
delineated in the previous chapter, this position is interactive; indeed, it is dynamic, 
due to its communicative action at various levels. Expressed otherwise, it is crucial to 
understand the various multi-layers and textured complexity of the social world. For 
this project, the social worlds of agents comprise three different but closely related 
levels. Firstly, a subject’s views construe parts of his or her reality. Secondly, in 
conversations and discourses, phenomena are actively produced, thereby constructing 
reality. Finally, subtle structures of sense and related rules contribute to the 
construction of social situations through their generated activities. All in all, the   
social worlds of agents can be mainly perceived through their publications (related to 
conferences and workshops organised and attended by them). Content analysis (of 
which more explanation later) is one of the keys used here to filter out data necessary 
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for this project. Exclusive interviews will also be undertaken to reinforce information 
about the social worlds of agents and how agents perceive them. 
One strong point of the qualitative method is that it offers holistic forms of 
analysis and explanation (or Verstehen, the epistemological principle, as Uwe Flick 
terms it2), based on methods of data generation, which are both flexible and sensitive 
to the particular social context in which data are produced. Suffice to say that 
qualitative research opens a window for critically linking normative theories to the 
research project. It offers an on-going process for researchers to reflect not only on 
their thoughts and (social) concerns, but also on the ways in which they understand 
and interact with their surroundings in the interest of change, at the very least by 
pointing out the way or ways to implement change. This thesis considers the 
qualitative method suitable particularly when it is understood as a resourceful means 
of encouraging a circular way of conducting a research project. Not only is this style 
of on-going research compatible with the framework outlined in Chapter 1, it also 
testifies to the fact that a normatively open conversation (see Chapter 1) can be 
actualised. 
 
Constructing and conducting research questions 
Jennifer Mason proposes that using the concept of ‘intellectual puzzle’ as the basis of 
conducting a research is useful for helping researchers construct, clarify and proceed 
with their research puzzles (or questions) and projects. Intellectual puzzlement 
connects the ontological and epistemological positions of researchers, which are 
encapsulated in the project and grounded within the specific context of the project. 
There are four main types of intellectual puzzle: the ‘developmental puzzle’ aimed at 
understanding and explaining how and why x or y works;  the ‘mechanical puzzle’, 
which is interested in how something works or is constituted (how x or y works and 
why it works this way); the ‘comparative puzzle’, indicating the interest of 
researchers in learning and explaining differences and similarities between x and y; 
and the ‘causal/predictive puzzle’, applied when researchers want to comprehend the 
influence x has on y or what causes x or y (Mason 2002: chapter 1). 
When applied to this project these puzzles become the following: 
                                                        
2
 For a definition of this project of how agents acquire knowledge about their social world see the 
previous chapter, particularly the first and the third sections  
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 -Developmental puzzle: how agents’ engaging activities, labelled here ‘East 
Asian Security Intellectual Networks’, are constructed, and who engages in these 
networks; 
 - Mechanical puzzle: how the process of network cohesion works (the 
intellectually and socially engaging process, or socialising process), and why it works 
that way; 
 - Causal/Predictive puzzle; what is the impact of the networking process on 
engaging and on regional security? 
Two main groups of research questions have been formulated to address these 
puzzles within a more elaborate timeframe and a way of conducting the project. The 
first group of basic questions is not only concerned with uncovering who those active 
non-state agents are but was also concerned specifically with how they construct and 
expand their networking, engaging security matters through both non- and traditional 
understandings. 
The second group is about assessing both their capabilities and their impact. 
'Capabilities', which covers their abilities as changing-agents (regarded here as 
intellectual), are particularly derived from their (security-related) ideas. They also 
refer to social functions, namely, whether they are independent enough to initiate 
emancipatory change or are just part of their society and serve to reproduce the 
dominant concept of traditional security. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
emancipatory change for this project refers to engaging/networking agents’ attempts 
to liberate a concept of security, dominated by a state-centric perspective, at a 
regional level.  
'Impacts' concerns their impact upon the regional security and lead to 
observations regarding their respective identities and whether and how they have 
changed to become more collective as the communicating process continues. 
Experience gained from fieldwork urged this researcher to enlarge the scope of 
questions in order to shed more lights on agents’ perceptions towards their own 
regional socialising processes. These additional questions cover how they assess the 
success of existing networks, whether the relatively elitist and exclusive nature of 
their networks have any impact on their networking activities and the way they 
perceive their identity or identities. 
These puzzles and research questions help one to find the way to limit the 
participating agents, to focus primarily on those in the ASEAN-ISIS, and those in the 
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JIIA and JCIE in Japan. These agencies appear to have successfully persuaded their 
governments to establish the ARF in 1993 and have encouraged others - like-minded 
and non like-minded alike - to join in the expanded network since 1994. Of course, 
their efforts in terms of creating and providing their ideas/perceptions and activities, 
did not come out of thin air. In order to decipher both development and mechanical 
puzzles more effectively, this thesis traced back to the earlier periods during which 
economists laid the ground for further co-operation (Soesastro 1995a, Morrison 1997, 
PECC 2005). This facilitated the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS in 1984, a fact that 
many active engaging agents point out.3 On this point, it is anticipated that the 
mechanical puzzle should play a significant part, in particular guiding the way to 
decipher to what extent the existing networks and activities function in the current 
milieu, trying to promote the concepts of ‘ASEAN Community’ and ‘East Asia 
Community’ as their next active movements. 
As suggested in the Introduction, the causal/predictive puzzle has played a 
significant role in helping establish the themes for analysing the impact of the existing 
networking process. First, it is worth pondering several points: whether their 
sustaining and explanatory activities affect the engaging agents themselves; and 
whether they are independent enough to take a critical leading role in bringing change 
to security concepts and activities in the interests of better regional security.  
It will then be necessary to discover more about whether their 
ideas/perceptions towards their own activities, identities and regional security have 
changed. In order to answer all of the related research questions, the framework in 
Chapter 1 offers a means for collecting, sorting out and analysing concerned data. As 
this project is fashioned after the ‘research wheel’, the last part will consist of 
reflections on the whole project, particularly the framework. In order to find answers 
to the aforementioned questions, content analysis will be employed as a core means of 
covering both textual and interview analyses. It is difficult to deny that by applying 
(qualitative) content analysis, this project is a subjective assessment of the content and 
value of the material applied to test hypotheses (Burnham et. al 2004: 236).  
There are two connected hypotheses for this project constructed by this 
framework. First, the ideas and perceptions by agents of their surroundings, in terms 
                                                        
3
 Interviews (July 18th 2006 in Singapore, October 3rd and 27th 2006 in Bangkok, Thailand) 
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of regional security, can drive them to seek means of improvement. Second, an 
agent's function as a (critically) changing agent is bound (or constrained) by the ways 
in which he/she perceives his/her surroundings. The underlying intertwined 
hypothesis is that ‘agents’ shared ideas/perceptions lead to their intersubjective action 
to improve the regional security environment.  
The framework set up in Chapter 1 helps construct a main theme for finding 
the required content from collected data, which will be sorted according to key 
concepts (agents’ ideas/perceptions, agents’ function as intellectuals, and agents’ 
engaging/networking activities). The process of charting and synthesising the original 
data and locating it within the above thematic framework involves an inspection of 
original terms, concepts and languages used within the collected data (Ritchie, 
Spencer and O’Conner 1006: 262). This means that reduction and ordering data are 
the keys to presenting analysed data.   
Thematic analysis will help to systematically determine if there are any 
irregularities or regularities in terms of single words, themes or concepts. For this 
project, words and themes are seen to act as sign-posts, including the following: 
ideas/perceptions of regional surroundings, dialogues, socialising processes, 
comprehensive and/or alternative security, collective and/or regional identity. By 
employing such analysis, it is possible to clarify the conceptual categories that lead to 
the process of hypotheses testing and reformulating on the basis of the discovery of 
new relationships among data. Analysis will help (less subjectively) identify the 
process and meaning of interactive communication (Mostyn 1985). 
In order to make content analysis more concrete, other forms of analyses 
(textual and interview) will be employed. As suggested in Chapter 1, texts produced 
by agents engaging with the networks’ activities are essential as sources for capturing 
their ideas/perceptions and/or reflections. Generally speaking, textual analysis refers 
to utilising deciphering processes of making meaning as a means of uncovering the 
social effects of texts. The interpretation of texts is a core element. What should not 
be overlooked here is that texts are produced according to the convention of 
documentary reality (Atkinson and Coffy 2006: 73). Thus, it is important to remind 
whosoever uses the documents that they should be understood in relation to both their 
production (authorship – particularly implied) and consumption (readership).  
Flick, who explains this point cogently, sees texts as world making. They can, 
he claims, be comprehended by acknowledging three mimetic elements: as 
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transforming experiences and/or ideas of person being studied in narrative form; 
awareness of the construction of texts on the basis of previous elements when 
researchers interpret them; and feeding back those interpretations into everyday 
contexts (when reading the presentation of this finding). Flick’s argument is that 
people who read and interpret written texts are involved in the construction of their 
reality (Flick 1998: chapter 3). This approach is compatible with the current project. 
Agents produce numerous forms of texts, particularly proceedings from their 
conferences and workshops including monographs of their special events. These are 
employed here as a meaningful source material to help to decipher their (social) world 
and to realise their preferences.  
To be more precise, discourse analysis will also provide a guiding means 
through textual analysis, particularly in the sections concerning agents’ action and 
representation, which appear in texts as well as interviews. Discourse analysis also 
provides a way to understand the multi-functional quality of texts: enacting social 
relations between participants; connecting parts of text together; and connecting texts 
with their situational contexts (Fairclough 2003: chapter 1). Connected with each 
other, text and context act as a gate-way to comprehend the actions of intellectual 
agents, representations, and identification. They are dialectically discernible from the 
social practices of agents, which (for this project) can be traced through their 
produced texts and interviews (Fairclough 2003: chapter 2). In other words, discourse 
analysis, which provides the meaning of ‘articulation’ as it refers to managing and 
combining different elements into a new identity, is understood here as a 
complementary and useful means of comprehending the actions and interactions of 
agents in forging and maintaining their group or networks (Howarth 1995: 115-133). 
The main sources of texts for this project are secondary and tertiary 
documents, directly and/or indirectly related to its scope, according to the 
categorisation of Burnham, Gilbert, Grant and Layton-Henry (2004: 165-188). The 
former (secondary) are documents produced by members of ASEAN-ISIS and its 
Japanese counterparts, JIIA and JCIE. The main sources for this group are the Asia 
Pacific Roundtable (APR) proceedings conferences papers and ASEAN-ISIS Monitor 
(terminated in 1997).   
Other documents include monographs and reports produced for specific 
occasions. The ‘Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium 2003’ and the ‘2004 Japan-
ASEAN Security Project: 1st Workshop for Team of Experts Report’ published by 
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JIIA (whose Japan Review of International Affairs terminated in 1997) are significant 
sources, along with proceedings from international conferences such as ‘Global 
ThinkNet Paris Conference 1999: The Role of Civil Society in Domestic and 
International Governance’ and the ‘Fourth Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s 
Tomorrow: Health and Human Security – Moving from the concept to action’ 
published by JCIE.  
For the purposes of this thesis, priority will be given to papers and articles 
published by institutions whose activities have been active throughout the periods of 
this study. These institutions are the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), which is a secretariat of ASEAN-ISIS (at the time of conducting this 
research project), and the Malaysian Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
(ISIS), which was a central organizer for the APR before ASEAN-ISIS took a leading 
role. The former publishes Indonesian Quarterly. Other less active institutions include 
the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) and the Institute of Security and 
International Studies (ISIS), Thailand. The publications by the Institute of South East 
Asian Studies (ISEAS) also offer useful data covering the whole of Southeast Asia. 
These prioritised sources of data also include related web-page content from 
the aforementioned institutions’ official websites, linkage websites created for special 
events, namely, their network-establishment anniversaries, ASEAN official website, 
foreign ministry websites of key actors’ countries, and national/international news 
agency websites. In order to competently access important documents and data, these 
sources, which present the ideas and activities of intellectuals, will also be scrutinised, 
along with articles and books published by other sources including materials produced 
by Japanese and Western sources.  
 
Active Interviews/Conversations  
Interviews are valuable for generating and collecting more precise data. Particularly 
important is finding an appropriate technique to elicit the reflections of agents on their 
personal ideas/perceptions and experiences engendered by their activities in a 
network. Interviews are essential to analysis, especially questions about whether their 
engaging experiences have in any way impacted on their ideas/perceptions and the 
ways in which they think about their identities or identity.  
In order to facilitate the process, this project will apply an elite interviewing 
strategy based on a semi-structured style - what Nigel Fielding and Hilary Thomas 
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(2001: 144) call a ‘non-standardised or unstructured interview’. The word ‘elite’ here 
does not precisely refer to interviewees’ socioeconomic backgrounds; it will be 
assumed that they are socio-economically better placed than their country fellows. 
Rather, 'elite' refers to interviewees’ experiences as experts (Leech 2002b) in 
engaging activities within the periods chosen for this study.  
This appropriately focused style will help in the gathering of more in-depth 
information about ideas, attitudes and experiences. This can only occur fully after 
both sides (researchers and respondents) pass through a ‘rapport’ period, establishing 
a friendly attitude towards each other (Leech 2002b). It is this rapport period that 
facilitated the researcher to extend interview sessions naturally, specifically when 
basic information regarding this project was given in an informal way. That means 
this researcher gained more time for interviews than expected. It also smoothly paved 
the way to turn interview sessions into friendly conversations (see related concept 
below). Moreover, most of the senior interviewees used this period to exchange 
general views covering many topics, including current situations in Thailand and 
studying PhD courses in the United Kingdom in particular. ‘Guided questions’ not 
only help researchers to apply their techniques of probing and prompting more easily, 
but also generate chances for respondents to provide their information in a relaxed 
and informal way (Burnham et al 2004, Devine 1995, Fielding and Thomas 2001: 
211-217).  
The term ‘active interview’ suggests that meaning, derived from the 
interactive process, is not constantly reformulated anew but reflects relatively 
enduring local conditions such as the research topics of the interviewer, biographical 
particulars, and local ways of orienting these topics. This type of interactive 
interviewing process is based on practical reasoning, defined as interpretive practice 
involving respondent and interviewer as they articulate ongoing interpretive 
structures, resources, and orientations (Holstein and Gubrium 1995: chapter 2).  
Robert G. Burgess (1995: chapter 5) proposes that the interview should be 
regarded as a ‘conversation’ helping researchers to gain access to situations that 
through time, place, or situation are closed for them. Put another way, the interview is 
essential for gaining access to the biographies of individuals, and for obtaining details 
of situations that the researcher has not witnessed, but which may be of vital interest 
to her/him.  
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It may be that details of the backgrounds of prominent interviewees come to 
be revealed in interviews, a factor that may prove useful not only for comprehending 
the ideas, attitudes and actions of interviewees, but also for cross-checking 
information gathered from other interviewees.4 It is essential particularly regarding 
the elusive evolution of networking activities in Southeast Asia and attempts to stretch 
beyond the region. Guided by this technique, Chapters 3 and 4 are not only 
constructed according to the periods of time concerning networking/engaging agents’ 
main activities, but also according to their areas of interests. Chapter 3 emphasises 
economic aspects which are closely related to engaging agents’ preferred concept of 
comprehensive security, whilst Chapter 4 expressed engaging agents’ extended 
interests to a more traditional sense of security, directly related to policies of regional 
states, which used to be regarded as taboo topics. Yet, the extended topics, such as 
transnational migration and drug trafficking which flourished again after the 1997 
financial crisis, could be considered as part of the concept of comprehensive security.  
G. Mishler’s (1986: chapter 2) proposal regarding how to conduct interviews 
seems compatible with the above technique, although he is more precise about the 
ways in which the interview should proceed. Mishler sees it as a ‘speech event’, in 
which the interviewer and respondent attempt to ‘fit’ their questions and responses to 
each other and to develop discourses. Following Mishler and Burgess, the current 
work aims to pay close attention to all of the linguistic and paralinguistic features 
appearing routinely and naturally during the talk and to systematically eschew 
standard written texts. Indeed, paralinguistic features during many interviews, 
specifically related to questions regarding at which scale of satisfaction (from 1-the 
least to 10-the most) that they want to put by their own judgment, signified their 
uncertainty. These features helped this researcher to probe more questions in order to 
re-check about their perceptions regarding their experiences on regional socialising 
processes. Generally, their placements seemed high (even at 7-8 in some cases) but 
their facial expressions seemed to tell another story. 
Moreover, transcription should be carefully done in order to make it reflect, 
and be sensitive to, as many queries and uncertainties surrounding the research 
questions as possible. It is crucial to focus on the relations between meaning and 
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 Experiences from interviews (July 5th and 14th 2006 in Singapore, August 28th and September 14th 
2006 in Tokyo, Japan and October 3rd 2006 in Bangkok, Thailand)  
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speech, but not at the expense of ignoring the limitations of the data employed. The 
contextual meaning of (verbal) data that appears throughout the interviewing process 
should also be counted.    
What is interesting about regarding interviews as purposeful and creative 
conversations is that it empowers the respondents. This implies accepting that they 
not only speak in their own voices and tell their own stories, but also understand that 
their interests are respected. This project will be structured along the lines of a radical 
transformation of the power relationship between interviewer and interviewees. The 
latter will not simply be regarded as passive informants, as entities answering only 
what is asked. They will be accepted as active and contributing participants who 
occupy an equal footing. For this project they are ‘research collaborators’ (at best) or 
(active) ‘informants’ (at worst), as Mishler (1986) proposes.5  
By regarding interviewees as research collaborators, it is anticipated that they 
will become aware of the interpretative terrain at hand in which their ability to 
'storytell' offers an orientation. They will provide ‘theoretically coherent’ descriptions, 
accounts, and explanations. In other words, they will be treated as agents capable of 
improvising upon and/or speaking about, informational and interactive challenges that 
may spontaneously arise during the interviewing process (Holstein and Gubrium 
1995: chapter 3). Stephen K. Tagg emphasises that the three essential entities for the 
life-story interview (regarded here as the agents’ reflections on their ideas/perceptions 
and experiences derived from their engaging activities with the networks) are events, 
actions and places (Tagg 1985: 165).  
For this project, interviewing provides a helpful means of comprehending an 
agent’s own reflections about his/her or their preferred concept of comprehensive 
security. In addition, it is important to uncover how he/she evaluates his/her own 
activities. Both their concepts and activities to some extent are affected by global and 
regional circumstances. In other words, the improvisation and modification of 
                                                        
5
 Elliot G. Mishler (1986) argues that there are three pairs of relationships between the interviewers 
and respondents that can radically transform the power relation (previously accepted that the former is 
superior and the latter is oppressed inferior). The first is ‘informants and reporters’. This pair seems to 
credit the respondents rather than the interviewers while the second pair, ‘research collaborators’, and 
seems to accept them on an equal footing. The third pair, ‘learners/actors and advocates’, seems to 
favour the first more than the other two since the researchers are those who learn from the respondents 
and try their best to support the respondents’ ideas and performances (chapter 5).  
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information through interviews are crucial for effectively comprehending ideational 
factors in perceptions and activities. 
 
Interview Questions  
Burgess and Mason provide sound methods of transforming research questions into 
more practical interview questions. Burgess proposes three styles of questions that 
may help researchers to achieve their goals. The first is descriptive, allowing 
informants to provide statements about their activities; the second is structural, 
attempting to ascertain how informants organise their knowledge; and the third is 
contrast, allowing informants to discuss the meaning of situations and providing an 
opportunity for comparing and contrasting situations and events in the informants’ 
world(s) (Burgess 200: chapter 5). 
Mason offers a seven-step guideline for circular-style qualitative research. The 
first step is to set up comprehensive research questions, based on the researcher's 
ontological position. This project is based upon a constructivist-styled position. The 
second is to translate the previous material into a mini-research question, being aware 
of a researcher’s epistemological standpoint. Knowledge, as understood in this 
project, is no less than a social product. The third step concerns the possible interview 
topics and questions. The fourth is to cross reference back to the second and the first 
steps. The fifth and sixth steps (following on from the third step) are to set up a loose 
interview structure or format, including standardising questions (as shown below). 
The last is to cross reference back to the third step (Mason 2002: 72). This project is 
based on interview questions created as a set of guidelines for the semi-structured 
component, based on what Burgess and Mason suggest and with particular attention 
to the fifth and sixth steps due to their reflective and open characteristics.  
For the first puzzle, the questions are as follows: How do the interviewees 
perceive global/regional (and/or domestic) security? Where did the idea of 
constructing and/or engaging the networks (particularly ASEAN-ISIS and its 
Japanese counterparts) stem from? 
The second puzzle: How do they construct, sustain, and expand their 
networks? Have they gained cohesion from the socialising process? This is also 
related to the question of identity in the third puzzle. Have they changed their ideas 
regarding security, particularly pertaining to regional scope, during the socialising 
process? If so, why?  
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Questions pertinent to the third puzzle include the following: What social 
role(s) or function(s) do they think (or claim) that they have been playing/fulfilling? 
What are their perceptions vis-à-vis their relationships with their particular 
governments? Do they think of themselves as a group? How do they define 
themselves? How do they perceive their impact (derived from their ideas and/or 
performances) upon regional security and/or regarding the general situation? How do 
other people see them, particularly the officials who may or may not transmit their 
ideas and/or proposals into policy? Why do they see them in this/these particular 
way/s?  
Most of the potential interviewees were members and/or intellectuals engaging 
with the activities of the institutions forging the networks, particularly those from the 
SIIA, the Indonesian CSIS, the Malaysian and the Thai ISIS, the JIIA, and the JCIE, 
who formed the first group of interviewees. The second consisted of officers from 
Thailand and Japan, mainly due to limited access to bureaucratic systems of other 
countries (for example Indonesia and Malaysia), and partly due to inconvenient times 
for appointments (specifically in the case of Singapore). It was anticipated that they 
could help to clearly decipher the third puzzle, particularly with regard to questions as 
to whether and to what degree the ideas, actions and interactions of these intellectuals 
impacted upon regional security, their respective countries’ policies, and ASEAN’s 
policies. In order to enlarge the numbers of interviewees for a further selective 
focused group, a ‘snowballing’ technique was also applied; namely, magnifying 
related-focus groups for further interviews by using respondents’ personal networks 
(Aber 2001, Devine 1995: 141-146).   
 
Impressions gained during the field work 
The first impression gained from my various periods of field work conducted in 
Singapore, Thailand, Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia was that utilising connections, 
(friends and friends of friends) is essential for getting access to key interviewees. This 
researcher strongly agrees with Kenneth Goldstein that ‘it would be foolish not to take 
advantage of any points of access that one has’ (Goldstein 2002: 671).  However, it 
was difficult to gain access to foreign ministries, Japan was an unusual case for this 
study due to the character and background of the JIIA, which played a key part. 
Affiliated with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the JIIA’s funds - 
and (some) members of its staff are supported by - MOFA, which means staff 
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positions have to be rotated. Yet, there are few staff members working in the area of 
academic research. Interviews were conducted with both staff and visiting 
researchers, aided by the aforementioned connections that helped this researcher gain 
access to MOFA circles, specifically through the networks of the Japan Foundation 
Endowment Committee (JFEC).  
Official letters of introduction were necessary for conducting interviews 
although they may not have been sufficient to persuade some high-ranking officers to 
oblige a PhD candidate, specifically in the case of the Japanese interviewees.6 Some 
professors connected with the Thai Foreign Ministry agreed to be interviewed. This 
kind of connection paved the way for a natural rapport, particularly when 
interviewees could refer back to other interviewees with whom this researcher had 
conducted and completed interview sessions. The natural rapport that developed 
during interview-sessions followed by that which developed during conversations 
made further probing less intrusive or apparently less intrusive (Leech 2002: 667-
668). The key interviewees helped this researcher form specific questions around how 
they gauged the success of existing networks and how they defined collective identity 
which are essential as complementary to clearly set-up questions. They are parts of 
guiding questions for Chapter 4 which also provide analytical content for Chapter 5.  
By seeking further clarification one can identify a speaker’s methods of using 
categories and activities to gauge the existing networks. It is a 'round-about' way of 
identifying the (cultural) knowledge and logic being applied. Carolyne Baker (2006: 
164, 175) argues that ‘what we hear and attend to in these interview accounts are 
members’ methods for putting together a world that is recognisably familiar, orderly 
and moral’. Reflecting upon how interviewees move through these processes not only 
provided resourceful information for the analysis, but also led to further reflection on 
the framework being applied. It became clear that it was necessary to enlarge it to 
accommodate the concept of trust, as examined below. 
For information about events and persons, the snowballing technique led this 
researcher to a large group of informative interviewees, specifically in Singapore and 
                                                        
6
 Fortunately, in the case of the Japanese interviewees, Japanese nationals, particularly those who 
shared a similar academic background, having received post-graduate degrees from the United 
Kingdom, were really helpful in facilitating the interview process. 
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Indonesia. Some interviewees derived from this technique invited this researcher to 
observe their own conference and to mingle with their group when socially ‘informal’ 
talks took place.7 From interview-sessions in Singapore, one of the key informants 
asked his secretary to find space to invite this researcher to join the IDSS annual 
conference regarding the role of security experts and regional security.8 He even went 
straight to ask the director of the IDSS for a signature so that this researcher could 
join the event for free, since the organizer was already clear all money was paid for 
the registration. Illness at that time forced this researcher to be unable to attend. There 
was no close relationship (in general) between the observer’s presence and the place 
accorded the observer by the ‘other’ a situation that ethnographical researchers might 
encounter (Baszanger and Dochier 2006: 21). Nevertheless, it was an interesting 
social space that helped this researcher (and perhaps others also) to identify and 
reconstruct the perspectives and patterns of action and interaction that are part of 
diversely social world (Miller and Fox 2006: 38).   
There are some particular observations worth mentioning here. There was 
some reservation in participants who did not express their greetings freely, especially 
the current heads of member institutions of ASEAN-ISIS and earlier members. Some 
leading participants seemed to question the presence of a researcher. Ironically, the 
head of the Thai-ISIS and some of the institutions previous members seemed agitated 
with the presence of this researcher. The previous director of the institution came to 
the rescue by saying that it was she who had invited the researcher.  
However, the tension subsided when a very senior member of the Indonesian-
CSIS said that he had made an appointment with me from our previous interview-
sessions in Jakarta. He stated clearly that he wanted me to have first-hand experience 
of the ASEAN-ISIS style of conference. Moreover, he also offered to help this 
researcher to secure more appointments with ASEAN-ISIS members, specifically the 
senior ones who had encouraged the success of the networks. These experienced 
agents (at least those having more experience than the current head, at the time of 
conducting this project) tried their best to encourage this researcher and other invited 
                                                        
7
 Although some leaders of institutions – members of ASEAN-SISI – were aware of my presence as an 
observing researcher, most of the participants were not. Thus the situation allowed me to distance 
myself somewhat from the general participants.  
8
 The IDSS 10th Anniversary Conference on The Nature of Policy Relevant Knowledge in Asian 
Security Affairs (5-6 August 2006, Sentosa Spa and Resort, Singapore) 
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guests that their networks were inclusive. Also from the same conference, the head of 
the Philippines’ ISDS invited this researcher to participate in a conference organised 
by the ISDS that might persuade this project to scrutinise more about the relationships 
between the ASEAN-ISIS and its activities regarding track-III. Unfortunately, the 
short notice for the conference was not compatible with the schedule of this project. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of a slightly discomforting event at the Thai-ISIS 
conference was that many participants exchanged views with the researcher regarding 
how networking activities could be more inclusive provided that leading participants 
expressed exclusive and distinct attitudes. These observations were somewhat similar 
to those of the younger participants interviewed both before and after the mentioned 
conference took place.   
James A. Holstein and Faber F. Gubrium (2006: 142-143) opine that 
interviews are a collaborative accomplishment, involving participants in meaning-
making work in the process. This is difficult to deny given that the researcher is often 
personally part of this meaning-making work. Discourse analysis, based on the theme 
set up in Chapter 1, is helpful on this point, particularly when analysing conversation 
has fundamentally gone through a form of interaction that Sue Wilkinson (2006: 188) 
refers to as ‘talk-in-interaction’. According to what has been said thus far, cognitive 
phenomena are simply parts of social practices (Potter 2006: 216).  
In other words, the intersubjective meaning-making is still at the core. But it is 
not the sole analysis. With its connections with both an analysis of action and a 
context management, conversational analysis can be effectively analysed in a 
sequence of actions. It can be undertaken by applying three steps: being responsive to 
context by producing a ‘next’ action; the creation of context by producing that next 
action; and the showing of understanding by these means (Heritage 2006: 231-234). 
Employing a prompting technique is not only compatible with the way conversations 
go but is also helpful for the researcher to reflectively analyse interaction. Emphasis 
on interaction can be regarded as a way of validating the unfolding information; what 
Perakyla (2006: 291) calls validation through the ‘next turn’. This means that the 
interactants display their interpretations of what is going on to each other, especially 
what was going on in the immediately preceding turn of talk. Reflecting upon these 
sequences helps one construct observations, starting from observing participants, their 
interaction with each other, their surroundings, and their actions and interactions 
related to the existence and observations of the researcher.  
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Accepting that the researcher is part of this meaning-making work requires 
one to reflect upon one’s own experiences in the field. Suffice to say that an active 
sense of interviewing brings one to a narrative resources and orientation of the 
interviewees. It is the way to understand the rotating role between being a speaker and 
a listener. Their insights and the methods they use to describe the meanings derive 
from the particular social world of which they are a part; namely, their 'habitus' 
(Mitler and Glassner 2006: 134). Holstein and Gubrium’s (2006: 156) suggestion 
regarding ‘de-constructing’ interviews/conversations to show the reader how both the 
‘hows’ and ‘whats’ of the narrative of their lived experiences are formed is also 
helpful.   
For the data presentation, after applying a set up framework, the illustration is 
divided into two parts. The first is the main content of Part II, which consists of two 
chapters aimed at clarifying my first hypothesis. The second is related to the notion 
that agents’ ideas/perceptions of their surroundings (regional security in this case) 
drive them to find ways to better them.  
 
Data Presentation after Applying the Framework 
It is necessary to clarify that engaging in argument, following Mason, means the 
construction of a perspective, an interpretation, or a line of a reasoning analysis. It is a 
relational process in which researchers continually think about engaging with those 
with whom the argument is being made and the ground upon which they base the 
argument (Mason 2002: 173). Apropos of the former, this thesis aims to address those 
who have been engaged in intellectual networking within the East Asia region. It is 
anticipated that this academic project will illustrate that (on-going) reflection will 
illuminate the significance of the philosophical and sociological grounds of being part 
of the communicative-action projects. 
Tracing back to the way this project was set up, Part II provides some answers 
to the developmental and mechanical puzzles. To be more precise, Chapter 3 looks 
back at the 1960s, a time during which networking facilities were starting to emerge 
as a result of economic efforts. Later, the facilitation of socialising provided a fertile 
ground for the establishment of ASEAN-ISIS in 1984. Also within this time span, the 
Japanese launched the concept of ‘comprehensive security’, which allowed them to 
have more space for conducting flexible foreign policies in the region. Chapter 3 
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concludes at the initially ascending period of networking between 1984-1991, which 
culminated in the inception of both the ARF and CSCAP.  
The illustration continues in Chapter 4 and comprises two related sections. 
The first deals with questions of to what extent and in what ways did ASEAN-ISIS 
engage with its Japanese counterparts. It also analyses how they were successful in 
persuading ASEAN governments and the other non/like-minded individuals to ‘come 
on board’. The second section deals with the slow progress of the networks, until the 
revitalising projects such as the promotion of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and the ‘East 
Asia Community’ emerged. This part aims to show that these two projects were not 
only compatible but well connected due to the intentions and efforts of the networks-
engaging agents, who seemed to share the experiences, ideas and visions of their 
region(s).   
The focus of the last part is upon reflective analysis. It starts with a brief 
review of how agents’ ideas/perceptions towards their surroundings, specifically their 
global and regional contexts, help them to construct and persist in consuming their 
preferred concept of comprehensive security. By doing so, it highlights the 
significance of ideational factors upon agents’ networking activities. In order to 
determine whether or not and how changing contexts affect the thematic content of 
their networking activities, it provides figures to help magnify these points (see 
Chapter 5). The main reflection will be drawn from engaging agents’ experiences 
gathered during interviews. It then proceeds with the question of whether their 
expanded networks have had any impact on their function and status. In particular it 
seeks to determine whether they are independent enough to take a critical leading role 
in bringing change to security concepts and activities.  
 In the final section, the main content drawn from the aforementioned analyses 
helps to reflect on the weak and strong points of the framework for better revision, 
specifically in order to accommodate the concept of trust. The observation is that trust 
is a social-foundation concept, which is normally presupposed without clear 
definition. It is accepted that due to the limited space and scope of the original project 
it cannot be dealt with more extensively than already done so in Chapters 1 and 5. It is 
anticipated that reflecting on the original framework, and indeed upon the whole 
project, should  serve to energise and revitalise the notion that communicative action 
is a helpful starting point for understanding track II’s activities in East Asia. It could 
also lead to better change, should it have the chance to prosper. 
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Part II: Constructing and Sustaining East Asian (Security) Intellectual Networks 
 
Chapter 3 
Constructing East Asia (Security) Intellectual Networks 
 
The 1990s was a vibrant decade that witnessed the inception of many international 
fora as consultative and co-operative organs. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) and Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC) are cases in point. To a 
great extent they are regarded as the results of numerous co-operative efforts of what 
is termed here ‘East Asia (Security) Intellectual Networks’. They represent mingling 
networks of state-representatives and non-state agents, who seek to engage in 
improving their regional security. The latter are emphasised in this thesis, particularly 
the co-operation between those from ASEAN countries and Japan, whose efforts to no 
small degree helped to establish the aforementioned fora. It becomes even more 
interesting when the region is perceived as being dominated by state-centric activities. 
The main focus of this chapter is as illustrating the origins, processes, and 
activities that have helped to shape these networks. In order to achieve this, the 
chapter will follow the path established by the framework set up in Chapter 1. In other 
words, it will attempt to reconstruct agents’ historical contexts (specifically at global 
and regional levels, including domestic), particularly addressing the political and 
economic spheres. The historical context is regarded here as the inspiration for an 
agent’s actions which are structured by their perception on their regional security and 
social surroundings. This interplay process helps agents determine whether their 
regional security structure can be transformed as suggested by networking literature 
reviewed in Chapter 1.  
Within this discursive space, the interplay process, traces of internal logics of 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action can be discerned. The logic, for this 
project, is : truth about regional security of engaging/networking agents; their moral 
rightness expressed by having no precise solutions for every conflict before joining 
networking activities; and their sincerity to learn to know each other and to 
compromise by accepting shared principles. The most commonly accepted principle is 
their mutual understanding to improve their regional security. It is anticipated that 
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placing more emphasis on regional context will prove an essential means of 
unravelling the ways in which agents generate and maintain their networks. 
With the above concerns in mind, this chapter is structured chronologically 
using the inception of the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
(ASEAN-ISIS) in 1984 as its point of departure. The first time frame presented here 
will be traced back to regional activities in the 1960s, a starting decade that saw the 
formation of international economic and political fora (or organisations), which have 
provided fertile ground for the inception of intellectual networks. Their legacies help 
one comprehend the networking activities in later periods. Although some concrete 
platforms (specifically in the political realm, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) in particular, due to the changed environment – more discussion of which 
later) have already fallen, both the engaging and networking experiences have 
endured. The spill-over effects seem to be expressed in somewhat fluctuating content 
in terms of regional security and politics. 
The main body of this chapter focuses on the 1980s as a result of the creation 
of the ASEAN-ISIS. Economic and political activities came to be linked with non-
traditional security, although the state/military-centric focus looms large. Also within 
the same period the idea of ‘comprehensive security’ was established in Japan, 
allowing it to be more easily accommodated by its ASEAN counterparts. This chapter 
mainly provides information concerning who those intellectual-networking agents are, 
and how they perceive and interact with their surroundings.  
The last section of this chapter addresses more specifically their security 
concepts and related activities, most of which – in the case of this thesis - occurred 
between 1984 and 1991. It was during this period that new elusive ideas were 
carefully and gradually aired; then transformed into the inception of the ARF and the 
CSCAP as illustrated in the next chapter. The guiding questions for this chapter are 
drawn from both the first and the second groups of research questions. These 
questions cover who those active state- and non-state engaging agents were, how they 
constructed and expanded their engaging/networking activities, did these engaging 
agents share similar ideas on security, and how the process of network cohesion 
worked and why it worked out that way. 
 
The contradictory and uncertain regional context before 1984 
Politics-led state activities and economics-led private activities 
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Tracing back through regional contemporary history, East Asian countries have 
experienced contradictory and uncertain phenomena. To a great extent they have 
acted as catalysts for contextual change affecting agents’ perceptions of their 
surroundings, enabling and/or constraining agents’ activities, derived from an 
interacting process, the context of which has also changed. It is this interaction that 
will be narrated here. In terms of trying to break free from a confined space, the 
foundation of the interacting process has been globally ideological conflict. 
Irrespective of whether it was expected or not expected, the interacting process helped 
to generate overt regional experiences of networking.1 It was more explicitly 
successful in economic rather than political fields as early as the 1960s. 
Washington’s sweat, energy, and strategies, especially what is referred to as its 
‘hub-and-spoke’ approach, must be acknowledged. Together, it helped to establish 
what Peter J. Katzenstein (2005) calls the 'American Imperium accentuated in the 
globalising era by American soft-power' (as seen in the domination of American 
cultural products) (Nye 1990). Whether intentionally or not, American efforts have 
provided fertile ground for domestic and regional actors. The earlier period 
(specifically two decades after World War II) was a space in which would-be 
engaging/networking agents (both governmental and non-governmental) could assert 
their concerns, although initially they faced limitations.  
To be more precise, Washington’s containment policy and its ability to almost 
solely shoulder all responsibilities provided great chances for countries in the region 
to concentrate on their domestic difficulties, such as activities that included reaching 
out and co-operating so that they could ease their problems and establish better 
positions for themselves. Most of these countries were young nation-states whose 
nation-building processes were unfolding. These included Thailand even though it 
had never been colonised and was less devastated by World War II than other nations 
in the region. For these young-nation states ‘Third World countries’ threats came 
mostly from within, particularly when the core values of the regime were often at 
extreme variance (authoritarian rules) with the core values cherished by large 
                                                        
1
 Provided that ancient Asian merchants’ networks are included, the history might be traced back to the 
Medieval Age or earlier. Kazuo Furuta (1997) points out that at least Asian Merchants’ networks 
carrying Europe goods (cotton in particular) appeared in the late 19th century. Shanghai as the centre 
extended its reach in various directions, not only within main land boundaries but also within western 
Japan (Nagasaki and Kobe) and Korea (Inchon and Pusan). 
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segments of the population, who preferred more democratic rule, over whom they 
ruled (Ayood 1986: 11). Global, regional, and domestic contexts, specifically in East 
Asia that was full of these young nation states, for the would-be engaging/networking 
agents were neither helpful nor encouraging, but challenging as agents’ initial 
structure for thought and interaction. 
Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia faced different consequences from 
American security domination. For Japan, although the Korean War in the first half of 
the 1950s made it feel insecure, American intervention indicated that Washington was 
reliable. But the Japanese had to accept this 'security' at their own expense, by 
shouldering American bases and gradually increasing shares of their national defense 
expenses whilst at the same time expanding their economic interests into Asia. 
Indeed, it was ‘economic diplomacy or keizai gaiko’ which was the key to Japan’s 
approach termed ‘Yoshida Doctrine’2 (Mendle 1995: Introduction). It not only helped 
Japan to accumulate wealth and regain international recognition but also enabled it to 
exercise its leadership based on the moral and universal values of democracy, peace, 
and participation, embedded in America's Constitution (Drift 1980, Edstrom 1999: 
chapters 1 and 15, Nakanishi 2001). 
The 1960s were significant for understanding the emergence of co-operative 
trends at various levels (state, sub-state, and inter-state) in the region, which helped 
construct a primary structure for agents’ thought and interactions. Due to fewer 
domestic difficulties, Japan now had a better chance to provide energetic 
contributions. In fact, this whole period was a time of ascension for Japan. Many 
movements from both official and non-official efforts flourished. The role played by 
the Japanese could not be ignored, specifically as co-operative organisers and/or 
facilitators and even fund-givers. This was a period in which both the Japanese and 
the world so appreciated the story of Japan’s rapid economic success that they wanted 
results of that success to be shared by others. The Japanese, both government and the 
people, whether they were state- or non-state agents, explicitly directed their 
intentions and interests towards Asia-Pacific to share their good fortunes. Whether 
                                                        
2
 Yoshida Shigeru, the first post-World War II Japanese Prime Minister (1946-1947, 1948-1954), 
announced that in order to rebuild the war-devastated country, emphasis should be first placed on 
economic and social reconstruction within the parameter of the new Constitution. The other two 
emphases were: the creation of a strong economy based on the belief that economic strength and 
technological achievement was the key to future power and influence in the world; and a decision to 
rely on the US for security matters (Edstrom 1999: chapter 2).  
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their internationally outward performance should be considered as the way to mitigate 
their neighbours’ bad memories regarding Japan’s World War II legacies or not, is not 
the main focus of this writing. The point is to propose that the economic success and 
the energetic movements because of it provided ample facilitating environment for the 
flourishing of regional engaging/networking activities. 
Ikeda Hayato, who was Japan's Prime Minister in the early 1960s, accentuated 
the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ by implementing a clearer cut between the economic and the 
political (Seki bunri). This distinction was the result of turmoil due to the revision of 
the Security Treaty. Ikeda also increased the country's interests in Asian policy3 by 
emphasising that Japan’s prosperity and peace were closely linked to that of Asia. He 
aired to the (then) Australian leader his concern over Indonesia's hostile policy 
(Konfrontasi or Confrontation) towards its neighbouring countries (Walton 2006). 
Morinosuke Kajima, a businessman and politician (LDP), observed the same trend. 
Unfortunately, his proposal to establish a Pan-Pacific organisation aimed at 
administering a Marshall Plan-type of Asia Development Fund (to a large degree 
sponsored by the Japanese government) attracted no serious attention (Soesastro 
1983b: 181, Rezasyah 1996). 
The movements in the Japanese private sector were energetic, although they 
still followed the government's clumsy lead. The cooperation of the five states (at 
government-to-government level) was highlighted in 1963 by (a non-governmental 
agent) Saburo Okita4 of the Japan Economic Research Centre (JERC), who proposed 
                                                        
3
 Japan’s Asian policy (especially related to China) can be traced back earlier than Japan’s first stage 
of Modernisation (from the Meiji period until the country's devastating defeat in 1945). Wolf Mendle 
explains that in the early period, most policies reflected the fluctuation and alteration between 
acceptances of their inferior status vis-à-vis the Chinese court and a certain show of independence with 
a hint of equality. In the Tokukawa era (1603-1868), Chinese philosophy cast spells on Japanese self-
consciousness. But, in the late era up to early modernization, the Japanese acquired a concept of unique 
national identity Nihonjiron) within the encompassing of Chinese-civilisation and response to rivalries 
in world politics. Japanese self-assertiveness over other Asian countries seemed to accumulate over 
time up to August 1945 (Mendle 1995: chapter 2).    
4
 It might be difficult to deny the relationship between Okita’s idea of Pacific’s cooperation and a 
‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’. He used to participate in a Showa-juku (Showa Institute), a 
private school established by the Showa Kenkyukai (Showa Research Society) headed by Prince 
Fumimaro Konoe (who was prime minister three times between 1937 and 1941). It was Showa 
Kenkyukai that generated the ideas about an East Asian Cooperative Body and a New Order in East 
Asia, which were the founding stones for the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (Wood 1993: 38). He was a 
Director of Japan’s Economic Planning Bureau in the early 1960s, and was one of three Asian 
economists who had undertaken an ESCAFE (the former name of ESCAPE) study of ‘Regional 
Economic Cooperation’ in 1961 (Soesastro 1983a: 17).  
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the idea through a report entitled ‘Economic Cooperation in the Pacific Area’ (Wood 
1993: 38). Together with Kiyoshi Kojima5 of Hitotsubashi University, and his 
colleague Hiroshi Kurimoto, they undertook numerous discussions with their 
university colleagues and business persons who were interested in their ideas, 
focusing on common interests in economic relations, transportation, communication 
and cultural exchange. Finally, during the JERC’s first international conference in 
November 1965, Kojima proposed the formation of a Pacific Free Trade Area 
(PAFTA) (Rezasyah 1996, Borthwick 2005). Two years later, several Japanese 
business groups (mostly bankers and industrialists), together with groups from 
Australia, enlarged their bilateral meeting to be more inclusive. New participants were 
from Canada, New Zealand and the United States. These joint activities saw the 
emergence of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) (Borthwick 2005).  
Fortunately, Okita and Kojima received a good response from Tokyo in terms 
of finance6 and supporting policy. In 1967, Miki Takeo (who was then Foreign 
Minister) announced the ‘Asia-Pacific Policy’7 which decreed that Japan should 
contribute to the amelioration of the North-South problem in Asia by using economic 
development as a means of removing the causes underpinning ongoing regional 
                                                        
5
 Wood (1993) pointed out that Kojima received his impressions and inspiration from the 1964 East-
West Center conference in Honolulu on ‘Economic Cooperation for Development and Trade in the 
Pacific’ together with his experiences from working on regional economic co-operation with one of the 
big names in the field: Bela Balassa (pp. 41-42). 
6
 Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry) sponsored tours to various places opening up a significant chance for 
Kojima to meet potential friends. like-minded colleagues supporting the idea of Asia-Pacific economic 
cooperation: Peter Drysdale and John Crawford from Australia; Frank Holmes from New Zealand; H. 
Edward English from Canada; Howard P. Jones, Harry G. Johnson and Hugh T. Patrick from the 
United States (Wood 1993: 42). 
7
 The prestigious Keizei Doyukai (Committee for Economic Development): the audience signified its 
importance. Policy was based on: an ‘awareness of common principles’; regional corporation in Asia; 
cooperation among advanced nations within the Pacific area; and more extensive programmes 
(Soesastro 1983a: 18). This could be regarded as a good chance for Japan to restart the unsuccessful 
series of Ministerial Conference for the Development of Southeast Asia, known as SEADMIC and 
SEAMCED through which it wanted to promote ideas of a regional cooperative institution. A 
ministerial conference centered on the economic development of Southeast Asia, the MEDSEA (from 
1967 regarded as founding members of ASEAN countries) took place in Tokyo in April 1966. It was 
the first time after the war that Japan convened an international conference with no prior notice given 
to the United States. From 1960 to the mid-1970s, the Japanese government initiated and supported 
many organizations: the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC) and the Southeast 
Asian Agency for Regional Transport and Communications (SEATAC) in 1968; the Asian Pacific 
Coconut Community in 1969; the Study Group for Asian Tax Administration and Research (SGATAR) 
in 1971; the Southeast Asian Promotion Centre for Trade, Investment, and Tourism (SEAPCENTRE) 
in 1972; and the Southeast Asia Log Producers Association in 1974 (Mendle 1995: 105, Rezasyah 
1996). 
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conflict. The Japanese Foreign Ministry joined hands with the Rockefeller Foundation 
to sponsor the first Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conference. In 1968, it 
replaced PAFTA with fewer abstract intellects and more practical aims and themes, 
such as regional development and economic aid (Wood 1993: 43, Rezasyah 1996, 
Edstrom 1999, Borthwick 2005). 
A consultative and co-operative style of engagement operated within regional 
security and the political arenas which the Japanese had successfully joined and 
helped to organise. The establishment of the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC) in 1964 
provided them with just such a chance to practice and promote their regionally 
consultative and co-operative skills. Although it had a short life (terminated in 1975 
after the fall of Saigon), C. W Braddick (2006: 36, 39) and David Walton (2006: 23-
24) claim that there can be little doubt that it built up a sense of community and 
consciousness of common interests and objectives among members. Its success was 
based on the level of intimacy and frankness in dialogue, although it was intangible 
and less spectacular. Here Japan’s leadership was famous for developing consultation 
in a relaxed and informal atmosphere.  
Also within this period, the emergence of non-governmental networking fora 
was discernable. Although the Japanese shared an essential role as co-operative 
organisers and/or facilitators and even fund-givers, earlier fora were inspired by 
prominent American figures. The ‘Williamsburg Conference’ (initiated in 1956) was 
an early case in point under the aegis of the Asia Society (based in New York and 
supported by John D. Rockefeller III) (Taylor, Milner and Ball 2006: 46-47). The 
Dartmouth Conference (supported by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller 
Foundation) was initiated as a result of co-operation between non-governmental 
agents from America and Japan. Edwin O. Reischauer (who was the American 
Ambassador to Japan in 1961-1966) also played a part in persuading Tokusaburo 
Kosaka (a prominent Japanese iron industrialist) to provide for the Shimoda 
Conference. Starting in 1967, the Dartmouth Conference became a sphere in which 
eminent officers, politicians (such as Nakasone Yasuhiro, who was later Japan's Prime 
Minister in 1982-1987), and business persons (such as Akio Morita of Sony Corp) 
mingled together (Yamamoto 1994).  
Apropos of the countries of Southeast Asia, the first two decades after World 
War II (the mid-1950s to mid-1960s) were 'adventurous' to say the least. On the one 
hand, there were attempts to establish regional organisations. Before the mid 1950s, 
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the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established under American 
aegis. Despite its name, only Thailand and the Philippines were true regional 
members. When London announced its intention to withdraw from the East of Suez in 
1956, its lack of efficiency was accentuated. Its inefficiency was due to the refusal of 
a potential regional country (namely Indonesia) to become a member. This was also a 
main reason underpinning the success of the less relevant Association of Southeast 
Asia (ASA) comprising Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Yet the thwarting of   
MAPHILINDO, comprising Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, was 
attributable to a different reason, namely Indonesia’s aggressive policy of Konfrontasi 
(Huxley 1987: 194, Sirikrai 1990: 249).  
On the other hand there were conflicts that led to war. The infamous Indo-
Chinese War, which later became the ‘Vietnam War’ (as the Americans call it) or the 
‘American War’ (as the Vietnamese call it) was a good case in point.  Yet, what 
explicitly caused regional inter-state antagonism resulted from the formation of the 
Federation of Malaysia in September 1963. Sukarno8, who was then Indonesia's 
President, led his country under the banner of ‘guided democracy’, which was viewed 
by nationalists as a remnant of British neo-colonial design. Sukarno launched his 
Konfrontasi programme based on coercive diplomacy and small-scale arms activities 
due to many reasons. Apart from announcing it as a reaction to the Dutch authority's 
plan to liberate West Irian, Sukarno’s main point was to express his country’s strong 
position regarding the Philippines’ controversial claim over the British colony of 
North Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah), which planned to become part of Malaysia. To 
further complicate matters, Indonesia had to face a devastating internal rift involving 
the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Kommunist Indonesia: PKI.) Its members 
were accused of murdering several Indonesian generals during an abortive coup in 
1965. The PKI was suspected of receiving Beijing's support during the period of the 
‘Cultural Revolution’. (Lau Teik Soon 1986: 189).     
The situation changed with the ascension to power of Lt. General Suharto in 
1966. Suharto’s ‘New Order’ not only brought internal stability but also created an 
atmosphere of friendship in the region.  Jakarta emphasised that its concept of 
‘ketahanan nasional’ (national resilience) was the key, further emphasising that 
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 Most of the Indonesia take one only like the renown Sukarno and Suharto  
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national security lay neither in alliances nor under any great power’s military 
umbrella but in ‘self-resilience’. This concept rested on domestic economic and 
political strength and stability, infused with a high national morale. It was also 
anticipated to help to provide regional peace by constructing a concept of regional 
resilience as the sum of individual countries’ national resilience (Joesoef 1974: 80, 
Anwar 1990, Emmers 2003: 10-13). Resilience, as the basis for a comprehensive 
concept of security, gradually widened and became accepted in the region, due to its 
core concept of national development aimed at eradicating poverty and backwardness 
as the root causes of the internal insurgences which threatened to destabilise regional 
security (Kusuma-Atmadja 1990: 163).  
Regional cooperation was first discussed in 1966 when Tunku Abdul Razak 
(Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister), Adam Malik (the Indonesian Foreign Minister), 
and Thanat Khoman (the Thai Foreign Minister) held talks in Bangkok on the 
normalisation of Indonesian-Malaysian relations. As a result of these talks, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was inaugurated in August 1967 by 
the Bangkok Declaration, with explicitly non-political aims. Instead, economic and 
cultural co-operation was highlighted. But the early success of the Association was 
not as had been intended, due to a lack of functional economic integration. On the 
contrary, political issues were its real glue.9 In other words, ASA became extended 
and transformed. What should not be overlooked is that the founding members all had 
political notions of regional peace and stability in mind (Swasdiyakorn 1974, Xuto 
1974). Their attempts received good responses, particularly when Leonid Brezhnev, 
the (then) Soviet leader, called for the establishment of an Asian Collective Security 
Agreement in 1969, a call that aimed to build up a security network on bilateral bases 
against China (Lau Teik Soon 1986: 183).        
To summarise (see Figure 1 on p.212), the regional context, specifically the 
early post World War II period (1950-1960), may be seen as a mixed blessing. This 
kind of structure, that is, acted both to enable and to constrain agents’ perceptions and 
activities. On the one hand, the negative aspects of the ideological conflict, including 
those derived from colonial experiences, were glaringly apparent. There were many 
unsettled territorial and political issues, military skirmishes, and wars in both 
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 This led wags to comment that the acronym actually stands for (A)dhoc (S)trategies (E)ntity of an 
(A)mbiguous (N)ature (Jackson 1984: xi).   
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Northeast and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, uncertainty regarding peace 
undoubtedly encouraged the regional state- and non-state agents to be more co-
operative and inclusive as best as they could in terms of geography and other aspects. 
Initially, prominent engaging actors included Saburo Okita and Kiyoshi Kojima. Their 
links within and outside of Japan were crucial, specifically when the regional 
atmosphere was about to change. A rough concept of regional community 
(represented as the Asia-Pacific) was discernible. Japan, which was better off in terms 
of economic well-being, steered the regional co-operation in a more economic 
direction with encouragement from non-government agents, particularly from the 
mid-1960s on. Although Southeast Asia continued to be dominated by the regional 
governments’ military and political issues, the inception of ASEAN and its 
acceptance of the concept of ‘regional resilience’ extended from the Indonesian 
concept of  ‘national resilience’ indicated that the region inclined to accept less 
traditional security concept which would become the basic concept for ASEAN 
intellectuals’ comprehensive security.  
 
1970s: observing more energetic non-governmental agents 
The 1970s proved one of the turning periods for both Japan and the ASEAN 
countries. Discussions and attempts to achieve closer economic and political 
cooperation came not only from government and business, but also from academics. 
This was a period of more explicitly extended networking with more directed and 
focused concerns, first expressed in the attempts of domestic-based individuals and/or 
institutions and non-governmental agencies. Together, they all helped to construct 
‘Track-II Diplomacy’.  
In 1970, Eisaku Sato (who was then Japan's Prime Minister), declaring that the 
dawn of Japan’s ‘New Pacific Age’ had arrived, tried to steer Tokyo’s international 
co-operation towards Asia. However, he was careful not to let it contradict that of 
Washington. The harsh and negative response elicited when his successor Tanaka 
Kakuei toured the ASEAN countries opened Tokyo’s eyes to the difficult reality.10 
But despite that, Japan’s international role still showed some positive signs, 
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 The trip triggered a flare-up of deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment in these countries, particularly 
in Bangkok and Jakarta, which had been fostered by what was seen as Japan’s arrogant behaviour as a 
rapidly rising economic power with growing influence in the region (Masaki 2007). They tended to 
regard Japan as nothing but an ‘economic animal’.  
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encouraging - even providing opportunities for - inter-state-, state-, and sub-state-
networking activities. Tanaka’s successor Miki Takeo's foreign policy placed more 
emphasis on Asia, proposing that his country could become a successful bridge 
spanning the East and the West. 
Whilst Japan was struggling with its own international image, ASEAN 
presented a different one. The creation of the Association on the basis of personal 
friendship and mutual understanding had successfully paved the way for more 
diplomatic co-operation though there were still different ideas on how to manage the 
regional affairs. The idea of regional cooperation had been increasingly extended 
beyond the inter-governmental level to business people, academia, journalists, and 
ordinary citizens (Ishak 1974, Wanandi 1979: 53-54). The result was a convergence 
of political outlooks regarding decisions revolving around how to fit regional 
planning and cooperation more integrally into the national development plans of 
member states.  
The announcement of a ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality’ (ZOFPAN) 
in Kuala Lumpur in November 1971, signifying ASEAN members’ attempts to 
neutralise their region in terms of non-intervention by outside powers, was an early 
example of this planning (Joesoef 1974, Malik 1974, Dijiwandono 1984). Yet, 
members continued to disagree on how to practice the concept. Indonesia was against 
it due to its potential for domination; Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines worried 
about their closeness to the US (as their external guarantor) (Emmers 2003: 61-69). 
The politically convergent meaning of it was that the region could jointly prevent the 
predominance of any great power. It also implied that it was the regional states that 
would set the rule or at best manage the great powers in a balanced fashion (Wannadi 
1984: 201).    
As opposed to the previously mixed image of government activities, the early 
1970s were energetic years of initiative for non-governmental activities, particularly 
those directly engaging with the networking under investigation here.  
In 1970, Tadashi Yamamoto, one-time personal aide to Tokusaburo Kosaka, 
established the Japan Centre for International Exchange (JCIE), a non-profit, non-
government organisation that aimed to proactively and innovatively respond to the 
evolving needs of Japan’s international role. It laid claim to three main focuses: 
building co-operation and community in East Asia; strengthening human security 
responses to the challenges facing 'our' world today; and exploring and promoting a 
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more active international role for Japan (JCIE 2006: 4-5). It came as no surprise in 
1973 when David Rockefeller, who was then Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank 
and a leader of the philanthropic community in the US, asked the JCIE to help 
establish the Trilateral Commission. The Commission, a non-governmental forum 
comprising leading private citizens from Europe, North America and Pacific Asia, 
aimed to promote mutual understanding and closer co-operation through discussions 
and shared perspectives on common political, economic, and foreign policy 
challenges (Yamamoto 1994: 21). The Commission could be regarded as a fertile 
ground for nurturing the idea and practice of being inclusive a powerful linkage to 
affect governmental policies.  
In September 1971, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
was established in Jakarta, Indonesia, under the leadership of two law graduates of the 
University of Indonesia, Jusuf Wanandi and Harry Tjan Silalahi. Its earlier patrons 
were two senior military officers close to President Suharto, namely Ali Moertopo 
and Soedjono Hoemardani, who supervised Indonesian political and economic affairs. 
Hoemardani’s extensive links with business circles (Japanese in particular) made 
CSIS’s outreach activities tangibly possible. These activities included international 
exchanges with many important states in the ASEAN region, notably Malaysia and 
Singapore (Sudarsono 1988: 21). CSIS’s early movements expressing its firm 
existence were mostly engaged with similar institutions in the West; the French 
Institute of International Relations (IFRI) in 1972, the RAND Corporation, the 
University of California at Berkeley, the Chicago Council, the Council on Foreign 
Affairs in New York, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston and 
other key institutions in Washington D.C (Hourn 2002: 5-6). The CSIS’s trips to the 
US proved really productive when Hadi Soesastro, who had worked for the RAND 
Corporation, decided to join CSIS in Jakarta, becoming one of the key members of the 
institution and its engaging/networking activities.11 
More co-operative processes continued throughout the 1970s in both the 
political and economic dimensions and at both governmental and non-governmental 
levels, despite the world and the region being witness to many unexpected, often 
disturbing, phenomena. Apart from US President Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing, 
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followed by the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, 1975 was a memorable year: the fall 
of Saigon and the American withdrawal from Vietnam led to the rise of symbolic red 
stars all over Indochina; the establishment of the Council for Security Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, where people from NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
constructed friendships and promoted human rights; and six economic powers (the 
US, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan) held an economic summit 
for the first time (Irize 1997: 156-161). It was also the year that Japanese and 
European intellectuals joined hands to establish one of the long lasting international 
conferences; the ‘Hakone Meeting’. This forum provided a social space in which 
scholars, business leaders, journalists and policy experts from both sides sought to 
deepen their respective understandings of the problems faced by each side. At first, it 
did not proceed smoothly as both sides paid more attention to their relations with the 
US than they did to overlapping areas of concern. But its significance grew with the 
passing of time (Satoh 1984).  
Hanns W. Muall (1984: 64) suggested that the Hakone Meeting could be 
regarded as a helpful means of clarifying and accepting that there was no such thing 
as a ‘quick fix’. Yet, it could mitigate the vulnerability of Japanese perceptions that 
they were being discriminated against by both Europe and the US (Yoshino 1984: 74). 
The meeting raised three main questions: what kind of world do both sides want; what 
are the commonalities between them; and how can Japan and Europe, together and 
separately, provide for orderly change and greater predictability in international 
relations (Maull 1988: 8-9)?  The core institutions that helped to deliver a fruitful 
conference were: the JCIE, the European University Institute in Florence, the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs in London, Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige 
Politik (the German Society for Foreign Affairs) in Bonn, and the Institut Français des 
Relations Internationales (French Institute of International Relations) in Paris (JCIE 
1984: v-vi). They also, with collaboration from Indonesia's CSIS, helped to 
inaugurate both ASEM and the CAEC (for further discussion see chapter 4). 
Movements from non-governmental agents were unquestionably vibrant and 
the people-centred activist movement was also energetic. The Asian Cultural Forum 
on Development (ACFOD), which was set up in Bangkok in 1975, initially had 
regional networks in the Asia-Pacific region covering inter-exchanging-action 
programmes for workers, peasants, fishermen and women (Shuto 2000: 120). The 
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process, led by Kojima and Okita, sought closer economic cooperation. It went well in 
accordance with ongoing efforts to encourage closer intellectual cooperation.  
Peter Drysdale of Australia National University (ANU) proposed a more 
progressive and inclusive step - aimed at the industrialised countries only - to form an 
Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD). His proposal was 
officially supported by both Okita and Crawford in 1976.12 In order to help it 
materialise, the Japanese government unofficially funded many programmes aimed at 
supporting better understanding in terms of technical scholarship and economic and 
cultural communication13 (Wood 1993: 43-48, Borthwick 2005: 6). 
In the interests of governmental co-operation, in 1976 ASEAN created more 
affirmative documents: the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) and the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord. They accentuated the need to promote national and 
ASEAN resilience in terms of political and economic ties, the latter being directly 
related to the perceived Japanese domination of the region. Only firmer economic co-
operation could guarantee and reinforce the visibility of ASEAN in a time of regional 
turbulence and Japanese economic domination (Wanandi 1980: 49, Parrenas 1990: 
213-215, Rolls 1991: 317-318). 
Everything concerning cooperation seemed to be hastened when Japan’s 
‘visibly active’ international role – in the form of the 'Fukuda Doctrine' - was 
announced in August 1977 by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda during his tour of 
ASEAN countries.14  It was aimed at reassuring these states that Japan would take 
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 This proposal was highly recognised in 1979 when Professor Hugh Patrick (then at Yale, now at 
Columbia) and Peter Drysdale wrote a report presented to US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
using OPTAD as a centre piece.  The East-West Center in Honolulu, Lawrence Krause of the Brooking 
Institute (at that time) and Richard Sneider, a former US Ambassador to Korea, all supported the 
proposal (Borthwick 2005: 7).  
13
 In 1974, the Japanese government entirely funded an Association for Overseas Technical 
Scholarship (AOTS) in order to train workers from regional countries and other developing countries. 
The Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) was also created to supervise the association. In 
the same year, the Asia Club of Japan (originally named Asia Club for Promotion of Economic and 
Cultural Communications: ACPECC) was organised to promote communication among Asian people 
(Samad and Muhammad 1994: 261).  
14
 A speech delivered on 18 August 1977 in Manila, in the Philippines, can be summarised according 
to three principles: Japan rejects the role of military power; As a true friend of the Southeast Asian 
countries, Japan will do its best to consolidate the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on 
a ‘heart-to-heart’ understanding with these countries; Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its 
member countries (Saeki 1978: 15). In March of the following year (1978), Japan announced a 
contribution of ¥ 5 billion to the ASEAN Cultural Fund as a sign of genuinely creating heart-to-heart 
communication (Samad and Muhammad 1994: 263, Maswood 1988: 265). 
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peaceful steps in its active role (political acts) and it especially proclaimed the 
Japanese to be good supporters of regional economic development.15 Included in the 
Japanese plan for the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ was the acceptance of ASEAN as an equal 
partner, creating the necessary conditions for a stable, particularly the relationship 
between ASEAN and Indochinese countries, and peaceful world based on a free trade 
system.  
 CSIS organised a major conference in 1977, with the aim of planning the 
future of East Asia under the theme ‘What’s next for East Asia?’ Many participants 
from the US and Asia attended, including from Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Japan. This kind of activity continued in later years with closer 
collaboration between members of ASEAN and institutions in the US. Robert A. 
Scalapino, a prominent participant, encouraged efforts to set up an ASEAN centre in 
the region based on the networking already in place.  
Topics were varied. They included traditional security concerns (the regional 
role of major powers, including Japan), the ongoing turmoil in Cambodia, and 
economic co-operation (Hourn 2002: 6-8). It was the last-mentioned topic that 
brought ASEAN scholars close to Japan, before extending their interests to cooperate 
with like-minded participants from America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Narongchai Akrasanee's experiences (one of Thailand's most energetic and engaging 
agents) confirm this point. According to him, a shared belief in the positive aspects of 
liberal capitalism and development was the glue binding ASEAN and Japan, 
particularly under the energetically bridging role of Tadashi Yamamoto.16 Few 
participants from ASEAN and their governments withheld their support. They came 
together because they observed a trend towards integration, first in its economic form, 
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 In order to avoid the negative effects from this short-sighted hit-and-run economic policy, Daoed 
Joesoef (1978) proposed that so many areas deserved priority consideration: the modern methods of 
production through which the value-added could be increased or established; improving the quality of 
the local products or at least reducing their costs; paying attention to import substitution (less 
significant with the passing of time); the strong-linkage effects of the investment; and investment 
contributing to the expansion of the export. In the case of Indonesia at that time, agricultural 
development in terms of transferring knowledge and experience about small-farm management 
(including cash-crops and rubber smallholders) and developing the linkages between agricultural 
machineries and small scale metal industries (as import substitution) were essential economic 
cooperation from Japan in order to reduce the poverty of the general people (Kamiya 1978: 80-91, Miki 
1978, Rangkuti 1978, Soedjatmiko 1978, Soehoed 1978). 
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 Interview conducted October 3rd 2006 at Saranee Group, Bangkok, Thailand 
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and then in terms of institutions. In the words of Hadi Soesastro, they wanted to 
‘position ASEAN in the wider region’.17   
 In late 1979, Japan seemed to catch on after Fukuda met incumbent US 
President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), who suggested that Southeast Asia was an area 
for which Japan had to take responsibility (Shibusawa and Yano 1978: 43). Japan saw 
itself as the ‘new type of great power’ based on economic and moral virtues (Edstrom 
1999: 95). This concept was close to that of ‘civilian power’. The term signifies a 
state which actively promotes civilising international relations. Despite its having 
been generated in Europe as a means of understanding (West) Germany’s active 
international role, the term could be compatible with what Japan was trying to 
achieve, through its emphasis on replacing the military enforcement of rules with the 
internationalisation of socially accepted norms (Harnisch and Maull 2001: 1-9).  
Fukuda saw a necessity to help facilitate more institutionalisation in order to create a 
new type of super power. The Japanese government could utilise the status of being a 
civilian power and develop its internationalising process through it (Lie 1977, Yano 
1977). Of course, the need for raw materials and markets played its part in Japan’s 
Asia policy (Kuroyanagi 1978, Panglaykim 1978, Mendle 1995: 106).  
In 1977, Japan’s perception of security was about to be broadened in order to 
accommodate the changing environment and leave room to allow more internationally 
flexible activities. It was the Nomura Research Institute that first urged this 
broadening, by introducing the concept of ‘comprehensive security’. This encouraged 
Japan’s leadership to bolster its economic contributions as a means of shouldering an 
international security responsibility. This meant utilising ‘economic cooperation’, 
particularly through international industrial adjustment, to generate international 
security, efficiency, and justice (Shinohara 1983).  
In 1978 the Study Group on Comprehensive National Security (commissioned 
by Masayoshi Ohira, the then Japanese Prime Minister) presented the concept in a 
more organised way. Not only were traditional military elements included, which was 
of least concern at the time, but also political, economic, ecology/energy, and natural 
disasters were added. These had the potential to affect the country and its people’s 
well-being (Chapman, Drift and Gow 1983: Introduction, Edstrom 1999: chapters 6-7, 
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9). Japan incorporated economic as well as political and military aspects within the 
concept in terms of interpretation of security due to its unique dependence on 
overseas supplies (raw materials and markets) and less direct pressure from traditional 
security issues (Maull 1984: 66). The economic aspects of Japan’s comprehensive 
security were about to be tested when in 1978 the US recommended that Japan had 
not played an international role commensurate with its economic status (Wood 1993: 
218). Ohira responded by being more assertive towards Pacific co-operation through 
existing networks generated and sustained by his Foreign Minister Okita, who also 
chaired the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group before becoming a minister.  
The Study Group called for an international symposium to discuss options for 
ongoing Pacific economies’ co-operation, in order to create an institutional 
mechanism to help the economies in the Asia Pacific to work constructively with the 
Western hemisphere. The way to fulfill this role was to construct common bonds by 
overcoming cultural diversity, in the interests of facilitating and increasing the 
confidence required for long-term co-operation. The appropriate way to achieve this 
was to create a private standing committee of 15-20 ‘persons of authority’, that could 
initially manage a series of international conferences on Pacific co-operation. 
Members of the committee should comprise both state- and non-state agents 
possessing backgrounds from economics and business. It had the chance to become an 
informal consultative forum for discussion surrounding regional issues of common 
interest. In the long-term, the forum might establish ‘working groups’ to study 
regional issues, make recommendations by consensus, and develop into an inter-
governmental consultative organisation with a permanent secretariat (Davies 1980, 
Pang 1981: 10, Edstrom 1999: chapter 9, Elek 2005b: 15, Patrick 2005: 140-142). 
Their quest received a good response from the PBEC. At the 12th general meeting, it 
gave its approval to the concept of a ‘Pacific Economic Community’. From that point 
on, PBEC became actively involved by virtue of its significant business driving force 
for the more inclusive and co-operative region (Borthwick 2005: 5-6). 
With hindsight, their efforts widely generated discussion about the stalled 
process of building a ‘Pacific Community’, mostly due to economic difficulties and 
political uncertainties that lingered on into the 1980s. As regards the prevailing 
economic problems, it is difficult to deny that North-South disparities continued and 
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the breakdown of the postwar monetary system was also significant.18 In addition, a 
flexible exchange rate and wide fluctuations of key currencies (namely the US dollar 
and the Japanese yen) were introduced, in tandem with regional protectionism and 
‘stagflation’.19 At the same time, Australia and New Zealand's shift towards the Asia-
Pacific and the ‘Asian Tigers’ (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore), along 
with the 'opening' of China, seemed to identify them as potentially challenging 
economic forces.  
The insular trend of US foreign policy after the Nixon doctrine, the intrusions 
of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan and Vietnam into Cambodia (in 1979), and the 
increasingly accepted significance of ASEAN, were the main reasons for the ensuing 
political uncertainty (Akrasanee, Ariff, Estanislao, Pang, Soesastro, Tan, and 
Wanandi 1980: Introduction, Roth 1980: 23-24, Hirano 1981, Lee 1983, 
Mangkusuwondo 1981).  Japan tried to become more active in international political 
arenas. It contributed financial assistance to Turkey at the same level as France, and 
bore 70 per cent of the cost required to deepen and widen the Suez Canal to 
dimensions through which a large American aircraft carrier could pass. In addition, it 
was the first country to commit increased economic aid to Pakistan in the immediate 
aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Satoh 1984: 27). Unfortunately, 
these actions were not viewed as not being commensurate with Japanese economic 
might.  
Whilst officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry tried their best to persuade 
their national and international counterparts to accept possible membership of forms 
of international (economic) cooperation, the Japanese did not have to 'go it' alone.20 It 
                                                        
18
 From the perspectives of the international-political-economic theorists and world-system theorists, 
the North-South problems derived from an asymmetric (economic) relationship between the developed 
economies (mostly residing in the northern hemisphere) and the developing countries that used to be 
referred to in more inferior terms as ‘less developed’). The latter tried to unite for more bargaining 
power (like the Crain Group, Group-77 etc.) and even proposed the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) to the United Nations (particularly via UNCTAD), albeit with lack of success (for more 
background see Brown 1997: chapters 8-10). 
19
 A macroeconomic term describing a period of high price inflation combined with slow output 
growth and high unemployment (see more description, historical background and related theories at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stagflation accessed on January 10, 2007 
20
 At first, Tokyo proposed the ‘five-plus-five’ formula comprising five from developed countries 
(namely Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US) and five from ASEAN’s founding 
members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). Later South Korea was 
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found active colleagues in Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser21 and in Sir 
John Crawford, Chancellor of the Australia National University at the time, who in 
turn had the support of the PBEC committee. This was the period that the Australian 
government and their business community tried to find their spaces in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Their energetic intention met with that from the Japanese. Together, their 
engaging/networking agents laid the foundation for the first meeting of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC – more discussion of which later). 
In order to avoid harsh criticism of Japan’s leadership, Okita allowed his 
Australian counterpart (Crawford) to take the lead in organising the ‘Canberra 
Seminar’ in September 1980 (Ariff 1981: 29, Wood 1993: 90-91). The path, however, 
was not so smooth that no alteration was needed. Scepticism was already in the air 
before the second seminar was held in Bangkok two years later, proposed by Snoh 
Unakul of Thailand.22 He urged for endorsement of the concept of a tripartite 
standing committee, comprising officials in their private capacity as academics and 
business people (Elek 2005a). Most were members of the G-77 and/or from ASEAN 
countries (English 1983: 99).  
To appease the sceptics from ASEAN countries, the Jakarta based CSIS 
provided fora and publication on the matter. The conference convened in 1979 (the 7th 
Japanese-Indonesian conference entitled ‘Japan-Indonesia Relations: Past, Present, 
Future’) noted what had transpired. Two themes from the conference were related and 
reflected the trends of the time. The first, political-security issues mostly concerned 
Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia). The second was capital-technology 
transfer, namely how to decrease dominant Japanese funds by channelling them into 
particular sectors like agriculture, energy and human resources.  
                                                                                                                                                               
added to the formula so as to ameliorate ASEAN’s uncomfortable feeling that they might be dominated 
by this unequal (economic) partnership (Davies 1980: 171).  
21
 Ohira met Fraser at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meeting 
in May 1979, in Manila, the Philippines (Wood 1993: 90).  
22
 Borthwick summed it up stating that several international meetings and lecture series from 1979 to 
1980 were remembered as playing significant roles in shaping the course of the debate. Among them 
were: lecture series sponsored by the East-West Centre (Hooper 1982); the Asia Dialogue at Oiso, 
Japan (JCIE 1980); the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Jakarta), Indonesian 
Conference in Bali in 1980; a conference on the Pacific community concept (Easter Island, Chile, 
1979); and a security conference related to debate help in Pattaya, Thailand in 1979 (Borthwick 2005: 
7).   
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The shared perception by the participants was that Japan should and could be a 
constructive partner. Its insistence on ‘omni-directional diplomacy’ by maintaining a 
position as a ‘non-military economic power’ could well prove compatible with 
ASEAN’s concept of ‘resilience’, deriving from military to politico-economic and 
socio-cultural elements (Kuriyama 1979, Moertopo 1979b, Ushiba 1979b). The bulk 
of Japanese public opinion between the 1950s and 1960s also supported the view of 
omni-directional diplomacy23 (Kuriyama 1979). Fukuda initiated it to allow Japan to 
play a more constructive political role in bridging relations between conflicting 
nations (Sudo 1992: chapter 6). He had in mind the Southeast Asian nations. There 
was even a claim by the Japanese that their aid programmes rendered ASEAN’s 
‘resilience’ and its economic development a success by shouldering the American 
presence (Oshima 1988: 38-39).  
Although it started with the adoption of the resolution on the establishment of 
a New International Economic Order (NIEO) supported by the UN General Assembly 
since 1974 (Alatas 1984: 11), the dialogue concerning NIEO achieved little success. 
At best, it should have concretely supported the linking of the trilogy of development: 
the equal distribution of development; sufficient high growth of the economy; and 
national/regional stability (Hoemardani 1979: 5). The CSIS panelists proposed that 
due to its economic power, Japan should assume political influence and responsibility, 
the perfect role being to provide solutions for the North-South Dialogue (Wanandi 
1979a).  
However, one of the most cited conferences was held in January 1980. It was 
called ‘Asia-Pacific in the 1980s: Towards Greater Symmetry in Economic 
Interdependence’. There were two main perspectives for these events. First, the US 
wanted a more institutionalised organisation. Second, Malaysia's Deputy Prime 
Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad, wanted an informal forum for the more free 
discussion of 'hot' issues, and the cul-de-sac ‘North-South problem’. Mahathir 
proposed that the focus should be upon the destruction of tak kenal maka tak cinta 
(‘we don’t know one another therefore we don’t like (love) each other’) (Mohammad 
1980, Roth 1980: 23-28), as a forerunner to constructing a friendly atmosphere for 
deepening and broadening cooperation.  
                                                        
23
 With hindsight, the meaning of ‘omni-directional diplomacy’ has gradually unfolded: it means 
omni-directional unequal distance diplomacy within the framework of unequal diplomatic relations. 
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However, Krause and Kojima, adopting positive tones, saw cooperation as a 
useful means, not only of helping to increase ASEAN’s economic-cum-political 
consolidation, but also as a mediator for transmitting economic and technological aid 
from developed to developing countries (Kojima 1983, Krause 1983). Ultimately a 
peaceful region would emerge as a result of long-term regional development and 
(mutual) understanding (Lee 1983).  
In 1981, ASEAN scholars proposed the establishment of a loosely-structured 
non-governmental organisation (contrary to the US perspective). The aim of this was 
to comprise the aforementioned tripartite focus on economic, environmental, social 
and cultural issues, and to promote and study these issues in a cooperative fashion 
(Akrasanee et al 1981, Soesastro 2005b: 32). What is worth noting is that these issues 
indirectly engaged with political issues, within a broadened security concept in a 
comprehensive sense favoured by both ASEAN and Japan.   
Also in 1981, CSIS, with the collaboration of the East Asian Institute of the 
University of California, Berkeley, organised a ‘US-ASEAN Conference’ in Bali, 
Indonesia. The conference, with the theme of ‘Economic, Political, and Security 
Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s’ was an important stepping stone for the 
intellectual networking under examination in this thesis (Soesastro, Jowono and 
Hernandez 2006: 3-4). It was there that potential would-be engaging/networking 
agents from ASEAN initially socialized by getting-to-know each other. At the 
meeting, participants from the ASEAN region built up more familiarity. Key scholars 
included Narongchai Akrasanee (Thailand), Noordie Sopiee (Malaysia), and Carolina 
G. Hernandez and Jesus Estanislao (the Philippines) (Hourn 2002: 9). 
This networking cooperation was particularly helpful as far as the Asia-Pacific 
economic community was concerned. A seminar was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in 
June 1982, organised by the Thailand Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee and 
the John F. Kennedy Foundation (Thailand) with the assistance of the UN agency the 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). It was fruitful 
because of its connection with Narongchai, who managed to mobilise funding from 
Tokyo to launch a project on ‘ASEAN and Pacific Economic Cooperation’. The good 
relationship established with intellectuals from CSIS’s networks was an added bonus 
(Soesastro 2005a, Wood 1983: 98).  
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From this seminar, the name ‘Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference: 
PECC’ officially emerged, and the International Standing Committee was set up.24 
The status of the tripartite conference (in terms of regular multilateral meetings) was 
confirmed. The process was nurtured by the anticipation that the ‘habit’ of conducting 
regular regional dialogues supported by thorough presentation, broad representation, 
and interests of high-level tripartite (English 1983: 98-99, Wood 1983: 89, Young 
2005).  
 It is worth noting here that these activities went on whilst ASEAN continued 
to deepen its rules, norms and the more common objective of regional integration. 
The concept of consensus as unanimity was gradually abandoned, due to its time-
consuming process within the period of expanding scope of interests, as the concept 
of a ‘coalition of the willing’ was increasingly accepted. In addition, patterns of 
consultation were broadened to include military and intelligence (Lau Teik Soon 
1986: 192). Yet, the most prominent trend was ASEAN’s attempt to pave the way for 
more economic cooperation at governmental level. The attempt emphasised the 
meaning of ASEAN’s vision of comprehensive security, namely that economic 
development and political stability should interact positively and go forward together 
in the same direction (Weatherbee 1984, Sudarsono 1984, Pauker 1984, Emmerson 
1984). 
The inception of task forces for PECC also encouraged the preparation of 
papers with the cooperation of international study groups based in several research 
centres in the region. It was anticipated that they would serve as mini conference-
cum-consultation fora (Akrasanee 1983: 81, English 1983: 98). The participants 
agreed to set up their own national committees for progressive works and to persuade 
their respective governments to be more cooperative. One year earlier (1981), Okita 
chaired a newly established Special Committee on Pacific Cooperation (SCPC) as a 
working group within the Japanese Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), an affiliate 
                                                        
24
 The PECC-ISC was referred to by some as the ‘Pacific Mafia’.  Young regarded it in a positive light 
as ‘Pacific Statemanship’, comprising Crawford, Okita, Thanat Khoman (Deputy Prime Minister of 
Thailand), Moertopo (Indonesian’s deputy head of Intelligence, minister for information and defense, 
and personal advisor to President Soeharto), David Sycip (senior advisor to PCI Management 
Consultant, the Philippines), Eric Trigg (senior vice-president of Alcan Aluminum, Canada), 
Ambassador Richard L. Sneider (vice-chairperson of the Washington-based Pan-Pacific Community 
Association), and Nam Duck-Woo (chairperson of the Korea Trader Association and a former prime 
minister and finance minister of South Korea), and the only one who was not at the Bangkok Meeting.  
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of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Borthwick 1983, Wood 1993: 98, Soesastro 2005a, 
Young 2005).  
 The significance of PECC lies in the fact that Tokyo had given official 
approval and full support to its process. As a result, governmental officials in ASEAN 
countries took serious notice of the PECC proposal. Earlier proposals, such as those 
of the PAFTA and OPTAD, had been ignored, partly because they were discussed in 
exclusive non-official circles and were seen - by extension - as a reflection of the 
domination of developed countries (Wanandi 1986: 41). The PECC process was 
different. It offered a spirit of inclusiveness in terms of engaging agents and their 
networking processes, from official and non-official circles alike. In addition, 
economic matters were prominent as already suggested. 
Although Okita insisted that Japanese efforts had thus far had nothing to do 
with politico-security matters, he was unable to deny the indirect link, particularly the 
external force from the US as sine qua non for its security (Okita 1983, Soesastro 
1983b: 184). Economic cooperation in the region could not be separated from 
attempts to provide for political and security co-operation. At least, movements from 
ASEAN scholars indicated that much. Those who met at economic conferences also 
met at political conferences. US-ASEAN conferences proved a significant series of 
networking activities that led to the consolidation of co-operation whereby scholars 
from America, ASEAN, Japan and Korea became familiar with - and cooperated with 
- each other.  
To sum up (see Figure 2 on p.213), from the 1970s to the early 1980s, a 
regional cooperative outlook became firmly established despite the fact that the region 
experienced economic hardship resulting from oil crises, political and security 
problems from military intervention, to massive floods of refugees. Movements from 
non-state agents were clearly visible. Not only did agents from Japan try to extend 
their networking activities as far as Europe through conferences relating to economic 
and political issues, but those from ASEAN also encouraged their enlargement.  
Tadashi Yamamoto from JCIE was quite prominent due to his connection with 
intellectuals and engaging agents from Europe, who participated in the long engaging 
inter-continental cooperative forum like the ‘Hakone Meeting’ and from the US, 
whose cooperation with those from Europe and Japan constructed the renowned 
‘Trilateral Commission’. Engaging experiences within economic fields not only 
inspired agents to extend their networks to other fields but also socialised them to 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 3: Constructing East Asian (Security) Networks 
110 
accept the significance of inclusiveness (in terms of issues and geography). ASEAN 
scholars, Narongchai (Thailand) and Soesastro from Indonesia’s CSIS in particular, 
have joined in activities across fields since the initial periods. Intellectuals in the 
region regarded economic issues to be part and parcel of their security definition. At 
least some of the founding members of the ASEAN scholars’ network agreed to the 
concept, namely, Jusuf Wanandi (Indonesia), Noordin Sopiee (Malaysia), and 
Carolina G. Hernandez and Jesus Estanislao (the Philippines). Participants from the 
US, Canada, New Zealand and Korea who agreed to the concept proved to be 
potential networks for the later period.  
The expansion (derived intellectuals from ASEAN and Japan) appeared in 
terms of both linkages with more diversified countries and more exchanges and 
discussions on political and security related issues. Successful efforts, particularly in 
the case of the PECC process, had to be shared with state representatives. The 
significant link was Okita who changed from being a non-governmental to a 
governmental engaging agent when he ascended to the position of Foreign Minister of 
Japan in the late 1970s. The appointment should not have been a surprise at all when 
the process of tracing back to his background as an important non-state agent who had 
had abundant regional networking experiences was taken into account. During earlier 
periods, he was not only energetic in regional networking activities, but also 
incrementally accumulated regional knowledge of economic contours in terms of who 
was who, and what kind of substantive knowledge was specifically at issue. His 
expertise and deliberation to provide for better regional economic environment were 
matched by the Japanese government’s assertive international role at that time.  The 
regional context, whether within state or non-state agents’ activities, was by then 
familiar through informal consultation, common interests in regional issues and 
consensus. 
The significance of these ‘informal’ characteristics was perceptible in the 
success of ASEAN-ISIS networking activities although it was difficult to deny that 
they were also discernible in the political cooperation of states. Malaysia's Noordie 
Sopiee (1986) highly praised ASEAN's continuous and repeated discussions, 
deliberation and multi-decision making. Talk, talk and more talk became ASEAN's 
effective ‘meat grinder’ to mince difficulties and differences. The Philippines' 
Carolina G. Hernandez argued that ‘to some extent ASEAN-ISIS had the experience 
of the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC). There was already an 
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economic co-operation mechanism. There was a development co-operation model. 
That was what ASEAN-ISIS had in mind’ (Hourn 2002: 18). In other words, the 
would-be ASEAN-ISIS scholars favoured PECC informal characteristics comprising 
informal consultation, accepted common interests (economic development fostering 
political stability) and consensus. 
 
Initially ascending period of networking 
Early movements before the formal establishment of ASEAN-ISIS 
The previous section illustrates the regional context and incremental networking 
activities, with an emphasis primarily on economic matters. These were in fact 
incorporated under the broad umbrella of security of both states and non-state agents. 
They provided the discursive arena, in which the engaging agents perceived, 
interpreted, interacted and formed their ideas and activities. It was this interplay 
process that guided engaging agents to assert that their regional security structure, 
based on comprehensive concepts emphasising economic aspects at that stage, should 
be altered. This section will focus more upon how and to what extent earlier engaging 
agents consolidated and extended their efforts in the name of ‘ASEAN-ISIS’. 
Experiences from consolidating and expanding activities provide essential venues for 
their socialising processes thus far.  
CSIS continually played a leading role in networking activities, which focused 
more on the Southeast than in the earlier period by organising numerous conferences 
and workshops. Between 1981 and 1988, five US-ASEAN conferences were 
convened. Apart from scholars from CSIS, Kusuma Snitwingse, M.R. Sukhumbhand 
Paribatra (from Thailand, who was a friend of Narongchai), and Carolina G. 
Hernandez actively took part and continued to collaborate with one another upon 
returning home, as did Lau Teik Soon of the Singapore Institute of International 
Affairs (SIIA) and Chan Heng Chee of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS).  
These were scholars who sought to make themselves relevant to foreign policy 
by building up networks and presenting what they were thinking, although there were 
some constraints due to their (respective) official obligations. Kwa Chong Guan, who 
was at SIIA and joined the process in its embryonic stage, reflected: 
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‘[W]e were hoping that by linking up ... ideas we will provide another 
platform to discuss things together in an unofficial and informal way. We ourselves 
can contribute an alternative way of thinking’.25   
His statement was aimed at what seemed like cul-de-sac issues at that time, 
both economic and/or political. As well, there were deteriorating security matters.  
At a meeting in Bali in 1984, a consensus was reached that would lead to the 
inception of  an informal grouping of regional institutes. The idea first appeared in the 
form of a suggestion from Donald Emmerson of Stanford University to Jusuf Waandi 
when they met at US-ASEAN conferences organized under the auspices of Robert 
Scalapino, University of California, Berkeley (Wanandi 2006: 31-33). Its working 
name at that time was the ‘ASEAN Institute’. Engaging agents came together with the 
idea that they ‘should develop the idea of regional order together in political and 
security fields. It should not be only economic. But at that time, of course, economic 
(aspect) was focused [upon]’.26 In order to achieve their goal, they decided to become 
more efficient and effective by combining their resources to ‘avoid duplication’, 
particularly when mobilising funds and resources (Hourn 2002: 9-10). 
The names of agents who appeared there are listed in the caption of the group 
photograph. Members of the group, who later became founders of ASEAN-ISIS, 
included: Jusuf Wanandi (CSIS, Indonesia), Noordin Sopiee (ISIS, Malaysia), Lau 
Teik Soon (SIIA, Singapore), Kusuma Snitwongse (ISIS, Thailand), and Carolina G. 
Hernandez (the University of the Philippines). The last mentioned was encouraged to 
establish a similar institution in the Philippines. Finally, the network became a 
network of institutions, with five institutions as the original members acting as the 
focal institution in each of the member countries (Soesastro et al 2006: 5-7). In the 
same year, noted Mexican poet Octavio Paz commented that ‘dialogue keeps us from 
denying ourselves and deny[ing] the humanity of our adversary’ (Coker 1988: 61). In 
other words, dialogue - not monologue - should energise and empower people in their 
life-world, as Habermas proposes in his theory of communicative action (see Chapter 
2).  
                                                        
25
 Interview conducted July 18th 2006 at IDSS, Singapore 
26
 Interview conducted October 20th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia 
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Up to this point, engaging agents were those who familiarised themselves with 
discursive discussion centred on political and security related issues with diverse 
participations. Most interesting of all were their experiences with PECC’s inclusive 
and informal process, which embraced representatives from governmental, non-
governmental (mostly intellectuals whether or not from academic fields), business 
persons and journalists. Many founding members of ASEAN scholars’ network 
accepted that PECC process represented their benchmarking model for constructing 
ASEAN-ISIS. Their main characteristics were informal consultation, acceptable 
common interests (economic development fostering political stability) and 
consensuses.  
The first half of the 1980s saw a period of consolidation of a co-operative 
atmosphere, seemingly on a governmental level within both the political and 
economic realms.  On the one hand, the US trade policy's tough and hard stance faced 
being modified under the threat of the Section 301 of the Trade Bill. This added to the 
uncertainty being felt by many countries in the region (Tanaka 1988: 25). On the 
other, the future seemed brighter, partly due to China’s big swing towards four 
modernisations: namely agriculture, light-industry, science and technology, and 
defence. But it was also a period that echoed resentment towards Japan’s superior 
economic organisations and performance. In addition, there were differences between 
Tokyo and Beijing over issues concerning Japanese textbooks regarding 
contemporary history and the significance and status of the Yasukuni Shrine. Most 
worrisome was whether Japan intended to remilitarise (Maull 1987, Shibusawa 1987).  
At the governmental level, an ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-
PMC) was launched, which was expected to be a two-tiered forum for Pacific co-
operation. The first tier consisted of project co-operation (Human Resources 
Development as a pilot project); the second, which was ostensibly to have been a 
form of policy dialogue, failed to start until the early 1990s, when it took off thanks to 
the initial efforts of non-government agents (Simandjuntak 1990: 32).  
Movement at the governmental level was attributed to efforts by both Japan 
and ASEAN. Japan saw a necessity to establish more familiarity and personal 
acquaintances through informal exchange and conferences at the international level. 
The inception of the UK-Japan 2000 Group in 1984 was a case in point (Wallace and 
Roper 1988: 8-9). Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who was Indonesia's Foreign Minister in 
1984, proposed closer economic co-operation based on a formula of ‘6+5’ (6 ASEAN 
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members and 5 including Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the US) (Okita 
1987: 502-503). Japanese efforts became more effective and energetic as a way of 
softening the hard criticism levelled at their economic domination. An idea circulated 
that Japan wanted to use this cooperation as a platform for adjusting international 
economics, by increasing more horizontal international division of labour - to 
complement Japan's vertical division labour27 (Shibusawa 1983: 137-139). 
This idea had its genesis in the perceived close connection that existed 
between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), later the Ministry of 
Economic, Trade and Industry (METI), and many sogo shosha (general trading 
firms). The MITI White Paper published in 1988 confirmed this role again as a means 
to achieve its strategic thinking for Japanese interests that lay in promoting the idea of 
inclusive and cooperative region. It emphasised the private sector’s support of Japan’s 
‘Flying Geese’28 model in Asia. The process was hastened after the Plaza Accord 
agreement was signed in 1985, under pressure from the US to correct its own huge 
current account and trade deficit29 (Saeki 1988, Kikuchi 2001). Japanese efforts to 
                                                        
27
 The characteristics of Japanese horizontal international division of labour were based on the 
connection between the government sectors setting the broad outline of the national targets, 
bureaucracy implementing and connecting with the latter group, and business groups, carrying 
operational plans, particularly those with sogo shosha such as the Fuyo Group (Fuji Bank as a centre), 
the Dai-ichi Kangyo Group centered around the Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank. They are the sine qua non for 
business groups. On the other hand, the sogo shosha or Japanese multinational corporations would 
invest via a ‘package deal’, comprising management, technology, capital and international networks 
(all linked back to the headquarters) (Panglaykim 1981: 54-62).  
28
 Kaname Akamatsu coined the phrase ‘flying geese pattern (genko keitai) of development’ in the 
1930s. Originally, he was asked to find means for increasing the Chrysanthemum Throne’s interests 
after the Imperial Army’s victory. The idea re-emerged in English in the early 1960s. The core concept 
is the stratification of development divided into three aspects: intra-industry ascending from import to 
production to export; inter-industry upgrading from consumer goods to capital goods, the same as from 
simple to sophisticated technology; and international via relocating the two previously mentioned from 
developed to developing countries. The last aspect was the origin of ‘A Theory of Unbalanced Growth 
in the World Economy’.  Saburo Okita, who revitalised it at the PECC’s 4th meeting (1985), stressed 
that in the Asia-Pacific the US developed first in the 19th century; then Japan began a catching-up 
process. When Japan was (or has been) ascending, room was (or has been) left for followers who 
wanted to join and take advantage of its distinctiveness of supporting the stratification of division of 
labour (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying-Greese-Paradigm. accessed on January 14th, 2006, and 
http://www.grips.ac.jp/module/prsp/FGeese.htm. accessed on January 14th, 2006). 
29
 On September 22, 1985 the G-5 nations (France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US) met at the 
Plaza Hotel, New York. They tried to find appropriate means for sustaining growth and expanding 
markets in both developed and developing countries, and to manage a sound basis for continued and 
balanced expansion with low inflation. They stressed that in order to achieve expected objectives 
exchange rates should play a role in adjusting external imbalances by better reflecting fundamental 
economic conditions. Orderly appreciation of the main non-dollar currencies (their targets were the 
Japanese Yen and Deutsche Mark) against the dollar was needed.  The US could gain more exports due 
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broaden international economic cooperation were directly linked to the high-speed 
depreciation of the Yen after the Plaza and Louvre Accords, from 240 Yen to the 
dollar in September 1985 down to 150 Yen by mid 1986 (Noguchi 1987: 20-22). It is 
interesting to note that Japan and Europe (European Community members at the time) 
seemed to be on the losing side of struggling to defend their currencies. Within a short 
period after applying the Accords, the Central Banks in Japan and Europe spent 
around US$ 90 billion dollars on intervention (Lambsdorf 1988: 66). Okita’s proposal 
of a ‘Japanese Marshall Plan’, which could be viewed as supplementary to the 
process, aimed at devoting a portion of Japan’s savings and current account surpluses 
to the growth of developing countries, in order to avoid their agitation, as occurred in 
the 1970s (Okita 1987).   
The depreciation of the Yen could also be regarded as a significant milestone 
for accelerating the processes of regional co-operation, including security aspects. 
Generally speaking, it was accepted that economic development and cooperation 
could lead to the strengthening of domestic pluralism in peaceful democratic 
countries. Any alteration to the economic and socio-cultural dimensions of the 
regional threat perception could spill over to other areas (Paripatra and Samudavanija 
1986). Perceptible movements were viewed in the ASEAN region, some of whose 
members experienced leap-frog economic growth following the Japanese industrial 
relocation. To some extent, they absorbed the Japanese style of social networking, 
relying on such social norms as homogeneity, harmony, mutual trust, and consensus. 
They synchronised with a state strategy designed to extract higher gain from world 
markets (Akrasanee and Prasert 2003: chapter 5). 
Non-government movements, such as conferences and intellectual exchange, 
continually flourished. They were anticipated to act as fora providing and accelerating 
effective means of conveying agents’ thoughts to each other through mutual trust 
constructed through exchanging processes between persons not just upon rhetoric 
words (Viravan 1986, Yoshino 1986). Issues raised may have differed from forum to 
forum, but generally they shared some characteristics that were not for airing at 
formal fora. They could be regarded as 'fora for complaining'. The ‘Japan-Thai 
                                                                                                                                                               
to a 51 per cent decline of its currency versus the Yen. Yet, the depreciation continued. The Louvre 
Accord was signed in 1987 to halt the decline. As regards the Japanese, the Yen’s rapid appreciation 
led to the asset-price bubble in the late 1980s and Japan's long recession since then (for more detail 
please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plaza-Accord , http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm850922 , 
and http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=6872 all accessed on January 16, 2007).   
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Symposium’ organised by the JCIE provides one example. Accusations levelled about 
unfair Japanese treatment in economic terms extended to technical assistance from the 
Thai side. Japanese representatives elaborated upon their increasing sense of 
nationalism and expressed their concern regarding the Soviet military presence at 
Cam Ranh Bay and the deployment of SS-20s in Asian Siberia, topics rarely raised at 
the formal fora (Viraphol, Akrasanee and Xuto 1986, Shibusawa and Yamamoto 
1986).  
The connection between economic and political issues was more easily 
discernible, as far as non-governmental agents were concerned. They actively mingled 
within discursive areas of interest. Cases in point were the connection via Hadi 
Soesastro (Indonesian CSIS) and Narongchai Akrasanee, who had never been a 
member of the Thai ISIS but who had energetically engaged in networking activities 
since their embryonic stages. They were also involved in the PECC process as well as 
the Federation of ASEAN Economic Association (FAEA), comprising selected 
economic professionals from the ASEAN countries (Hourn 2002: 17-18).  
In 1986, a changing atmosphere became recognisable in terms of economic 
and political issues. As regards the former, Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was then 
Japanese Prime Minister, accepted the recommendations of the Advisory Group on 
Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony, chaired by Haruo 
Maekawa, a former governor of the Bank of Japan. The ‘Maekawa Report’, published 
in April 1986, proposed that Japan should continue with its large current account 
imbalances. Not only should this act as a means to manage the Japanese economy -  to 
buy more foreign foods, but it should also encourage the harmonious development of 
the whole international economy. As a result, Japan should be encouraged to 
undertake an historical transformation in its traditional policies on economic 
management and the nation’s life-style (Noguchi 1987: 22-24, Schaub 1987). 
From a political perspective, as earlier change came first from the Soviet's 
Alexandr Iakovlev, Head of the Central Committee promoted by Mikael Gorbachev 
(who was President of the Soviet Union at the time), who questioned the prominence 
of the ‘US-first’ orientation of Soviet foreign policy (Kimura 1987). The most 
significant communication, facilitating a positive changing global atmosphere in the 
later periods, came directly from Gorbachev himself, particularly in a speech he 
delivered in Vladivostok in which he called for some mechanism in Asia-Pacific 
equivalent to the successful CSCE process, which had ensured more stable security 
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since 1975 (Huxley 1993: 76). While it immediately inspired numerous high-ranking 
official visits to China from Poland and East Germany, no tangible impact was seen in 
the region (Glaubitz 1987). At that time, such a change was an unexpected event for 
Asia-Pacific engaging/networking agents, specifically either from America or from 
ASEAN. For David Martin Jones and M. L. R. Smith (2001, 2002, 2006), these 
agents had been hooked on the concept of ‘Sovietology’ which should be understood 
here as the Soviet-first orientation of US foreign policy. It was this policy that also 
dominated both the making of and the implication of regional security policies. 
Nevertheless, what should not be overshadowed by this dominant paradigm was that 
the sprouts of regional socialising processes from engaging/networking activities were 
about to flourish when they received externally accelerating activities or agents, 
particularly from the USSR (more discussion of which later). Yet, those engaging 
agents from the governmental side seemed less prepared.  
Suharto (the then Indonesian President) was unable to persuade other ASEAN 
leaders to agree to support a regional (Southeast Asia) nuclear-weapon free zone, as 
incorporated in the Manila Declaration 1987 (Leifer 1989: chapter 5). Nevertheless, 
raising the issue indicated some degree of change in a region dominated by economic 
considerations and the Cambodian problem. One good sign was that the changing 
atmosphere mentioned earlier steadily eliminated the tension between the Soviet 
Union and China. Negotiations regarding the normalisation of relations were initiated 
in August 1988. Diplomatic ties between Moscow and Beijing were restored during 
Gorbachev’s official visit to China in May 1989 after the Soviet Union ceased its 
support for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia (Emmers 2003: 83). What should not 
be overlooked is that Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech signalled positive change; he 
urged more inclusive and cooperative action and a more peaceful environment. 
Governmental agents partially went along with this path; the establishment of 
‘ASEAN 6+5’ and ASEAN-PMC were examples of ASEAN countries’ efforts. 
In sum (see Figure 3 on p.214), from the early to mid 1980s, the global and 
regional environments in which agents interacted in order to construct ideas related to 
their networking activities were dominated by economic factors. The economic 
downturn and recession were so serious that they received priority from advanced 
industrial countries. In order to close their financial gap and boost their economies, 
Plaza and Louvre Accords were agreed. Yet, this was not enough for Japan, whose 
trade surpluses were so massive that its trading counterparts thought it right to force 
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Japan to be more responsible. The ‘Maekawa Report’ signified another major effort 
made by Japan to mitigate negative perceptions of its economic performance. 
Southeast Asia was one of the Japanese favoured destinations for relocating their 
high-cost and environmental-burdened enterprises. Both ASEAN governments and 
intellectuals became energetically involved in the movements.  
However, politico-security problems did not fade from the scene. Engaging 
agents employed them as a means of focusing their themes for co-operation. Within 
this cooperative boundary, agents from the ASEAN countries flourished. Their 
interaction with their counterparts from America encouraged them to think of 
consolidating their core networks within their own Southeast Asia region. This was 
the origin of the ASEAN-ISIS. 
 
Consolidating (security) networks: the inception of ASEAN-ISIS in 1988 
The consolidating processes of networking and co-operation became more obvious in 
the late 1980s, notably in 1987 and 1988.  In particular, 1987 witnessed a great 
movement of second track activities: the UN Regional Centre for Peace and 
Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific was created (and organised in 1989). The 
Japanese government provided generous financial support, while voluntary 
contributions came from UN member states. The ‘Kathmandu processes’ was its 
centre stage; it was here that track-II agents gathered to discuss disarmament and arms 
control. The process was extended to set up the ‘Kanagawa Symposium’ for 
discussion surrounding disarmament and security in broader terms (Taylor et al 2006: 
45-46). 
In 1987, a Japan-ASEAN Conference entitled ‘Global Trends and Regional 
Issues’ was convened between January 29-31 in Tokyo, as a result of ASEAN’s 
suggestion to Seizaburo Sato of Tokyo University two years earlier. The conference 
was hosted by the JIIA in collaboration with leading international research institutes 
of ASEAN countries through the CSIS, Malaysian ISIS and Thai ISIS (‘A Note’ 
:1987). The ASEAN institutes presented themselves as more concretely consolidating 
networks. 
In the same year, heads of research institutions in ASEAN countries reached a 
decision to establish a formal association. CSIS took the initiative to contact Nono 
Anwar Makarim, who in his capacity as solicitor, drafted documents for the inception 
of the ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). At the 
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4th ASEAN Institutes meeting in Singapore in June 1988, the ASEAN-ISIS Charter 
was signed by founding leaders Jusuf Wanandi (CSIS, Indonesia), Noordin Sopiee 
(ISIS, Malaysia), Carolina G. Hernandez (Institute of Strategic and Development 
Studies (ISDS), the Philippines), Lau Teik Soon (Singapore Institute of International 
Affairs (SIIA), Singapore), and Kusuma Snitwongse (Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS), Thailand).  
ISEAS declined an invitation to participate on the grounds that its mandate 
was a regional research institute, not a national research institute developing a 
national policy alternative, as was the case with members of ASEAN-ISIS, whose 
research interests and activities covered both their respective national and regional 
interests.30 Each member institute independently conducted fundraising for its own 
projects and programmes until the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) undertook to support ASEAN-ISIS activities in 1996 (Hourn 2002: 11-12). 
Member institutes evinced different characteristics in terms of direction and 
relations with their respective governments. SIIA resembled the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR in the US) and RIIA in the UK, in terms of a loosely structured 
organisation of professionals who were interested in international affairs. Although at 
one time it shared space and a part of its budget with the National University of 
Singapore (NUS), it relocated its office to share space with other international 
organisations. Their independence was easier discernible in terms of fund raising and 
staff (Hourn 2002: 14, 21).  
ISIS Thailand was different, being affiliated to the Faculty of Political 
Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand.  Whilst it has had to comply with the 
Faculty’s direction, due to its limited staff and budget it has had enough free space to 
raise funds outside for each individual project. Unfortunately, it cannot contribute 
much in terms of economic-related policies and activities. Space has been left for 
Narongchai Akrasanee (a Thai economist) to fill the gap. He has tried to build upon 
his connections with the younger generation of Thai economists, particularly from the 
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Thailand Development and Research Institute (TDRI) and Ministry of Finance to 
encourage them to participate within the existing networks.31 
ISDS is the result of Caroline Hernandez’s efforts. Hernandez has engaged as 
an individual within the ASEAN-ISIS context since its initial period. ASEAN-ISIS 
was set up in April 1991 and registered with the Philippines' Security and Exchange 
Commission as an independent, non-stock, non-profit, professional research and 
training organisation in January 1992 (Hourn 2002: 24). The Malaysian ISIS, located 
within the country's exclusive government compound, has received generous support 
from the government. Conversely, the Indonesian CSIS has received less support 
from the Indonesian government. The Indonesian CSIS has enjoyed close relations 
with the authority since its inception. The CSIS has received very good and generous 
support from the (Chinese-Indonesian) business community and the press, particularly 
the Jakarta Post, owned by the Wanandi family.32  
These engaging agents, ASEAN intellectuals in particular, share some 
historical backgrounds apart from their belief in the power of liberalism and economic 
development to help stabilise domestic and regional arenas. Most of them share a 
social and economic elite status as well as sharing expertise in their respective fields 
(Chapter 2). All of them graduated from American educational institutes, whether or 
not they were a part of American attempts to counter a different ideology in the 
region.  In other words, their US-based education, or should be regarded as socio-
politico, background, emphasising on the power of economic liberalism does matter. 
It does that not only as part of their ingrained structure for thought, but also as shared 
principles guiding their engaging/networking activities (see Chapter 1). Although 
most of them worked for educational institutions supported by their governments or 
worked directly for governmental bureau in one area or another, some used to work 
for international institutions. Narongchai and Soesastro were examples of the latter. 
ASEAN, as both institution and region, seems to continually receive more 
attention from Japan in the broader sense. The large amounts of Japanese direct 
investment and Official Development Assistance (ODA) that poured into the region 
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were, to say the very least, impressive. Yet what should not be forgotten is that it also 
increased Japan’s function as the Pacific region’s ‘growth pole’ from both the demand 
side (increasing exports to the archipelago) and the supply side (acting as a base for 
capital goods) (Soesastro 1988).  
What was seemingly quite novel was that the domestic consensus within Japan 
increasingly supported the country’s proactive leadership in three distinct areas: the 
environment; energy; and food-related concerns. Although Tokyo tried to be more 
active in a subtle way - a faithful mediator leading from behind - in dealing with the 
Cambodian problem (such as Prime Minister Suzuki Senko's attempts), it achieved 
little credit and success. However, movement in Japanese business circles was 
different. Representatives invited Hun Sen (Khmer Prime Minister at that time) to 
Tokyo to persuade him to change the cause of the Cambodian problem (Wood 1993: 
chapter 10, Calder 2000). The general atmosphere was so encouraging that both state 
and non-state agents acted in ways that did not occur to them in earlier decades. It is 
interesting to note that the ‘comprehensive approach’ to security, with its particular 
stress on diplomacy for security purposes, signified a trend towards alleviating public 
concern in Japan and elsewhere about shifting too rapidly towards a military response 
to security problems (Satoh 1982). 
In the case of the Japanese, comprehensive security was the linkage of politics 
and the economy as a means of protecting peace. Suzuki Senko made this clear when 
he visited ASEAN countries in 1981. He inherited the concept from Masayoshi Ohira, 
who had died suddenly in 1980 (Sudo 1981: 20). Wanandi argues that there was a 
subtle difference between ASEAN and the Japanese parallel concepts of 
‘comprehensive security’, although generally their definitions seemed to be 
convergent. While the Japanese were more precise about concrete concepts and 
policies regarding food and energy, that of the ASEAN covered ‘[all] aspects of life 
that have to be taken care of, the economic, political as well as military part, then 
social part, even cultural part’.33 Put otherwise, ASEAN comprehensive security 
concepts see security with a more holistic perspective than that of Japan whose core 
concept firstly revolts around economic necessity before extending to other aspects. 
For ASEAN, domestic and regional resilience is at the core of the concept; there is no 
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clear pre-given priority for security agenda, apart from the common perception of 
improving the region. As a result, ASEAN version of the concept is much more 
flexible to respond to changing environment than that of Japan. 
With the dawning of the 1990s, the co-operative activities in the region 
intensified. Activities and projects undertaken by ASEAN-ISIS in collaboration with 
other institutes were many and condensed. In addition, the PECC process initiated the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Some member institutes were also 
members of the PECC, for example CSIS, SIIA, and Malaysian ISIS (Hourn 2002: 
33). In the meantime, apropos of ASEAN-ISIS, Hourn concludes that at least four 
themes of conferences were already established and proceeding. The first was the 
‘Second Quadrilateral Project’ involving scholars from ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, 
and the US (1987-1988. The first event to take place spanned from early 1983 to mid-
1984). The second theme was the ‘ASEAN-Japan Conferences’ (1987-1989). The 
third was the ‘ASEAN-Pacific Islands Conferences’ (1987-1989). And the fourth was 
the ‘ASEAN Young Leaders Conferences’ (1989-1992). 
Other conferences were convened before the 1990s: the ASEAN-Korean 
Conferences (in 1987); and Southeast Asia Forum and Southeast Asia-China 
Dialogues (both in 1988). These conferences, particularly those that were 
continuations of the earlier conferences, were conducted mostly under themes related 
to multilateral security co-operation and the role of ASEAN in the progress of 
regional process making in the Asia-Pacific region (Hourn 2002: 15-16). The longest 
and most successful series of conferences was the Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR) 
which was inaugurated in 1987. Governmental, non-governmental, academics and 
journalists came together just before ASEAN-PMC to develop a co-operative security 
dialogue process. Dialogue was the key as Peggy Mason34 pointed out in 1992:  
‘[T]hroughout the three days, both in and out of the session, participants whether in 
groups or duos, were engaged in dialogue, networking or track two diplomacy’ (Isa 
and Teoh 1992: 7). 
What should be noted here is that there were divisions of responsibility 
concerning organising regional programmes. The APR had been the function of 
Malaysian ISIS; the Human Rights Colloquium (HRC) had been associated with the 
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ISDS; the ASEAN Young Leaders Forum (AYLF) used to be associated solely with 
the CSIS. The inclination to establish close relations based on historical backgrounds 
helped to pair-up arranging activities. As the most energetic and long-running of the 
institutes, the CSIS had been handling ASEAN-ISIS’s bilateral relations with the US. 
The Thai ISIS was responsible for bilateral talks with China; and the SIIA was in 
charge of the dialogue meetings with the Taiwan Institute of International Relations 
(IIR) (Hourn 2002: 31).   
The movements of the PECC process were very productive, whether viewed 
from state (particularly Japan and Australia) and/or non-state agents’ perspectives. As 
regards the governmental agents, there was close international co-operation. MITI, 
together with Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 
encouraged other regional counterparts to firstly initiate moderate communication at 
the official-and-minister level. Prime Minister Nakasone mooted the idea publicly in 
San Francisco and at PECC VI in Osaka, Japan. It was again that the Japanese let 
Australia take the lead so that accusations of perceived domination were avoided, 
despite the fact that the Japanese were criticised for not playing broader and more 
imaginative political and economic roles (Wanandi 1990b).35 What should be noted is 
that Nakasone’s assertiveness of Japan’s international position saw him trying hard to 
transform the Japanese society into being more internationalised by applying positive 
gaiatsu (outside pressure) from the US (Wood 1993: chapter 11).  
ASEAN and PECC were closely consulted in order to get the on-going 
consultative process functioning smoothly. Prime Minister Takeshita stressed that 
Japan would support the establishment of any Pacific regional organisation that had 
ASEAN’s support. The proposal was part of his ‘International Co-operation 
Initiative’, which focused on both politico-security and the politico-economic fields as 
Japan’s contribution to the world and the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, the first-ever 
senior official meeting was held in Sydney under the banner of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), having been officially proposed in Seoul in January 
1989, by Australia Prime Minister Bob Hawke (Wanandi 1988, Simandjuntak 1990, 
Habib 1990, Elek 2005a).  
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The numerous efforts made by both state and non-state agents (from Japan and 
ASEAN in particular as far as this project is concerned) contributed to how the scope 
of the Asia-Pacific region should be perceived and how the co-operative activities 
should proceed. Economic functional considerations, based on liberalism and 
development, were at issue, not traditional geographical definitions of the region.  It 
was the compromise that made APEC’s geographically cooperative scope so broad, as 
preferred by those agents from Australia, the US and even Canada. This kind of 
compromise was generated by a blending of instrumental action, negotiating to 
decrease differences, with communicative action, reaching mutual understanding to 
establish region-wide comprehensive cooperation, albeit emphasizing economic 
aspects at an initial stage (see Chapter 1). Additionally, activities derived from 
economic functional considerations covered more and more non-traditional security 
matters, as preferred by those agents from ASEAN and Japan. Although 
engaging/networking agents did not mention community building clearly at the time, 
the way they emphasised a preference for a process-oriented rather than a result-
oriented approach demonstrated that community building occupied a place in their 
thinking (Watanabe 1995).  
To some extent Japan expected that processes (flexible diplomacy) derived 
from PECC, APEC and other institutions (formed by Japanese helping hands) would 
help in building a consensus on politically sensitive matters. Although the sensitive 
issue at that time meant facilitating liberalisation, it also showed signs of spill-over 
effects generating more dialogue surrounding more seriously politically sensitive 
matters, as Harris, Adler and Barnett maintain (Harris 1994b, Matsunaga 1995, 
Yamakage 1995, Adler and Barnett 1998)36 (see Chapter 4). The themes of numerous 
conferences and workshops reflected not only ASEAN intellectuals’ concern over the 
Japanese threatening economic policies in particular, but also the direction they 
should take to solve regional difficulties in ways that governmental and non-
governmental engaging agents desired. 
Although 1989 was regarded as the year the Cold War ended, Yukio Satoh 
(then Director-General for Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo) doubted that 
its cessation would bring much change, particularly in Northeast and Southeast Asia. 
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There were still remnants of the old ideologies in the region. Soviet troops were still 
stationed in the East of Poland; North Korea was developing nuclear-weapon 
programmes, not to mention the many potential conflicts in the Southeast Asia region. 
As Yukio Satoh observed that ‘The end of the Cold War rarely changed the 
geopolitics at all’. 37 Seizaburo Sato argued that three hurdles clouded the Japanese 
way of explicitly engaging with regional security developments alteration. The first 
was how to overcome strong public opinion against open acceptance of a collective 
self-defence policy. The second was the popular fear that such a move would provoke 
the Soviet Union into a new round of the arms race. The third was the fear harboured 
by Japan’s neighbours regarding the expansion of its military forces (Sato 1990: 11-
14). 
Conflict continued, particularly in the Southeast Asia region, and glimpses of 
change were becoming evident. Whilst the Cambodian problems (Vietnamese troops 
and the Khmer four factions) were showing more positive signs, difficulties in the 
South China Sea were surfacing. Cases in point that occurred in 1988 included the 
Chinese-Vietnamese naval encounter, and the arrest of a Philippines' ship by the 
Malaysian authorities (Harris 1996: 40-41). Fortunately, the regional context in 
general was less hostile and looked more fertile for co-operative activities, which 
could serve as catalysts and stepping stones for more concrete co-operation, especially 
in the political arena. States and non-state agents both had their fair share of trying to 
construct more cooperative regional atmosphere.  
The ‘cocktail party’, initiated by Professor Mochtar (Indonesia) and Nguyen 
Co Thach when the former visited Hanoi in July 1987, was intended to facilitate 
informal meetings among the Khmer factions. It proceeded to become the ‘Jakarta 
Informal Meetings (JIMs)’ in 1988 (July) and 1989 (February). These efforts enabled 
Indonesia to open negotiations with Phnom Phen and Hanoi, and to co-chair the 
International Conference on Cambodia in October 1991 (Emmers 2003: 105). Jakarta 
also sponsored a successful series of multilateral dialogues and workshops on 
‘Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea’, launched in 1990 and initiated 
by co-operation between Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia and Townsend-
Gault, a Canadian academic. The CIDA was the main source of funding. 
                                                        
37
 Interview conducted September 14th 2006 at the JIIA, Katsumigazeki Building, Tokyo, Japan 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 3: Constructing East Asian (Security) Networks 
126 
In the same year, the Malaysian ISIS proposed the inception of a Regional 
Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime (RMSSAR) for Southeast Asian waters. An 
atmosphere of friendship led to the Bundung Workshop in 1991 at which the notion of 
the declaration on the South China Sea was drafted. Finally, in July 1992, the ASEAN 
foreign ministers signed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (Taylor et al 
2006: 55-57, Bateman 2007: 11-112). Political Change could also be discerned in the 
North Pacific, where the process of ‘North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue’ 
was initiated by Canada in the mid-1990s (Jin 1991: 6). These activities reflected a 
more co-operative regional atmosphere encouraged and facilitated by 
engaging/networking agents as mentioned previously. 
Change, particularly in the political arena, was now in the air. As Hadi 
Soesastro, with his long engaging experience in regional affairs observed, ‘[T]here 
appears now to be a shift of focus from economics to security issues’.38 Engaging 
agents, seizing a more co-operative regional atmosphere created by the post Cold War 
world and their expertise in regional affairs, called for more and rapid change, 
especially from their respective governments, to establish greater regional order. For 
them, greater regional order could be created by enhancing the efficacy of the extant 
formal and informal mechanisms for consultation, confidence-building, and conflict 
resolution. A report from the heads of an ASEAN-ISIS meeting (in Bangkok 1990) 
affirmed the call, particularly regarding the Mekong River and the South China Sea. 
They proposed that Japan could play a helpful part in the scheme for burden sharing, 
by providing financial and technological support for ASEAN’s sea line of 
communications (which were also vital for Japanese well-being). In addition they 
called for a more consolidating framework for ‘ASEAN PECC’ (Paribatra 1991: 10-
11).  
What may be concluded here is that the engaging agents’ attempt (at worst) to 
accommodate and (at best) to bring more change in their direction of preference 
persisted and produced more profound milestones concerning regional security. In the 
case of attempts from governmental engaging agents, ‘ASEAN 6+5’ was created and 
later developed into ‘Dialogue Partners.’ ASEAN-PMC was also set up as a flexible 
and consultative forum for more expansive issues, namely, regional problems and 
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security. In the case of non-governmental engaging agents, ‘ASEAN- Institute’ was 
set up as a cobweb of initially networking activities by engaging scholars from 
ASEAN countries, although the initial concept was not their own. The ASEAN-US 
Conference cosponsored by the Indonesian CSIS and UC at Berkeley was a platform 
proposed and encouraged by their US counterparts. Later, the name was changed to 
‘ASEAN-ISIS’ in 1988. Substantive themes for cooperation remained unchanged; 
regional economics and politics must complement each other as an important part of 
nation-state building and comprehensive security. Details of how agents achieved 
that, and what lessons were leaned from their engaging experiences, will be recounted 
in the next chapter. 
 
Summary 
The guiding questions drawn from the first and second groups of research questions 
for this chapter were: who were those engaging/networking agents that initiated and 
nurtured engaging/networking activities; how they constructed and expanded their 
networks; how the cohesive networking activities worked out and why they worked 
out that way; did these engaging share similar ideas on security; and did their 
activities prove effective and energetic networks? In other words, this chapter 
illuminated to what extent political and economic phenomena within the time span 
from the 1960s to early 1990s were seen to provide insights into intellectual 
networking activities. They were activities derived from ASEAN and Japan and also 
mingled with the discursive networking space under scrutiny here. 
 This chapter found out that not only did engaging/networking agents who 
participated in regional activities attempt to construct regional (at first, economic) 
cooperation, they also energetically tried to consolidate and expand their networking 
activities. The inception of the ASEAN-ISIS was intrinsic in the existing networks 
developed in the 1960s, whilst the existing networks paid more attention to economic 
co-operation. ASEAN-ISIS focus had been upon highlighting (comprehensive) 
security concerns since its start. Yet, ASEAN-ISIS scholars were not alone in 
embarking upon an alternative regional co-operative direction, which appeared at both 
state (ASEAN, APEC) and non-state levels (PECC).  
Non-governmental cooperation, with the support of numerous governments, 
proved an important driving force for bettering the regional context by prolonging 
facilitation and constructing channels for cocooning and nurturing friendships based 
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on shared visions. The question of whether they could lead to trust as the 
constructivists suggest is addressed in Chapter 5. Shared visions based on the concept 
that liberal capitalism and development held the key to the consolidation and 
expansion of their activities, first under the guiding banner of an economic aspect, 
flowed in to other aspects, political and security in particular. The shift came as no 
surprise given that that the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ was taken into 
account by tracing back and observing engaging agents’ regional activities. 
As long as agents’ ideas and actions could not be plucked from thin air, the 
regional context had to be regarded as their resource. On the one hand, at some point 
it barred them from stepping further into rather unproductive traditional security 
areas, especially territorial disputes and military-related matters. On the other, 
oppressive political environments encouraged them to try harder to utilise what was 
available to them at the time, within the economic field, in order to make themselves 
more apparent and relevant. Although they were limited in terms of budget and staff, 
ASEAN scholars were keen on playing a go-between role. They both consolidated 
and divided their resources and responsibilities, in order to better deal with their 
counterparts, particularly those from Japan, the US and the Asia-Pacific countries. 
As far as the Japanese were concerned, whether they first intended to or not, 
they helped to generate and accelerate a fertile regional context for co-operation39 
(Katzenstein 2000: 8). Their success was based on the establishment of their ‘global 
buying network’ and far-flung regional production networks, combining horizontal 
and vertical networks as mentioned previously, supported by a broad array of trade, 
aid, investment, and cultural policies (Soesastro 1990, Katzenstein 2005: 8). It was the 
prolonged Japanese network with Europe that paved the way for those from ASEAS-
ISIS to coordinate the inceptions of ASEM and CAEC. ASEAN’s scholars are more 
active in explicit ways, whereas the Japanese are good in a subtly encouraging role, 
apart from initiating regional economic cooperation.    
To a great extent, those attempts were derived from the US’s compulsion 
regarding Japan, namely to link economics and politics with security in the 1970s and 
1980s (Shiraishi 1998: 44). In other words, the so called ‘porous region’ (encouraging 
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and facilitating non-state agents’ movements, as well as those of the states) was more 
or less under the aegis of the American 'Empire' (Katzenstein 2005). Vulnerability left 
both Japan and many other countries in the region having to comply with American 
plans as a sine qua non for (their economic) growth, not long-term stability. Yet, both 
state- and non-state actors tried hard to change the cause in order to makes themselves 
less dependent on the US and be more directly relevant to and cooperative for their 
own regional affairs. They anticipated creating and facilitating long-term stability in 
the region. Japan was keen to bridge international interdependency with its national 
power and channel it into more informal processes in a bid to soften the negative 
images resulting from World War II and their economic success (Kato 2000).  
ASEAN scholars have captured the trend well enough to channel Japanese 
cooperation in a direction that not only facilitates their activities, but also encourages 
them to support the broader ambition of constructing a more expansive regional 
community.  
The next chapter will illustrate more about their attempts to link broader 
supports not only from Japan and other countries in the region but also from other 
regions in order to construct a more stabilised, inclusive, and peaceful region. 
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Chapter 4: Strengthening, consolidating and revitalising networks 
 
Chapter 3 discussed how agents’ ideas and perceptions of their surroundings (the 
regional environment in particular) transform them into energetic engaging agents. 
Not only do they construct shared ideas about regional affairs, but they also extend 
their concerns and networking activities across their own respective countries. They 
helped to initially construct what this thesis terms ‘East Asian (Security) Intellectual 
Networks’. 
This chapter also illustrates and analyses the ways in which they interacted 
with each other within discursive areas of changeable ideas and actions that helped 
them to synthesise and crystallise their ideas and actions. Although they may differ 
regarding the degree to which, and how they should approach their counterparts from 
governmental sections and how regional environments should be 
transformed/created/developed, they nevertheless agree that their ideas and 
perceptions should not go unheeded. 
 The prospect of economic cooperation reinforced the efforts and actions of 
these engaging agents; their belief in liberalism and economic development united 
them. From within this discursive area, numerous capable and intentional agents 
emerged, namely, both non-governmental mainly from academia and also 
governmental agents acting in their own private capacities. Clearly the governmental 
agents opted not to discard their governmental links; rather, they used them as one of 
many available resources that would both sustain and boost their networking 
activities. The emergence and sustainability of the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council (PECC) and the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
(ASEAN-ISIS) are cases in point. 
 In order to proceed, questions guiding this chapter are drawn from both the 
first and second groups of research questions, albeit emphasising more on the latter. 
The basic questions underlining the narration of this chapter are who were they, 
specifically those relating to the expanded network, and to what extent and under 
what circumstances did they join these engaging/networking activities? The questions 
from the second group of research questions and additional ones from fieldwork are: 
whether their socialising processes had any impact on their networking activities and 
their perceptions on these activities; whether they were capable as changing-agents 
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transmitting their ideas, at least to their track I counterparts in order to transform the 
regional security environment. 
 This chapter also argues that a spill-over effect occurred when most of the 
engaging agents became sufficiently familiar with each other to expand further upon 
perceived difficult issues as part of their broad definition of (comprehensive) security. 
Familiarity was regarded here as an impact from socialising processes derived from 
activities mentioned in the previous chapter. It was not considered necessary for them 
to strike at the sore nerves of traditionally territorial disputes and states’ sovereignty 
when the time was not ripe. The numerous international seminars convened on global 
and regional affairs, supported by ASEAN-ISIS and its counterparts (either in Japan 
or the US), are regarded here as significant stepping stones for increased focus on 
direct security matters. A broader definition of (comprehensive) security remains at 
the heart of these agents’ networking activities. This emphasis will be examined more 
closely in this chapter. 
 The chronology of events is at the core of this long tracing back process. This 
chapter illustrates two connected sections: the first demonstrates to what extent and 
how the above engaging agents placed an emphasis on more traditional security 
concepts. The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Council for 
Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) and the Council for Asia Pacific Cooperation (CACE) offer a basis for 
illustrating how ideas and discursive activities were transmitted/translated into 
concrete fora. Additional guiding questions are as follows: to what extent and in what 
way did ASEAN-ISIS closely engage with its/their Japanese counterparts? And how 
successful were they in persuading ASEAN, other governments and other non/like-
minded individuals to get on board?  
 The second section deals with the slow progress of the networks, that is, until 
they discovered some interesting projects that would revitalise their activities, such as 
the promotion of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and the ‘East Asia Community’. The aim 
here is to shed light on these two projects, which are not only regarded as compatible, 
but also as well connected. The reasons for these perceptions are due to the intentions 
and efforts of networking-engaging agents who share experiences, ideas and visions 
about the region. Questions concerning identities are also addressed, particularly those 
involving the abundance of activities that took place in many areas. 
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Ascending periods of success 
Early 1990s: a very energetic period for engaging agents 
The 1990s were full of positive and negative signs that helped to construct agents’ 
perceptions, actions and interactions. Apart from ideological diminishment, the end of 
the Cold War opened up ample room for the shifting of global and regional powers. It 
also signified the uplifting and spreading of people power, irrespective of whether 
they supported a negative (nationalism and separatism) or a positive trend 
(participation and democracy). Here, the latter was a result of a ‘social and political 
awakening’ (Sopiee 1993, Paribatra 1993).  
 Gone was significant power in terms of actual control and in terms of offering 
simply alternatives to the Soviet Union. There was even a prediction by Francis 
Fukuyama that the US domination, based on liberal democratic belief and systems 
would lead to the end of human’s struggling history1 (Fukuyama 1993). What has 
overshadowed the concept of geo-economics is the important return of geo-politics as 
a fertile ground for catalysing the linkage of three concepts: economic liberalisation 
aimed at generating growth; democratisation; and peace on both domestic and 
regional levels (Chan 1992). These potentially and discursively conflict-prone areas 
are what Robert A. Scalapino (1994) calls the ‘Natural Economic Territories’ (NETs), 
which cannot be precisely demarcated by politics, let alone the traditional concept of 
security based on states’ sovereignty. 
The many attempts to normalise relations by nullifying prior enmities (such as 
the US and Vietnam, Vietnam and China, and China and India) should be regarded as 
parts of the positive process. Most interesting of these was the Sino-Soviet 
normalisation signed on May 16, 1991, which signified the positive settlement of the 
border dispute between the two with the Amur River as the demarcation line (Zagoria 
1988: 14, Okazaki 1991: 34). Celebrations were held everywhere, particularly in the 
West. But the agents in the Asia-Pacific region viewed it with suspicion. Yukio Satoh, 
one of the significant supporters of multilateralism asks: ‘What makes the Asia-
Pacific region different from Europe is that the core of the Cold War does not much 
change’, citing the situations in Korean Peninsular, and the Taiwan Straits as apparent 
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 This is what Fukuyama suggests when he argues that there would be no ideologically dialectical 
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cases of partition from the Cold War’s legacy.2 A Japanese scholar warned that apart 
from strengthening economic resilience and restructuring the international economic 
system, the following three traditional security methods should not be ignored: the 
strengthening of conventional deterrence; the link between theatres; and developing 
an effective intercepting system to capture a variety of hostile missiles (Sato 1990). 
 What should be emphasised here is that although the dawn of the decade 
brought uncertainties with it, glimpses of positive change could be perceived in Asia. 
For some observers, such a positive new report announced the diminishing of the 
US’s military might in the region in 1990 (Yuzawa 2007: 37-38). Contributing to 
further uncertainty on the wider Asia continent was the outbreak of the wars in the 
Middle East: Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US invaded Iraq under the banner of the 
United Nations Security Council. These events were accompanied by power-shifting 
trends, namely, the opening up of China, and Japan's unsettling self-defining position 
whether it should shoulder more international burdens (Chin 1991, Heisbourg 1992). 
The latter, combined with the extremely poor image that distinguished Japan due to its 
large monetary contributions to help Kuwait without risking lives of her nationals, 
forced Japan to renew its efforts to rebuild its image. Otherwise, Japan might be 
perceived with less moral respect by international communities as a selfish middle-
rung power who knew only how to spend her money to buy off her international 
responsibilities (Motofumi 1991, Yuzawa 2007: 39-44). To sum up, the changing 
atmosphere required all of the regional players to reflect and question whether the 
system they had been familiar with, particularly in terms of policies, either at the 
bilateral or regional levels, was still in fact relevant.  
Scalapino (1990: 27) suspected that the old saying ‘familiarity breeds 
contempt’ might prove true. The region's long legacy of power domination was 
revealed when its conflicting ideological veil was lifted. If the protectionism in the 
technology trade could not be dealt with satisfactorily, the trend could worsen 
(Simandjuntak 1991: 179). Another matter that could no longer be ignored was the 
significance of domestic politics and foreign policy; there was no longer a clear 
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demarcation between low and high politics3 (Bunbongkarn 1990). On this point, there 
was a call from ASEAN intellectuals saying that intellectuals and research institutes 
should be more readily accepted, for not only do they act as extra resources that lessen 
the burden of foreign ministries (as in the case of Indonesian CSIS, the University of 
Indonesia, and the Indonesian Institute of Science - LIPI), but also as an effective 
means of setting up and implementing co-operative programmes (as in the case of the 
Filipino Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme - CARP) (Hernandez 1990, 
Wanandi 1990a). In Singapore, the linkages between the ministries (of foreign affairs 
and of defence) and researchers attached to strategic studies institutes were apparent, 
particularly with those from the SIIA (Katsumasa 2003: 101). It was difficult to deny 
that activities derived from engaging/networking intellectuals were affected by 
domestic power politics that they would like to diminish in order to convey more of 
their ideas. 
There were also questions about the effectiveness of ASEAN, a regional 
institution with its concept to promote a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality 
(ZOPFAN). How it would handle the question of whether a Southeast Asia nuclear-
free-zone (SEANWFZ) should be established (Alagappa 1988a, Snitwongse 1990, 
Djiwandono 1991a, Rauf 1994, Kusuma-Atmadjya 1994). The question of whether 
Japan would remilitarise was also attracting interest from regional countries, and for 
this reason the Japanese government promoted more assertive diplomacy based on a 
non-military contribution and by calling for more multilateral consultations at both 
regional and global levels (Hamzah 1991, Kiyofuku 1990, 1991). 
Later, in the spring of 1991, Japan set up a guideline for its official 
development aid (ODA) covering a multitude of concerns from ecology and freedom 
of information to human rights records, in order to be compatible with the Western 
standards. Somewhat ironically, Japan refused to sign the Bangkok Declaration on 
Human Rights when its voice was needed (Deng 1997, Villacorta 1998). It may be 
observed here that the resurgence of political difficulties made not only Japan but also 
many countries in the region reluctant to rush ahead with changes that could affect 
their internal difficulties. In addition, the resurgence of political difficulties not only 
made things hard for engaging agents (governmental and non-governmental alike), 
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they also dissuaded non-governmental agents to rush their networking activities. 
Those difficulties were the harsh perceptions regarding frequent wars in the Middle 
East and the uncertain regional leading role taken by Japan and China in particular. 
Waiting for, and reading the right signs from governmental agents were their 
beneficial tactics.  On the surface, waiting for track I agents to give initial hints, for 
examples encouraging track II opinion-giving activities or even asking for 
consultation, could be considered as taking the role of scholar-bureaucrat, as Jones 
and Smith (2001, 2006) notified. Yet, what should not be overlooked is that those 
engaging/networking agents did not totally reify the existing regional security order. 
On the contrary, waiting to read the right signs should be perceived as a tactic 
(Habermasian instrumental action of the reading of this project) accompanying their 
routine activities aimed towards constructing mutual understanding about the 
improvement of their regional security. The mutual understanding is read here as 
Habermasian sense of communicative action (see Chapter 1). Nevertheless, this 
understanding and the aforementioned perceptions might be altered in later periods 
mainly due to changing environmental structure for engaging/networking agents’ 
thought. 
 Put differently, the uncertainties associated with a rapidly changing 
environment required regional countries to do something; either accommodate the 
change, or channel it into the direction preferred by all, namely, multilateralism, 
fashioned after the success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). At that time, multilateralism was their mutual understanding in the sense of 
communicative action. Many agents not only voiced their perceptions and proposals 
but even tried to persuade others to accept them as shown below.  
Gorbachev came in early; even before the end of 1980s he indicated that he 
wanted to take the lead in channelling the change into the direction emulated CSCE. 
He first discussed the subject with India's Rajiv Gandhi in May 1985, subsequently 
reiterating it in his speeches at Vladivostok in July and in Krasnoyark in September 
1986.  Not only did his speeches help the Soviet leader to appear reasonable and 
conciliatory, they also indicated Gorbachev’s intention to push forward with the 
programme for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, with which he sought to 
identify as part of his country’s identity. The Malaysian-ISIS was quick to sense the 
changing climate when it organised the First Asia-Pacific Roundtable conference 
under the sponsorship of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund of New York. The event, 
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which was titled ‘Confidence building and conflict reduction in the Asia Pacific’, 
attracted 80 participants, mostly from Asia-Pacific countries4 (Alagappa 1988b). Also 
present at the APR, Australia Foreign Minister Bill Hayden (1989-1996) proposed the 
application of confidence building measures (CBMs) as part of broader regional 
security building. Gorbachev’s senior advisor from Policy Planning Department 
confirmed Gorbachev’s statements at the 2nd Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR) meeting 
in 1988,  stating that the ‘establishment of broad, equitable and mutually beneficial 
co-operation among all Asian states is a sound guarantee for removing a threat of war 
and improving the political climate’ in the region (Boutilier 1989, Sergiev 1989). It 
should not be overlooked here that the sign given by Gorbachev had a positive impact 
on the acceleration of regional engaging agents’ activities.  
Scholars from Australia and the US also used the APR to highlight European 
experiences on CBMs as the way to solve regional territorial problems. Proposals for 
naval activity ranged from freezing nuclear capable aircrafts in Asia to creating 
submarine free zones or anti-submarine warfare free zones (Findlay 1989, Prezyestup 
1989). Yet, the most interesting, experimental and ready to be implemented CBMs for 
solving the Cambodian (or Kampuchean at that time) problem came from a Malaysian 
scholar, Noordin Sopiee (1989) of ISIS. Various talks and meetings ranging from 
small groups of leaders or high officials directly responsible for the problems to 
international conferences were his key components for success due to their potential 
to mitigate (at worse) and/or dissolve (at best) difficulties and different views 
regarding the problem. Comparing to what used to be thought of as a cul-de-sac 
problem; the Cambodian problem was viewed with brighter hope through many talks 
both official and non-official. Also at the APR meeting the following year, Malaysian 
Prime Minister (Mahathir) positively advocated the CBMs for regional affairs (Evans 
1991: 57-58). Although nothing concrete eventuated, there was a trend that 
governmental and non-governmental engaging agents saw things in a more 
cooperative direction. In other words, official support could make a different for 
regional networking activities regarding security. 
Thus far, multilateralism for regional security was still a popular topic. In 
1990, the Philippines' Foreign Minister (Raúl Sevilla Manglapus) alluded to it in his 
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opening statement entitled ‘ASEAN towards an Economic Treaty and a Security 
Dialogue’, delivered at the 23rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) . But proposing 
that ASEAN should begin to engage in dialogue on regional security issues was as far 
he could go. Several days later, a more elaborate idea came from Australia's Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans, who debated it at the ASEAN-PMC in his statement entitled 
‘Leading through Dialogue and Decision’. Suggesting that ASEAN’s dialogue 
partners could become the embryo for a regional dialogue on politico-security issues, 
he named the proposed forum a ‘Conference on Security Cooperation in Asia’ 
(CSCA) (Wanandi 1991c: 110, 1991d: 323, Acharya 1993: 60). In the same year, 
reiteration of the need to create new habits of dialogues and cooperation based on the 
adaptation of the CSCE in the Pacific, was presented by Joe Clark (Canada's 
Secretary of State for External Affairs) at the APR. It was a time that many official 
and non-official engaging agents saw necessity to relentlessly encourage more 
changes for regional comprehensive security matters through numerous fora.   
The Canadian proposal, which became crystallised by the autumn of that year, 
gave birth to the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD). First 
organised as a colloquium in Victoria, Canada in April 1991 by York University, it 
led to a more fundamental conference in the early spring of 1993. The cooperative 
security concept of the forum was based on the twin notions that the threats to 
security were increasingly diverse and multi-dimensional. It had two operative tracks: 
the first concentrated on government officials, mostly policy planners5; the second 
involved non-governmental organisations including academics. Together, they were 
the creators and the main component of a series of international conferences and 
workshops (Evans 1991: 58-60, Jin 1991, Mason 1993: 155).  
Japan was positively affected by the appeal of multilateralism. Its 
reconsideration of the idea began when Yukio Satoh assumed the position of Director 
General of the Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in January 1990. Sato tried to find an appropriate way to respond to 
the invitation of the Soviet. In the meantime, he helped Taro Nakayama, the then 
Japanese Foreign Minister, to organise the Asia-Pacific Foreign Ministers' Conference 
on the sideline of the 45th UN General Assembly. The aim was to gather support for 
multilateralism after having received good support from the Japan-Korea Conference 
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in May. In July 1990, preparations commenced for the Japan-Soviet Foreign Minister 
Conference scheduled for the September.  
Taro Nakayama proposed that the first policy meeting for CBMs take place in 
December (Yuzawa 2007: 23-25). Japan and Yukio Satoh were ready to venture more 
on the route to multilateralism. 
To sum up, not only did the changing climate and the positive signs emerging 
in the late 1980s help the regional players to reflect on their experiences, it also 
encouraged them to cooperate more with each other. Fortunately, the condensing of 
their experiences, the intensification of their intentions to reap the benefit of the 
momentum of the trend, and the positive feelings they gained through numerous 
meetings, conferences and workshops, specifically at the APR, encouraged the agents 
from ASEAN and Japan to cooperate closely for the construction of important 
international fora in the region. 
 
New initiatives from ASEAN-ISIS and the Nakayama Proposal 
Up until 1991, it was obvious that governments in the region, apart from Japan, were 
slowly beginning the process of regional, political and security dialogue. Gorbachev 
was an external actor in this project. In his official visit to Japan in April 1991, he 
conveyed his idea directly to Tokyo’s leader. He presented two proposals that brought 
a degree of discomfort to Toshiki Kaifu, who was then Japan's Prime Minister. They 
were disarmament talks in the North Pacific which had always been rejected by the 
US and a security conference attended by the foreign ministers of all the Asia-Pacific 
countries in 1993 (Habib 1991: 259, 1994).  
 The non-government agents were serious about pushing forward further 
change. They seized this chance, aware that the governments also wanted to change 
their policies no matter how reluctant they appeared. The ASEAN-ISIS initiative was 
a successful case in point. The most important matter for the government agents was 
the discussion concerning ASEAN's way forward. Additionally, they not only called 
for reflection on - and a search for - an appropriate framework, but they also called for 
more efficient and effective way(s) to utilise the existing regional institutions, 
including those already established and joined by ASEAN. ASEAN’s unity was 
crucial to the ideal international community confronting diversified problems 
(Kusuma-Atmadja 1991, Lau Teik Soon 1991, Mangkusuwondo 1991, Wanandi 
1991a).  Tracing back through time, it may be suggested that the existence and 
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activities of ASEAN provided a background for the institutionalising process, no 
matter how weak it was compared to the European experience. 
 ASEAN-ISIS scholars saw the time as ripe for proposing their ideas for the 
region’s metamorphosis. The eagerly awaited ASEAN Summit Meeting in Singapore 
(the 4th scheduled in 1992) would be their testing platform. The report entitled 
‘Strengthening the Structure and Mechanism of ASEAN’ prepared by a panel of 
eminent persons was crucial (The Fourth Summit 1991). In order to better prepare the 
proposal, ASEAN-ISIS members organised meetings and conferences in a bid to 
attract more ideas and comments. There were two events that should be emphasised as 
the discursive space in which engaging agents from ASEAN and Japan communicated 
in order to reach a mutual understanding and produce a concrete outcome.  
The first was entitled ‘ASEAN and a New Asian Pacific Security Structure’ 
(2-3 June, 1991). As one of the main organisers, the CSIS invited Paul M. Evans of 
NPCSD and Yukio Satoh as their special non-ASEAN guests, inviting them to share 
their experiences and ideas on the changing regional climate. Satoh confirmed 
Japanese public support for a more active international role (Jin 1991).  
The second, an ASEAN related conference sponsored by the Filipino and Thai 
governments (named the ‘ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region: Prospects for Security 
Co-operation in the 1990s’) was held in Manila on 5 June 1991. The most important 
experience for Satoh was the lively clarification of the ‘expectation on Japan from 
ASEAN’s perspectives’, preferring close cooperation and not the Japanese ‘go-it-
alone’ way of managing regional affairs. It other words, it left ample room for Japan’s 
initiative.6 At the two fora, the European experiences of confidence building 
measures were questioned for direct application and NPSCD was initiated as the spin-
off from the Canadian efforts.  
In order to get more support from the US, Satoh mentioned clearly in his 
presentations, particularly at the second conference, that there was nothing compared 
to the US-Japan alliance. But a multilateral security arrangement could be an effective 
supplementary option (Yuzawa 2007: 28-29). He deliberately used the term 
‘reassurance’ rather than ‘confidence building’ (based on the concept of avoiding 
miscalculation on military confrontation in Europe), signifying his aspiration to 
reduce tensions among existing hostile enemies (Evans 1996: 207).  Satoh stated: 
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‘Among Asian countries, we had much historical scepticism. To overcome this and to 
increase economic interdependence, the most important way was to enhance the level 
of ‘reassurance’ among Asian countries’.7  
To sum up, the results from previous attempts were a proposal called ‘A Time 
for Initiative’ from ASEAN-ISIS and the Nakayama Proposal from Japan.  
 ASEAN-ISIS presented the proposal ‘A Time for Initiative’ to the respective 
governments. The proposal illustrated four areas in which ASEAN could significantly 
contribute to the changing climate: an Asia-Pacific political dialogue; a new regional 
order in Southeast Asia; the strengthening of ASEAN; and the enhancing ASEAN 
economic cooperation. Regularising the ASEAN Summit once every two years and 
institutionalising more of the ASEAN Secretariat were the keys to the third area. The 
fourth supported the proposed East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) as a step towards 
establishing an East Asian Caucus within the diversified APEC8 (Stubbs 2002). Yet, 
the most interesting initiative was the first, which was closely related to the second. 
ASEAN-ISIS scholars proposed that the ASEAN-PMC should initiate a constructive 
discussion surrounding Asia-Pacific stability and peace after the end of their usual 
meeting. ASEAN-PMC meetings had a record of dealing rather effectively with 
political issues (Afghanistan, Namibia, and Middle East), among the more prominent 
being Indochinese refugees and Cambodia-related problems. 
 It was also suggested that the agendas and arrangements for each ASEAN-
PMC initiating ‘Conference on Stability and Peace in the Asia Pacific’ should be 
prepared by a senior official meeting (SOM) of the ASEAN states and dialogue 
partners (A Time 1991, Wanandi 1991b, 1995b). The issues regarding the 
establishment of SOM and its functions made ASEAN-ISIS scholars uncomfortable 
with their Japanese counterparts. They did not anticipate hearing about them when 
Taro Nakayama, the Japanese Foreign Minister, delivered a speech calling for the 
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The idea was proposed by Mahathir Mohamad, the then Malaysian Prime Minister. Later, the name 
was change to East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) in order to mitigate the sense of regional blocking. 
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The rationale was mainly due to different expectations from the Anglo-American side (wanting more 
legally binding forum and agreement) and the East Asian side (emphasising only facilitation and 
technical assistance). In the meantime, ASEAN’s unity and capability were also questioned because of 
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official establishment of an Asia-Pacific security dialogue, namely, the ‘Nakayama 
Proposal’ (Akaha 1995, Simon 1995: 18, Midford 2000, Yuzawa 2007: chapter 1). 
Nakayama’s idea was to expand and institutionalise further the ASEAN-PMC as a 
process for mutual reassurance. His final draft, which included the SOM, was 
prepared by members of the Asia Bureau, who included Yukio Satoh’s report of the 
meeting he had with ASEAN scholars. He was not there to leave out the SOM part, 
which originated with ASEAN-ISIS.9  
At first the initiatives were not warmly welcomed, particularly when the 
Nakayama Proposal came somewhat as a surprise. They were viewed by regional 
governments, ASEAN in particular, as untimely. In addition, both non- and 
governmental agents did not expect that Japan would take the lead. Yet the following 
events proved that engaging agents from ASEAN-ISIS read the right signs, albeit 
slowly but incrementally accepted, for regional security architecture. Although the 
ASEAN-ISIS proposal was finally discussed and accepted by the 24th AMM in Kuala 
Lumpur (19 -20 July 1991) as an ‘appropriate’ base for addressing regional peace and 
security issues, no concrete programmes or even serious discussions followed. 
Although it was endorsed at the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore (January 1992), 
generally the officials saw it as untimely (Ball 1994a, 1994b). Of more significance 
was the need to accelerate ASEAN economic cooperation. The Singapore Declaration 
and the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (AEC), 
which was announced on this occasion, provided the basis for the establishment of an 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (Soesastro 1995b). Scholars from ASEAN-ISIS 
were to say the least surprised at Japan’s   spontaneous action, namely, at how quickly 
Yukio Satoh was able to persuade his government, ‘We did not expect a quick 
response from Japan. We knew it was hard even to persuade our own respective 
governments’ Jusuf Wanandi accepted that ASEAN-ISIS had rather underestimated 
Yukio Sato’s efforts at that time.10  
 From late 1991 to 1992 was the time when all of the regional engaging parties 
were about to change their minds. Several obvious events triggered the change. First 
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came the decline of American forward deployment in Southeast Asia. The US 
announced that it would withdraw all of its military bases from the Philippines in 
November 1991. However, the actual withdrawal from Subic naval base took place in 
late 1992. Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December was a key factor 
(McGregor 1993, Umezu 1993, Yuzawa 2007: 44). Third was China’s announcement 
in February 1992, proclaiming a new law pertaining to the territorial sea, including 
the Spratlys and the Senkakus, and the seemingly offensive upgrading capacity of its 
navy. And whilst later in July, at the AMM, Qian Qichen (the then Chinese Foreign 
Minister) assured other participants that China preferred to settle the issues through 
quiet diplomacy, the serious concerns of other could not be easily assuaged (Lee 
1994, Paik 1994). 
The Japanese worked hard on tracks I and track II. In the case of track II, 
Kazuo Takahashi, who was then Programme Director of the Sasakawa Peace 
Foundation (one of the main supporters for the APR), stated clearly that the Asia-
Pacific community would have to expand its geographical coverage. It needed to 
restructure the relationship among its members in order to develop itself into a 
political structure. At the 6th APR in June 1992, which was attended by prominent 
persons11 from tracks I and II, Wanandi reiterated that the ASEAN-PMC could be a 
workable starting point for regional dialogue. For Wanandi, the ASEAN-PMC had the 
absorbable capability to include both the ‘like-minded’ and the ‘not yet like-minded’. 
The inclusiveness was the main rationale that supported multilateralism in the 
political security field fashioned after the creation of the feeling of ASEAN-ness, 
signifying the Association’s long-term capability to absorb regional differences. It 
meant that the fora accepted the different and even conflicting perspectives on 
regional security issues (Wanandi 1993a, Acharya 1994a). Scalapino (1993) states 
that creating an official space to cover issues so critical to Northeast Asia 
accompanying the un- to semi- official meetings of the NPCSD would prove a 
promising development for the forum. 
Around the same time, the idea of creating an ‘Asia Pacific Community’ was 
also being mooted within the region, particularly by Japanese NGOs, who expected 
                                                 
11
Those prominent figures from track I were: Le Mai, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam; 
Georges Kiejman, Minister Delegate of Foreign Affairs, France; Hor Namhong, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and a member of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia; Paul Wolfowitz, the US 
Undersecretary of Defence for Policy; Peggy Mason, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, External 
Affairs and International Trade  
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that the associated outward-looking activities could eliminate their own society’s 
sense of superiority. In the long run, they could jeopardise Japan’s relationships with 
other Asian countries.  Alternative developments related to human rights also received 
attention, particularly the joining of forces between the environment-oriented NGOs 
and the Southeast Asia Forum for Development Alternative (SEAFDA), who not only 
questioned, but also helped to disseminate information about the double-standards and 
inconsistencies in the Western treatment of human rights. The result was the initiation 
of the People’s Plan for the 21st Century Campaign for the People’s Forum, held 
during the World Bank/IMF Meeting in Bangkok in 1992 (Minju and Aoki 1996, 
Pongsapich 1996). The topic was picked up due to the various countries that were 
prepared to take part in the Asia Regional Preparatory Meeting for the World 
Conference on Human Rights. It was the topic that engaging agents under 
investigation here were also interested in, specifically those from the Philippines, as it 
was compatible with the concept of comprehensive security. The event was to take 
place in Bangkok, Thailand (from 29 March 1992 to 1 April 1993).  
It is worth observing that the degree of attention that regional intellectuals 
gave the topic showed that they could not ignore topics mainly perceived outside the 
region as they were increasingly becoming part of their structural environment. In 
addition, the human rights topic should also be regarded as a clear signal for regional 
intellectuals to consider their preferred concept of comprehensive security, that is, to 
seriously engage with this topic. 
The liveliest movement, trying to turn the topic on conferences’ and 
workshops’ papers to a concrete movement came from ASEAN-ISIS, whose scholars 
presented a memorandum to both the ASEAN Secretariat and the SOM for the Manila 
AMM in 1992, encouraging ASEAN to study the matter at a deeper level in order to 
decide upon a suitable direction following the Vienna Human Rights Conferences of 
June 1993. The establishment of an ASEAN Commission on Human Rights was 
proposed (Mahaubani 1992, Wanandi 1993b, 1994a, Jones 1994).  
The notion of regional community-building was also floated, with Noordin 
Sopiee of Malaysian ISIS a key figure. The focal point was an ASEAN Community 
residing within a Southeast Asian zone of peace, independence, prosperity and 
cooperation. To achieve this, within the ASEAN community, three things should be 
developed and promoted: sense of community, cohesion and commitment to ASEAN. 
In addition, the Association should also enhance its institutional and organisational 
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skills in two areas; resolving of bilateral issues and tensions and establishing maritime 
safety and surveillance. This plan aimed at covering the whole of Southeast Asia, 
constructing a true Southeast Asia (ASEAN-10) and being a meaningful player in the 
Cambodian game. Although ASEAN’s interlocutor with Vietnam co-chaired the Paris 
International Conference on Cambodia in October 1991, a meaningful initiative was 
beyond ASEAN’s reach. The initiative was the international co-operation between the 
UN Security Council members, Japan and Australia (Anwar 1995).  
East Asia was Noordin Sopiee’s (1997) wider theatre. Two areas were 
significant, namely, defusing the South China Sea problem and establishing a zone of 
peace, independence, prosperity and co-operation in East Asia. In the Pacific region, 
according to Sopiee two matters needed to be achieved: establishing the ASEAN-
PMC process as the Asia-Pacific regional security dialogue process; and establishing 
a strong position of ASEAN within APEC. At the global level, ASEAN should unite 
resources (including people power) with other like-minded agencies in order to 
improve the system. These concerns helped to conceptualise the theme of the 7th APR 
(The making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific). 
To sum up, a preference for multilateralism was in the air from the late 1980s 
to the early 1990s. Otherwise, it would not be easy for regional agents to propose 
concrete proposals that would be accepted in the wider circles, namely, ‘A Time for 
Initiative’ and the ‘Nakayama Proposal’. They were related in terms of concepts to 
embrace the inception of a regional forum that would focus on and enfold security 
topics, irrespective of whether they were traditional or comprehensive. Their engaging 
agents penetrated through each other’s areas, Japan's and ASEAN's in particular. 
APR, CSIS, ASEAN-PMC, AMM and the ASEAN Summit as their significant fora, 
and Nakayama, Satoh and Wannandi as examples of their penetrating agents were 
crucial ipso facto. APR and ASEAN-ISIS networks of conferences played essential 
roles as platforms on which to both trade and mingle ideas. Whilst the two proposals 
had not yet been actualised, participating agents concentrated on energising 
comprehensive security matters, specifically those engaging with human rights. 
ASEAN-ISIS went a step further, proposing the set up of an ASEAN Commission on 
Human rights (see the next section). It was through these fora that Asian intellectuals 
urged their counterparts to reconsider whether it was appropriate to directly apply the 
European-CBMs experience to Asia. It was also the interaction of these fora that 
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encouraged them to aim higher to construct Asia Pacific and/or the ASEAN 
community (see Chapter 5). 
 
ARF and CSCAP: results of broad cooperation for content and procedure 
Energetic movement by both non- and governmental agents was easily perceived in 
the first half of the 1990s. It was the former’s networking movement that made this 
short period vibrant and colourful. ASEAN-ISIS became engaged in most of the 
activities from the Western to the Eastern Pacific Rim, including the annual meeting 
of the National Defence University in Washington, D.C., the NPCSD, and a series of 
conferences organised by the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at 
the University of California in San Diego (funded by the Ford Foundation) (Evans 
1983: 138). However, the most interesting came from the co-operation of the four 
institutions: the ASEAN-ISIS, the Pacific Forum in Honolulu, the Seoul Forum for 
International Affairs, and the JIIA. They started a multi-parties communication on 
Security-Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (SCAP). One of the early first results was 
PACNET, a fax networking organised by Pacific Forum in Honolulu linking scores of 
research institutes in Japan, South Korea, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Australia and the US. 
Their efforts, together with cooperation from previous periods, encouraged 
them to crystallise their region-wide track-II networks.12 The result was the inception 
of a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in 1993. Jusuf 
Wanandi, a long-time and significant engaging agent, reflected that he regarded the 
inception and extension of CSCAP as regional track-II’s (ASEAN-ISIS in particular) 
success.
13
 These region-wide networks and support stimulated them to put more 
energy into persuading their respective governments, specifically East Asian 
governments, to accept the establishment of a region-wide official security forum, as 
will be explained below. 
CSCAP’s Secretariat has been the Malaysia ISIS since its inception. This 
network has also been linked to the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), 
the Asian Secretariat of which has been the JCIE since 2005, which was established in 
1993 by Susan Shirk, the then Director of the IGCC (Ball 1994a, Taylor et al 2006: 
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 Interview on October 3rd 2006 at Saranee Group, Bangkok, Thailand 
13
Interview on October 27th  2006 at the (Thai) ISIS 25th Anniversary Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand  
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30-32, 36-38, Yuzawa 2007: 50-51). What should not be forgotten is that these 
scholars also exploited their extended network to bolster their attempts to change the 
regional security architecture. The JIIA, in association with ASEAN-ISIS and the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), organised a conference titled 
‘Enhancing Security in Southeast Asia’, this was another case of exploiting a chance 
to extend more co-operation (Building 1993: 7). Such cob-web conferences and 
seminars not only helped participants to share more socialising processes but also 
functioned as their platforms for consolidating their ideas and actions. It is worth 
emphasising here that many attempts to broaden the scope of security matters, such as 
comprehensive security and a focus on areas of conflict can be observed from these 
fora.  
However, the APR was still their most impressive assembly. Constructing and 
sustaining multilateralism for regional security was among their key concerns. The 
7th APR (1993) continued to express the view that the ASEAN-PMC would provide 
an important component for maintaining a non-military way of engaging the major 
powers in the region for its overall progress and stability. In fact, China and Russia 
had already joined the AMM as guests in 1991. Moreover, both Vietnam and Laos 
would accede to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in 1992 (Harris 1994a, Lee Lai 
to 1994). Although there was no clear evidence that the expansion of an official forum 
resulted from the efforts of non-governmental agents, it was difficult to deny that the 
existing networks comprising governmental and non-governmental agents under 
investigation here had no part at all. There was even a plenary session of the 7th APR 
indicating that the relationship between security and states should be reconsidered and 
re-conceptualised, since the region was a fertile ground for observing the 
intermingling of comprehensive, common and co-operative security. Only the concept 
of common security was understood as directly related to the states’ traditional 
security and political co-operations; the first and the second were perceived as having 
a broader scope to address/cover the diverse backgrounds of the states, according to 
their nation-state building process (Noor 1993, Dewitt 1994a, 1994b).  
 It is worth pointing out that many high profile persons who have been 
intimately involved in the on-going networking processes are the key to constructing 
more inclusive region - caring for more comprehensive security matters. These 
include SR Nathan (President of Singapore), Han Sung-Joo (former South Korean 
Minister of Foreign Affairs), Jim Kelly (former US Assistant Secretary of State for 
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East Asian and Pacific Affairs), Yukio Satoh (Japan’s former Ambassador to the 
United Nations), Stuart Harris (former Secretary of the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade), Jusuf Wanandi, and Tan Sri Noordin Sopiee (Taylor et al 
2006: 33).  
Most of the above-mentioned had been associated with regional networking 
activities since earlier times (see Chapter 3). Fruitful networks have been based on 
individually charismatic founding leaders of member institutes and their own 
extending networks. Malaysia-ISIS and its close connections with the Japanese 
Nomura Research Institute and its affiliates is a good example14 (Noda 1996a, 
1996b). Most engaging agents shared the experience of being members of somewhat 
closed societies in a period of ideological conflict. Few people were able to sojourn 
abroad, to enjoy different experiences in the relatively open societies in which they 
could learn and work. ‘It was hard to contact those outside our own countries, that's 
why we poured our hearts into turning a nigh impossible thing into a reality, as you 
have seen’ said Narongchai, reflecting on this point. 15  
Most of the energising engaging agents had directly experienced the PAFTAD 
and the PECC process and its derivatives attributed to the inception of APEC. These 
activities, creating and expanding intellectual networks, provided both ideas and 
models upon which to construct inclusive security fora. These engaging agents even 
had an aspiration to parallel that of the CSCAP and the PECC (Ball 1993, Evans 
1994b, Wanandi 1994b, Yamamoto 1996). The key was (or rather has been) to keep 
the conference circuit in the region in constant motion, creating critical support for 
ideas that might just work. Thus far ASEAN-ISIS has played this crucial role, 
according to a long-term engaging agent (Hernandez 1993).  
The government agents from Japan and Singapore were efficient. Kiichi 
Miyazawa, the incumbent Japanese Prime Minister, persuaded US President George 
Bush (1989-1993) to support political dialogue in the Asia-Pacific through the 
ASEAN-PMC. His attempt was witnessed in the Joint Declaration on the Japan-US 
                                                 
14
Although it is beyond the scope of my study, it is worth noting the vast network of Nomura Research 
Institute in order to magnify the potentially extended networks for the existing networks under 
investigation here. They include: the Brookings Institute (US), the Centre of Asian Studies (Hong 
Kong), the Centre for Policy and Implementation Studies (Jakarta), the Korean Development Institute, 
the Centre for Research and Communication (the Philippines), ISEAS (Singapore), the Chung-Hua 
Institute for Economic Research (Taipei), and the Thailand Development Research Institute.  
15
Interview, October 3rd 2006 at Saranee Group, Bangkok, Thailand  
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Global Partnership in January 1992. He reiterated the message again at the National 
Press Club in Washington DC in June 1992, by emphasising more that it was the way 
to enhance a sense of mutual reassurance. The message and timing were not 
surprising given that Yukio Satoh, who had a share in the ideas presented in the 
Nakayama Proposal, had drafted the Miyazawa’s speeches after he became Director 
General of the North American Bureau. In July 1992, the Japanese officials from the 
foreign ministry proposed enlarging the Japan-ASEAN Forum to cover political and 
security issues. It was also at this forum that the first ASEAN-PMC SOM was 
scheduled. 
Thus far, the concept of multilateralism loomed large in the region. It not only 
occupied space in governmental agents’ interactions, but was also regarded as a 
cocooning concept for further consolidation of networking by non-governmental 
agents. For governmental agents, multilateralism was taken further when Singapore 
assumed the chair of ASEAN’s Standing Committee from July 1992 to July 1993. 
Obvious cases of regional multilateralism were the expansion of the ASEAN-PMC 
dialogue and the establishment of ASEAN-PMC SOM, first held in Singapore in May 
1993.  
It was agreed at the 26th AMM in Singapore on July 23-24 1993 that 
henceforth the ASEAN-PMC would be extended and known as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF). Apart from the six ASEAN countries and their seven major trading 
partners, the forum included Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea. 16 
Initially chances of success were viewed by critics outside the region to be slim due to 
disagreement over common security agendas. Additionally, the newly established 
ARF was limited to dealing only using non-military means, reifying its image as a 
'security talk shop’ (Djiwandono 1994, Leifer 1996: 27-31, Mak and Hamzah 1996, 
Yuzawa 2007: 43-46). Yet, the Japanese engaging agents, both governmental and 
non-governmental, rather relentlessly supported it, their rationale being that the forum 
not only acted as a bridge between the ‘West’ and ‘Asia’, but also between ASEAN 
and China. It was a means to maintain constant communication (Hook 1998: 159-188, 
Umezu 1993: 82).   
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At that time ASEAN comprised six states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Brunei). Their dialogue-partners consisted of the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
South Korea and the European Community  
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Efforts by long-term engaging non-governmental agents made both the ARF 
and CSCAP eye-catching fora, however, of late their mantras of multilateralism have 
declined somewhat. Although CSCAP and its derivatives serve as essential debating 
venues for ideas and initiatives before they become recognised by more serious 
formal bodies, such as the SOM and ARF, there have been questions as to whether 
they might be overburdened by too many issues. Acharya (1994a, 1994b) argues that 
cooperation with the United Nations regional institutions to develop a system of 
preventive diplomacy might be helpful for regional engaging agents. Yet, what should 
not be forgotten is that those engaging agents established the CSCAP as a parallel 
forum to cooperate with the ARF in order to achieve better regional security in 
general.  
As suggested earlier, this short period, with its diversified movements and 
topics, was remarkably vibrant, indicating that the regional (social) environment was 
about to change. ASEAN-ISIS wanted to accelerate the process, first and specifically 
at the ASEAN level. A series of international conferences was organised in a bid to 
find a way to effectively enlarge the Association to cover all geographical areas 
(Myanmar and the Indochinese states). It started in 1988 under the banner of the 
Southeast Asia Forum. 
Whilst track I was rather slow, track II’s activities were different. Preparations 
to enlarge ASEAN-ISIS to cover research institutions from the Indochinese states 
were scheduled. Yet, there was also effective cooperation between the two tracks. The 
ASEAN-Vietnam Study Group, whose members from Vietnam became parts of 
ASEAN-ISIS networks, under the aegis of Anwar Ibrahim (then Malaysia's Minister 
of Finance) and funded by the Management for Change Project of the CIDA, provides 
a good example of the co-operation.  In 1992, the Thai-ISIS and Singapore’s 
Information and Resource Centre (IRC) co-organised an international conference 
titled ‘Towards One Southeast Asia in the 21st Century’ at which the ASEAN-
Vietnam Study Group Report on ‘Shared Destiny: Southeast Asia in the 21st Century’ 
was launched. Through ASEAN-Vietnam Study Group, the process of enlarging 
ASEAN as proposed by ASEAN-ISIS scholars, previously mentioned, took place. 
The process was condensed in the form of the 5th Southeast Asia Forum titled 
‘One Southeast Asia’. The main concept was that ASEAN should have no problem in 
accommodating Myanmar and the three Indochinese states (Towards 1993a, 
Balakrishnan 1993). On this occasion, Anwar Ibrahim argued that ASEAN could 
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embrace the ‘diversity of the region as a source of strength, rather than conflict’ 
(Towards 1993b).  It was reiterated by engaging agents that ASEAN should promote 
mutual understanding through bilateral and multilateral meetings in different ways 
and at different levels. The activities of tracks II and III were viewed as a way to 
diminish the differences and accompanied track I activities such as in their 
cooperation to reconstruct Indochina (Anwar 1993, Khamsy 1993). 
Only through the political process of consultation and accommodation 
fostered by frequent interaction at multi-levels could the potential newcomers, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, comprehend, construct and familiarise 
themselves with the ‘spirit of ASEAN’, with emphasis on informal, consensus and 
process-oriented phenomena (Acharya 1997, 1998, 2001: chapter 2). This was also 
reiterated in 1994 at the 6th Southeast Asia Forum entitled ‘Lessons from the Past, 
Signposts for the Future’. At this forum, Vietnam’s Institute for International 
Relations (IIR) was officially welcomed as part of ASEAN-ISIS, prior to Vietnam 
officially becoming part of ASEAN the following year (Balakrishnan 1995a, 
Snitwongse 1995a).  
The PECC and the APR were still employed as significant fora by engaging 
agents (governmental and non-governmental) to express their support regarding the 
idea of regional inclusiveness that had been nurtured since the 1960s (see Chapter 3). 
Encouragement to construct a wider community resurfaced in incumbent Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's opening speech titled ‘Open Regionalism’ 
delivered at the 10th PECC meeting 'The Way Forward’. Yet, as far as the Asia-
Pacific community was concerned, it was limited to emphasising East Asia, although 
the Pacific community was mentioned (Mohamad 1994). Adullah Ahmad Badawi 
(1996),  who was then Malaysian Foreign Minister, in his opening speech at the 9th 
APR (1995), called for the removing of the cold-war mindset, encouraging more 
cooperation even in the difficult areas (Balakrishnan 1995b).  
Sopiee (1995, 1996) a long-term ASEAN-ISIS scholar, also employed the 
same APR in 1995 to emphasise the psychological/cultural change or revolution to 
remove the cold-war mindset. The change should comprise three areas: a regional 
consciousness revolution; a confidence revolution; and an assertiveness revolution. 
Many issues presented at the 9th APR (1995) reflected these concerns: the impact of 
dependent media upon domestic and regional societies; how problems of population 
movements (both from economic reasons and refugees) impacted upon regional 
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security and well-being; and narcotics problems, focusing primarily upon heroin 
(mostly produced from Southeast and Central Asia) (Alegodo 1996, Chantavanich 
and Risser 1996, Simpson 1996, Swimnerton 1996, Yaman 1996).  
Concerns expressed within the APR urged serious thought about relationships 
among and within states. At first the thought was dominated (but not hegemonically) 
by the US. There was a question of ‘stateness’ reflected in diversified questions 
ranging from political identity to economic and cultural cooperation, more or less 
blurring the line between political amity and enmity. The APR reiterated that the 
definition of national and regional security interests should be reconsidered, due to 
their complex natures (Alagappa 1997).   
Thus far, track II activities proved that they were useful, specifically when 
they strayed into the socially related-diversified problems that often occurred in the 
natural economic territories (NETs). The ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP were at the 
forefront of providing venues for dialogues.  Wanandi indicates that their success 
came from the perception that ‘they not only provided new thinking but also created 
trust and solidarity’.17 To enlarge upon this point, 1994 first witnessed the enlarging 
unofficial-regional-dialogue process to include Vietnam, Russia, and North Korea as 
members.  India’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) gained entry as 
an associate member (Acharya, Dewitt and Hernandez 1995, Wanandi 1995a). 
Nevertheless, Wananadi also pointed out that ‘the enlargement of the CSCAP can be 
regarded as ASEAN-ISIS successful activities’.18 Put differently, track II activities 
could be considered as regional CBMs covering ASEAN, ARF, and CSCAP. They 
provide a potential path for the region to be more inclusive in terms of geography and 
security issues (Cossa 1997).   
Engaging agents not only maintained the dynamic momentum of 
multilateralism energetically initiated in the earlier periods, they were also astute 
enough to recognise the right moment for their initiation. As regards multilateralism, 
the numerous conferences and workshops that revolved around ASEAN-ISIS are 
prominent cases of promoting the concept of multilateralism and inclusiveness. The 
latter included the concept of comprehensive security. The ASEAN-ISIS key method 
not only engaged officials from their own respective countries and Japan with the 
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Interview on October 27th at the (Thai) ISIS 25th Anniversary Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand 
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 Interview on October 27th 2006 at the (Thai) ISIS 25th Anniversary Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand   
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socialising processes, but also persuaded them to accept diversified or different ideas 
and/or activities regarding regional security related matters. One of the Japanese 
officials they invited, Yukio Satoh has continued to play a prominent role in 
supporting multilateralism.  
It is worth noting that the agents' strategy to engage the prominent senior 
officials gave them more time not only to exchange but also to plant their ideas during 
the course of their association with the prominent senior officials. An example is the 
way in which these engaging agents tried to find an acceptable path to ameliorate their 
economic difficulties and differences through, for example, the PECC.   
Their socialising processes through numerous conferences, seminars and 
workshops were also their means of enlivening the concept of regional community 
with a more precise definition, particularly in terms of geographical areas than that 
proposed earlier (see Chapter 3). 
To sum up (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 on p. 215 and p. 216), what should 
not be forgotten is that the idea of uniting ASEAN had also taken root and started to 
bear fruit. The enlargement of ASEAN to accommodate Vietnam and Laos at the 
governmental level and the accession of IIR (a research institute in Vietnam) to 
ASEAN-ISIS at the non-governmental level were cases in point. Also we can see that 
PECC was still active. Networking activities went on in terms of both extending and 
consolidating their scope of cooperation. With more than usual co-operation from the 
Eastern Pacific Rim countries (Seoul Forum, Pacific Forum, and JIIA), and from 
academic institutions in the Western Pacific Rim and North America (NPCSD, IGCC, 
National Defence University - Washington, D.C, UC-San Diego), SCAP was 
established, initially with modest ambitions. Later it was linked with the newly 
established NEACD originated by North American and Japanese intellectuals (having 
JCIE as its Secretariat) and Australia’s AIIA. The result was the inception of CSCAP 
as a track-II paralleling the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 
 
Constructing ‘community’: a catch-concept for networking revitalisation  
It is no underestimation to say that the trend of the momentum was less dynamic from 
the mid-1990s on, due to static activities in terms of quality rather than quantity. The 
reverse trend occurred before the end of the decade. This section, outlining how the 
trend was changed and revitalised, particularly by the promotion of the ‘ASEAN 
Community’ and ‘East Asia Community’, shows that these two were compatible with 
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the intentions and efforts of networking-engaging agents, who shared experiences, 
ideas and visions of their region. 
 
ASEM and CAEC: further ascending steps before the 1997 financial crisis 
This section argues that networking activities in the region resulted from close 
cooperation between state- and non-state agents. The support given to the inception of 
both the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation 
(CAEC) followed a similar pattern to one another. The main difference was that the 
ARF and CSCAP were regarded as mostly initiated by track II, whereas the ASEM 
and CAEC (intended to parallel ASEM) were the result of a hard push by track I. 
Track-II agents shared in the significant activities that made them happen; CAEC's 
involvement in particular can be traced back to the longer processes of regional 
networking activities since the 1970s. Thus, the reason why ASEM and CAEC should 
be included here is that their existence and activities have been part of regional 
networking agents’ structure for thought and action since their inception. 
The apparent initiation of ASEM came from Goh Chok Tong, who was 
Singapore's Prime Minister when he visited France in 1994. The idea assumed a more 
precise shape at the subsequent World Economic Forum’s inaugural ‘Europe-East 
Asia’ summit in Singapore in 1995. In the same year, the EU-ASEAN senior officials' 
meeting took place. But all was not necessarily plucked from thin air. Singapore was 
not alone in its efforts to overcome a fear of a 'European fortress' following the 
announcement of a plan to construct the Single Europe signifying that European 
Union (EU) should be more than Asian’s ‘boutique’ (Leifer 1998: 204, Lehman 1998, 
Piei and Khalifah 1998). As usual, economic concerns took precedence. Han Sung-
Joo (the then South Korean Foreign Minister, who had been familiar with Asia-
Pacific economic cooperation since its inception) wanted to close the gap between 
Korea and the EU. To this end, he set up a ‘Wisemen’s Group’ to study the future of 
EU-Korea relations. The report proposed that intensive efforts were needed in image 
building and diversifying exchanges were required (Maull, Segal, and Wanandi 1998, 
Nuttal 1998).  
Japan was reluctant to establish closer links between Asia and Europe, in the 
main due to unclear signals from the US as to whether it was happy with the idea or 
not, until Washington gave positive signs - even helped to institutionalise and hasten 
the concrete action plan for APEC (Wanandi 1997, Harding 1998).   Tokyo was quick 
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to seize the chance for its familiar fields, albeit within limited scope. What should be 
stressed here is that the success of PECC and APEC, as successful processes that 
engaging agents under investigation here have helped to construct and sustain, can be 
considered as an ‘organic approach’ to political activities that not only worked really 
well for the region, but also encouraged further cooperation. 
Between 1993 and 1995, APEC's focus was upon whether it could go any 
further than simply being an elitist talk-shop and photogenic session. Fortunately, the 
sporadic emergence of growth areas lured Indonesia into becoming more inclusive 
further than ASEAN (geographical area) and hastened its regional cooperation. In 
1993 at Blake Island in the US, APEC leaders agreed on this vision; in 1994 at Bogor, 
Indonesia, they agreed the goal.  In 1995 at Osaka, Japan, they proposed the ‘action’ 
plan (Soesastro 1997a). 
It is worth proposing the notion here that experiences from previous 
cooperation demonstrate how the interplay between economic and political 
dimensions can come together, which has been a fundamental concept that engaging 
agents have promoted, albeit sometimes subtly, since their regional networking 
activities emerged in the 1960s (see Chapter 3). The mingling of economic and 
political dimensions acts as a structure for thought and action for all engaging agents. 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise when regional intellectuals argue that they 
should imitate the success of APEC for further constructing the cooperation of the 
diversified backgrounds between Asian and European countries that turned out to be 
participants of ASEM (Higgott 1998, Soesastro 1997b, 1998).  
Based on numerous regional experiences (some more negative than positive), 
it is understandable that Japanese agents viewed new initiatives as part of their 
complicated relationship with Asia. Socially, it was so discursive that from the 
Japanese perspective a successful ‘social game’19 was required (Tanaka 1999). Every 
engaging agent knows that it is necessary to be successful in social circles as much as 
possible. Equally necessary is the participant’s self-confidence to take action based on 
a sound background and intentions beyond mere tactics. In other words, ASEM could 
provide an optional path for Tokyo to highlight its role as mediator between Asia and 
the West. What should not be overlooked is that the meeting helps to illustrate the 
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 Every engaging agent knows that it is necessary to be successful in social circles. Equally necessary 
is the participant’s self-confidence to take action based on a sound background and intentions beyond 
mere tactics.  
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clearer scope of being Asia: as already suggested, the Asian side turned out to be 
within the scope of the EAEC proposed by Mahathir Mohamad (Gilson 1995, 
Heisbourg 1998: 231, Stubbs 2002). It re-emerged through the ASEM framework, 
when concerns about regionalism were reduced (Beeson 2003). The Asian side, 
comprising ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan, represented the same 
composition for the establishment of an ASEAN Plus Three (APT) after the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997.  
In contrast, the European side was more concerned with the rapidly changing 
political climate in the region. Although economic and political cooperation was 
evident, mixed signs confused those who were not closely engaged with the Asian 
dynamism. Rudiger Machetzki (1998) argues that the Europeans, as former colonial 
powers, either ignored or failed to understand the regional perceptions of nationalism. 
This perception, particularly in the case of human rights and related problems, proved 
an obstacle for smooth cooperation20 (Hernandez 1998, Kwa 1998). 
The European side expressed concern regarding regional political and security 
uncertainty, due to the many controversial issues that emerged between 1993 and 
1996. Within this period, a tendency towards arms accumulation in the region was 
raised (Sudarsono 1997). Although regional institutions and networking activities had 
thus far presented themselves as softening barriers to prevent extreme unilateral 
ventures, questions surrounding a clearer regional direction persisted (Wanandi 1998). 
On the one hand, APEC’s Eminent Persons Group (EPG) presented a vision for more 
institutionalising of the Asia Pacific Economic Community, on the other, the ARF 
(with the help of CSCAP) was questioned regarding whether it was really effective 
under ASEAN leadership. There was also the question of whether it would be better 
to deepen and broaden its role to cover human rights and a regional nuclear weapons-
free zone (Tay 1997, Soesastro 1998).   
The North Korean nuclear issue was still active, although there were signs of 
reconciliation between the two Koreas in October 1991. The year 1995 was perceived 
as dangerous: there was clearly an emerging concept of a ‘China threat’ as Beijing 
showed its military might in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait in retaliation 
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Scholars from the region emphasised that most social problems were not derived from different 
values on human rights as many Asian states tried to insist. They were derived more from urbanisation 
and modernisation without properly utilising their own social capital. People uprisings in many 
regional countries were good examples: Myanmar (Burma at that time) with its ‘8-8-88’ movement; 
Beijing and the May 1989 incident; and Bangkok with the May bloodshed-uprising 1992  
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for the US issuing a visa to Lee Teng Hui, the incumbent Taiwanese President.21 For 
Japan, it was a disastrous year. It had to contend with three major events: the Kobe 
earthquake, Tokyo’s sarin gas incident, and the high appreciation of the Yen (Ahn 
1997). It was also the year that the Bangkok Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone was signed (Nostis). The EU viewed these issues with no small 
discomfort as they had no say in them. There was even a perception that the 
difficulties in East Asia might come to resemble Europe in 1914 (Heisbourg 1998: 
234). The EU's attempt to find the common perception initiated by the European 
Commission in 1994 for its Asian policy had failed (Leifer 1998: 198-212, Nuttal 
1998). Meanwhile, at government level, where there was failure to determine whether 
Asia and Europe should become closer, non-government agents were on the move.  
In the spring of 1993, the JCIE launched a survey titled ‘Non-governmental 
Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community’. The report, 
which was published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in 
Singapore in 1995, gave details of research institutions in 15 regional countries. 
Unfortunately, because they emphasised institutions within states’ boundaries, little 
information was provided regarding regional or international linkages. Nevertheless, 
it was the first to be undertaken in the field. It was updated in January 1998 in 
preparation for a conference convened in Bangkok by the Asia Pacific Philanthropy 
Consortium (APPC) entitled ‘Support for NGOs in Asia Pacific’ (Yamamoto 1997). 
What was signified by the survey was that Japan was serious about emphasising its 
‘Asianness’ and intended to put forward a project based upon the ‘Asian Community’ 
(Chin 1997). 
In an attempt to combat the many negative signs derived from different 
perspectives specifically between Asian countries and the West, many engaging 
agents tried hard to insert positive signs into the region by organising more 
conferences, seminars, and workshops. Attempts by both governmental and non-
governmental agents to define the ‘preventive diplomacy’ (PD) as a way to reinforce 
the regional CBMs were one example. During 1993 and 1994, there was a series of 
three meetings on ASEAN-UN Cooperation on Peace and Preventive Diplomacy co-
sponsored by the Institute of Policy Study in Singapore and the Thai Ministry of 
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Lee Teng Hui may have visited Cornell University as its alumnus but Beijing regarded American 
action as violating the Shanghai Communiqué emphasizing that the US has accepted the ‘One China 
Policy’. 
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Foreign Affairs.  These objectives were to consider and revise the Agenda for Peace 
proposed in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was then UN General Secretary. 
The JIIA and the Japanese National Institute of Research Advancement (NIRA) also 
expressed interest (Acharya 2000). Although, it rarely went further than on paper and 
within the conference rooms, engaging agents (governmental and non-governmental) 
pushed harder their efforts to express their views and concerns through various 
publications.  
Also in 1995, the CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive Security and 
Co-operative Security tried hard to persuade regional countries to value the self-
resilience, inclusiveness and prominence of economic security concern, the basis of 
which was pragmatically mutual respect and egalitarianism for regional solidarity and 
successful international co-operation (Hassan 1995, Rolf 1995). The trend from the 
mentioned efforts was that engaging/networking agents gave their favour to the 
concept of co-operative security, emphasising less demand on non-offensive military 
postures and more demand on transparency in terms of military and political aspects. 
The rationale for such a direction was that Asia-Pacific was incrementally politically 
cosmopolitan due to its inclusiveness that was nurtured and flourished by many 
decades of regional networking activities. Nevertheless, not all engaging agents 
shared liberal values, except for a free market (see Chapter 3). At best, it could be a 
communitarian system – a community of communities and even this looked less likely 
at the time (Singh 1995, Yamamoto 1995). The concept of human security also 
received attention as a potential obstacle that could harm the existing networking 
activities, mainly due to varying perceptions and different prioritisation given to the 
definition of human security.22 Many engaging agents in Asia had been bound by 
their traditional discourse of giving prior significance to society, not to individuals. 
Following this logic, in other words, individuals as human-beings can be only an 
object of security. Engaging agents outside Asia wanted more emphasis on human 
beings as the subject of security since they were regarded by these agents as directed 
and vulnerable victims (Hussain 1997).   
The sum of these events also caused concern for European and Asian scholars, 
who supported cooperation between the two regions for more than two decades 
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The issues were publicised in the first half of the 1990s, mostly by the Brandt Commission, the 
Bruntland Commission and the Commission on Global Governance under the aegis of the UN. 
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specifically for those engaging with the Hakone process, and did not want this chance 
to pass by without doing anything. The most significant movement of the second track 
can be traced back to a workshop convened in March 1995 by the European 
University Institute in Florence. It was attributed to the cooperation of Hanns Maull of 
the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Gerald Segal, who earlier created the Pacific 
Asia Programme and was with the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), and Jusuf Wanandi of Indonesia's CSIS. Their efforts resulted in the 
inception of the Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation (CAEC) fashioned after PECC 
and CSCAP. Their efforts could be considered as a good example of both utilising 
and adding values to the existing familiar networks. 
Apart from the EU Commission, the Koerber Foundation and the Friedrich-
Naumann Foundation, its main sponsors were those familiar with multilateral 
institutionalising processes in the region: the Asia Pacific Agenda Project, which had 
been a centre piece of the JCIE’s Global ThinkNet activities since 1996, the Sasakawa 
Peace Foundation, the Nippon Foundation and the Foreign Ministry of Japan (Maull, 
Segall and Wanandi 1998: xv-xvi, JCIE 2006: 10). It is worth stressing that most of 
them were friends who had familiarised themselves with socialising processes either 
through the ‘Hakone Meeting’ or via ASEAN-ISIS's networking activities as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Their progress was based upon more than 20 years 
of experience in informal meetings. The cross-continent networking between Asia and 
Europe not only officially consolidated networking activities of their 
non/governmental agents, but also expressed the potential to be a social space that 
different views regarding different issues could be mitigated smoother than when they 
discussed with official fora. Although CAEC started with more traditional political 
concerns than PECC and CSCAP, its structure allowed it to be more open to 
comprehensive security because its networking agents had firm backgrounds with 
PECC and CSCAP.  
The first ASEM was convened in Bangkok in March 1996, at a time when the 
European side was concerned about the escalation of international trading in arms, 
apart from trade: most of the high purchasing-powers were East Asian (Babbage 
1997, Bates 1997, Wattanayakorn 1997).  Efforts to cover nuclear weapons free zone 
in the region had not gone as far as ASEAN expected (Anggoro 1996, Krause 1998, 
Segal 1998). The anticipation from the Asian side was that the European side could 
contribute its own ideas and experiences through comprehensive security, especially 
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how to institutionalise the international community and effectively manage the North 
Sea (Soesastro and Wanandi 1996, Gault 1997, Maull 1998). Asian engaging agents 
expected that European experiences from managing conflictive areas like the North 
Sea might shed light on how they could manage high-potential conflictive areas such 
as the South China Sea. 
The widespread financial crisis, which had its genesis in Bangkok 
approximately one year after the First ASEM Summit, was the crisis that not only 
devastatingly devalued many currencies  - in particular the Indonesian rupiah, the 
Thai baht, and the Korean won - but also discredited the Japanese model of 
development and led to questions about neo-liberal approaches (Acharya 1999).  Non-
governmental activities were also criticised for not being efficient enough to warn 
their track I counterparts in advance about the crisis. What can be suggested here is 
that although ASEM might have less impact on policies of their respective countries 
in the early stages, the ongoing-socialising processes still offered essential and lively 
experiences for the next generation of both sides to have each other's mutual benefits 
taken into consideration (Wanandi 2000a). 
The urgent initiative to mitigate the situation came first from Tokyo. Since 
1994, the Japanese Ministry of Finance had seen a need to set up a regional 
mechanism for stabilising the Asian currencies by reducing their dependence on the 
US dollar: 1994 was the year of Mexican currency crisis (Kikuchi 2002a). 
Unfortunately, Japan received no good response even from ASEAN. In order to 
confront the financial crisis effectively, ASEM was the Japanese government’s 
anticipated hopeful platform to float the notion of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). 
The idea regarding AMF could go no further. Many critics within and outside of the 
region viewed it as overlapping with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At that 
time, ASEM proved no match for a serious crisis. Its early socialising process was too 
weak to confront the financial crisis.   
 The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was issued at Kuala Lumpur in December 
1997 from the need of East Asian states to cooperate among themselves within the 
ASEM framework. Engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, warmly 
welcomed it and regarded it as a forum for providing more effective for 
communicating and condensing the sense of common destiny constructed by the 
'coalition of willingness' (Tay 2002).  
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The Japanese government seized the chance to express its intention and 
capability to take a lead by proposing the linkage between the concepts of 
multilateralism and its trade agreements. Again the potentiality of receiving benefits 
from boosting regional trade kept the momentum of regional networking activity, 
specifically in terms of trade, going23 (Tay 2002). The ongoing networking activities 
meant more inclusive chances to cover non-governmental agents’ concerns. The 
Miyazawa Initiative (named after the Japanese Prime Minister of the time, Kiichi 
Miyazawa) injected US$30 billion into the Asian currencies.  It led the ‘Chiang Mai 
Initiative’ (CMI) to a series of currency swap agreements (which were apparent 
examples) (Kikuchi 2002, Nabers 2003). All in all, closer co-operation among East 
Asian countries was being actively developed and the role of intellectuals was also 
actively involved with slightly different functions from their earlier periods of co-
operation that required them to wander beyond national boundaries. After the 
inception of the APT, the role of the engaging agents, specifically for non-
governmental, seemed to emphasise more on facilitating and accelerating track I 
activities, mainly due to the contents of the policies which were within the same 
direction of their preferred concept of comprehensive security.  
Earlier, a condensed vision for constructing an international community came 
from ASEAN non-governmental agents; those from Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia played a significant part. Malaysian-ISIS was very active. Indeed, it had 
experiences with helping the Malaysian government draft Vision 2020. Noordin 
Sopiee was a key agent here. ASEAN’s 2020 Vision was a way to construct an 
‘ASEAN Community’ that was progressive, peaceful and prosperous. In order to 
achieve its construction, Sopiee (1997) argued that ASEAN must be fully and firmly 
democratic, imbued with the fullest social justice. These desirable characteristics 
would enable ASEAN to win over the masses as well as the elites. This version 
followed the ASEAN-ISIS Draft of Pacific Concords, which was first circulated in 
May 1996. It was a revised version of a paper initially prepared for the ASEAN SOM 
in 1994 under the title ‘Norms and Principles for Regional Political and Security 
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It was as Simon Tay explained with a metaphor of the bicycle theory of free trade. Unless trade talks 
continue to move forwards, they will – like the bicycle – fail and fall. 
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Cooperation’24, an updated version of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976) 
(Evans 1997, Hassan 1997). It is worth emphasising here that the financial crisis 
helped regional intellectuals (mostly from ASEAN and Northeast Asia) to hasten their 
consideration of an integrative vision viewed through the engaging agents’ activities 
within the APT framework, ASEAN included. 
 The momentum of dynamic multilateralism seemed to swing back. The 
intellectuals tried to keep it going, irrespective of whether they were from non- or 
governmental agencies. At the time, being non-governmental agents apparently led 
them to choose a deeper track of reflection, whilst the governmental agents proceeded 
along a deeper cooperative path trying to reach further to people as the backbone of 
every society. For the non-governmental agents, the idea of empowering civil society 
was seen to offer an effective alternative to conventional society giving priority to the 
ruling and the advantage groups. They proposed that it was essential not to put too 
much emphasis on economic development under the banner of market liberalism. An 
important experience from such a wrong-footed policy was the Assembly of the Poor 
in Thailand, who suffered chronically from policies favouring infrastructure 
construction to accommodate the growth of the city. Lessons from the past showed 
that creating political space or channels to absorb them was crucial.  So did the more 
direct link between tracks II and III25 (Gomez 2000, Jumbala 2000, Lizee 2000, 
Ronas 2000). This link, or what should be termed as an interplay process for this 
project, has been anticipated from both track II and track III, particularly for the latter 
as the way to mitigate ASEAN-ISIS externally perceived image of an exclusive ‘elite’ 
club. The interplaying relationship should expand participation (general public-
oriented) of the ASEAN concerns (Caballeo-Anthony 2004: 581). 
What could be analytically summarised here (see Figure 5 on p. 217) is that 
around the mid 1990s, Asian leaders’ focus was more on economic concerns due to 
their perceptions that a ‘Single European Project’ might harm them. Han Sung-joo 
(one of the familiar faces in the Asia Pacific (economic) networking and one-time 
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Norms and principles mentioned in the document are: strengthening the identity of regional process; 
strengthening the forces for security co-operation in the area by reinforcing existing norms and 
principles; and provides a clearer normative and conceptual framework for the formulation of strategies 
and measures appropriate for security cooperation in the region.  
25
 Suffice to say that according to many papers presented at the 13th APR, the poor have scarified their 
traditional occupation. Although civil societies are not new, particularly in the former colonised 
societies, the rapid widespread of them was.  
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 4: Strengthening, consolidating and revitalising networks 
162 
Korean Foreign Minister) tried to find a more cooperative path between Korea and 
Europe in order to mitigate Korean economic difficulties.26 Effective change 
eventually occurred when the Singaporean leader loudly announced at the World 
Economic Forum (1995) that Europe and East Asia should cooperate more closely. 
Tokyo followed suit by supporting both the Asia-Europe Business Conference and the 
Asia-Europe Young Leaders’ Symposium. 
At track-I level, ASEAN, ASEAN-PMC and ASEAN-SOM played their parts 
as organisers and mediators to transplant and transmit an idea of cross-continental 
cooperation. The result was to initiate the establishment of an Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) as a forum at which each side could directly consult, co-operate, and voice 
their concerns and interests to each other. Although their interests may not have 
appeared alike, their concerns could seem compatible when the concept of 
comprehensive security was taken into consideration.  ASEAN-SOM also acted as a 
mediator between tracks I and II in ASEAN via ASEAN-ISIS, whose activities in this 
period covered more tangible security difficulties, specifically in the South China Sea. 
It was also a geographical area in which NIRA and JIIA were interested as well as 
Northeast Asia, specifically the Korean Peninsular - an area in which they could 
cooperate under the UN banner entitled ‘Co-operation on Peace and Preventive 
Diplomacy’.  
Japan’s JCIE played a significant role as coordinator and facilitator for 
regional networking activities. Its long-term connections with numerous research 
institutes in Europe via the ‘Hakone Meeting’ provided a fertile ground for linking 
Europe’s track-II to those of Asia via CSIS and ASEAN-ISIS. These connections 
generated the track-II parallel to ASEM: CAEC. There have been three pairs of 
regional cooperation in which ASEAN-ISIS and its Japanese counterpart have played 
their parts: PECC-APEC, CSCAP-ARF, and CAEC-ASEM. JCIE also encouraged 
more region-wide cooperation by supporting two energetic and effective projects to 
project regional future, namely, ‘Global ThinkNet’ and ‘Asia Pacific Agenda Project 
(APAP)’, which provide cross-cultural opinions and experiences to construct 
acceptable views on regional matters. Their derivatives included the ‘Asia Pacific 
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 His success as a Foreign Minister could be regarded as a success of regional economic networking, 
according to the JCIE (interviews 31  August 2006 and September 13 2006 at JCIE, Tokyo, Japan) 
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Philanthropy Consortium’, an elusive idea designed to support and/or construct the so 
called ‘Asian Community’. 
 
Engaging Activities after the 1997 financial crisis 
Before the dawn of the 21st century, the region witnessed an interesting tendency 
derived from APT members' forming of a network of ‘Free Trade Agreements’ 
(FTA). Indeed, the idea of constructing such a network could be traced back to the 
1960s, the decade that non-governmental agents took the lead due to an ideological 
conflict and suspicious perception that hung in the air (see Chapter 3). At this time, 
when an ideological conflict was not the problem and economic and financial 
difficulties were common in the region, the governmental agents indisputably took the 
lead in order to create more effective means to solve the problems. Keizo Obuchi, the 
incumbent Japanese Prime Minister, seized the chance when Kin Dae-Jung, the South 
Korean President officially visited Japan in autumn 1998 to launch the idea of 
constructing a free trade area between the two countries. In March 1999, it was 
confirmed when the two agreed upon a ‘Japan-Korea Economic Agenda 21’ 
(Yamazawa 2001).  
The year 1999 was another milestone in East Asian history. It proved that East 
Asian ways of approaching problems (informally, functionally, and incrementally) 
could contribute to peace and stability based on Japanese (economic) and Chinese 
(cultural) community networks. The APT members’ adoption of the joint statement on 
East Asia Co-operation, which covered financial, monetary, fiscal and other common 
interests, confirmed this (Chunlai 2002, Kikuchi 2002b, Sastrohandoyo 2002). In 
addition, the Singaporean government boosted the process by proposing an FTA with 
Japan, which materialised in January 2002. The Japanese government enlarged the 
scope to study the possibility of an FTA with ASEAN as a whole in 2000, In 
November 2001 it sealed an agreement to finalise negotiations with the Association 
within ten years (Munakata 2002, Kimura 2003).  
 What should not be overlooked is that in hindsight Tokyo’s policies and 
efforts could be considered strategic responses from the initiatives of Seoul and 
Beijing27 (Cai 2003). Many FTAs were derived from the proposal put forward by the 
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The important catalyst for the Japanese reaction was China’s aggressive effort to establish a 
comprehensive and closer relationship with ASEAN. The procedure thus far included an FTA, 
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cooperation between the networks of selected intellectuals called ‘East Asian Vision 
Group’ (EAVG) and APT officials known as the ‘East Asian Study Group’ (EASG). 
Both were attributed to Kim Dae-Jung’s initiative to explore practical ways and 
means of deepening and expanding the existing cooperation among members of the 
APT. Due to EAVG and EASG efforts, the inception of the East Asian Forum and a 
proposal for establishing an East Asian Community were included as a new potential 
project to consolidate networking activities enlarged and sustained by engaging agents 
(Kikuchi 2002a, Lee 2002, Yamazawa 2004). 
Although Korean initiatives came mostly from the government, they resulted 
from a changing environment in the region that the Seoul Forum members played a 
part in constructing an inclusive region (see Chapter 3). As for China, it is difficult to 
deny that engaging agents under investigation here had a part in helping China to be 
more internationalised, specifically through a series of conferences such as ASEAN-
China conference organised by ASEAN-ISIS, mostly chaired by Thai-ISIS. ‘Along 
the way, the Chinese agents changed a lot. From not accepting any Western style, 
ideas, methods, or even wearing Western suits, to being more internationalised and 
talking about economic development and an inclusive region’, Narongchai 
reflected.28 
After convening and producing their proposals, the results would be sent back 
to their track I counterparts through two broad frameworks for co-operation: from 
EAVG to EASG for the APT framework, and from ASEAN-ISIS to ASEAN-SOM 
for the ASEAN framework. It is worth noting that ASEAN-ISIS scholars had the two 
aforementioned main channels through which to voice their ideas, given that their 
respective governments were part of the APT framework. Three main ASEAN-ISIS 
member institutes had better chances to transmit their ideas to their official 
counterparts in their respective countries than other members; the Indonesian CSIS, 
Malaysian-ISIS and the SIIA (see Chapter 3). For Singapore’s case, sometimes the 
SIIA and the ISEAS worked together in order to persuade their governments to 
support their ideas, such as a draft for ASEAN Charter.29 In the case of the Japanese 
intellectuals, their connections with the ASEAN-ISIS and EAVG through the web of 
                                                                                                                                            
cooperation in finance, regional development, technological assistance, macro economic cooperation 
and other issues of common concerns to cover non-traditional security matter. 
28
 Interview October 3rd 2006 at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand 
29
 Interview on July 19th 2006, at SIIA, Singapore 
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connections circled around the JIIA affiliated institution to the Japanese foreign 
ministry. They also had their links with the Trilateral Commission through wide 
connections centred on the JCIE, a forefront non-profit institution in Japanese society 
since the 1970s, which really counted when transmitting their ideas.  
Suffice to say that for the governmental agents, the Japanese government 
played a significant role in sharing initiatives and efforts to provide fruitful regional 
structures for expressing, exchanging and finding common ideas/perceptions for 
bettering the regional environment. Japanese engaging agents were considered 
significant initiators and providers of the regional socialising process, specifically 
those covering the fields of scholarship (Inoguchi 2002). Although these movements 
from the mid-1990s were emphasised at the state level, they could be viewed, 
according to definitions given in Chapter 1, as parts of a constructed socialising 
process for regional agents. It was this dynamic process that led to the trend of 
creating a regional community and a shared identity: the ‘East Asia Community’ 
project. 
Whilst the new ideas took time to become formalised, there was sufficient 
space left for reflection and deeper thought upon what engaging agents, governmental 
and non-governmental, had done thus far; about what topics should be played down in 
order to make room for much more needed and urgent topics. The APR in Kuala 
Lumpur provided a significant venue.  
The 13th meeting in 1999 under the theme ‘Beyond the Crisis: Challenges and 
Opportunities’ reflected their notion that positive concepts could emerge from 
negative ones. The difficulties regional engaging agents faced forced them to 
seriously consider a more formal road for achieving mutual peace and prosperity, not 
merely as an option but as an imperative (Badawi 2000). It was at this APR that the 
imperatives of human security concept were strongly highlighted as matters that were 
easily affected by all dimensional changes of the regional environment. This concern 
was engaged with engaging agents’ consideration as to whether regional security 
architecture (in a comprehensive sense) should be more institutionalised and 
concretised. For concerned topics which covered human security imperatives, many 
questions from regional engaging agents were deeply scrutinised by the APR 
participants including: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; managing the 
pressure of globalisation; the status of state sovereignty; the proper role of 
international institutions in times of crisis, particularly how to effectively manage the 
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international capital flows; the impact of the events upon domestic and regional social 
and cultural changes; and challenges to human insecurity (Emmerson 2000, Higgott 
2000, Hitchcoke 2000, Fukushima 2000, Owada 2000, Teo 2000, and Yusuf 2000). It 
was the security of the marginalised people in many societies, now more easily 
perceived both by engaging agents and ordinary people than during previous periods 
when security related topics were taboos for those outside governmental circles and 
the concept of comprehensive security was still an alien concept, which sparked the 
contemplation of comprehensive security. Although the participants emphasised more 
on the state aspect: the comprehensive security could be compatible with human 
security, for as mentioned earlier, human beings’ freedom from fear and want were 
the foci of the concept (Hussain 1997, Acharya 2002, Caballero-Anthony 2002). A 
more specific case was the role of women in times of peace and war or even during 
peaceful reunification in the war-torn countries (Hontiveros-Baraguel 1997, Lee 1997, 
Whitworth 1997).   
For consideration regarding more institutionalising processes, two main 
institutions of regional security architecture (namely ARF and ASEAN) were 
questioned as to whether or not they could play more active roles. The rationales for 
such concerns were tensions regarding weapons of mass destruction for the former, 
and the enlargement by adding new members for the latter. Engaging agents 
anticipated that the ARF could provide and facilitate better regional security and 
politics. Upgrading the ARF scheme to cover preventive diplomacy and closer co-
operation with CSCAP was understood by regional engaging agents as an effective 
solution. Unfortunately, the devastating blow delivered by the financial crisis made 
this concretising process unlikely to happen, due to perception that this expected co-
operation was less crucial than the chance of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. 
Track II and their activities could prepare the venue for more serious discussion, 
specifically on the Northeast Asia difficulties, on the basis of trust and confidence 
initially constructed along the way through NPCSD, CSCAP, and the ARF in 
particular (Boyce 1999, Cossa 2000, Godement 2000, Job 2000). 
Engaging agents from ASEAN saw an opportunity to enhance their plan to 
effectively unite and enlarge ASEAN include all Southeast Asian countries by adding 
Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia in order to construct an ASEAN-10 as 
previously mentioned. Although the Indonesian government’s influence had declined 
due to the country's chronic problems, the extant networking processes continued to 
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pave the way for nurturing ASEAN’s ‘Unity in Diversity’. No voice against the united 
direction was raised, although there were worrisome opinions that the different 
backgrounds of the newcomers might lessen the strength of ASEAN. The potential 
track II activities, anticipated to mitigate the differences, were the annual ASEAN-
ISIS Colloquial on Human Rights, as a forum to diminish different concepts and 
practices on human rights issues, and the ASEAN Young Leaders' Forum, as a forum 
to cultivate young generations of regional engaging agents (Chalermpalanupap 2000, 
Hernandez 2000a, Leifer 2000, Luan 2000, Norodom 2000).  
In sum, the engaging agents agreed that reflection on the recent experience of 
the financial crisis was directly concerned with security. It confirmed that their efforts 
to promote comprehensive security did not go in vain. On the contrary, 
comprehensive security seemed to be more precise on the subject of security; human 
security was highlighted. The intertwining of economic and political areas could be 
seen as part of the relative safety of human beings from emergencies caused by 
natural or man-made disasters at national, regional, and international levels, whether 
in terms of political, economic, societal, and environmental spheres (Hyun and Kin 
2000, Mo 2000). The trend to emphasise on human security proved a very interesting 
challenge for engaging agents to find ways in which to construct what Abdullah 
Badawi (2002), the current (2008) Malaysian Prime Minister calls ‘sustainable 
security’ based on strong and good governance and democracy (Desker and Singh 
2002, Yamamoto 2002). Indeed, the talk about the relationship between good 
governance and democracy was not new. It could be considered as the re-emergence 
of difficulties derived from the struggling processes of the nation-state building for 
many countries in the region (see Chapter 3).  
What can be analysed in summary here for this brief period (see Figure 6 on p. 
218) is that the content of the 13th APR well reflected the more energetic 
governmental agents’ responses to the changing regional environment after the 1997 
financial crisis, which had the potential to diminish their legitimacy both domestically 
as well as internationally. ‘Sustainable security’, based on the concept of 
comprehensive security, specifically emphasised stronger economies as a means of 
constructing an ASEAN Community by ASEAN engaging scholars. ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT) was initiated after the crisis by the Asian side within the ASEAN 
framework. There were also a handful of bilateral agreements to deliver free trade 
areas (FTAs) as another counter-balancing means: Japan-Korea Economic Agenda 
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21; Japan-Singapore FTA; Japan-ASEAN FTA; and China-ASEAN FTA. The Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) proposed by Japan failed to be accepted while the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) proposed by ASEAN could be materialised.   
The Korean leader, who was an extremely energetic agent, proposed the 
setting up of selected intellectuals whose missions were to find ways and/or means of 
soliciting more effective and concrete regional cooperation: EASG for official agents 
and EAVG for non-official agents. Suffice to say that the concept of constructing an 
‘East Asian Community’ was discernible no matter how elusive it may have been 
perceived to be. The newly established EASG and EAVG were keen to connect with 
the already existing organs: ASEAN-SOM for the former and ASEAN-ISIS for the 
latter.  
Broader co-operation towards mitigating a negative changing environment 
was attributed to the construction of intensified cooperation. The ASEAN-ISIS ‘Draft 
on Pacific Concord’ and its cooperation with ASEAN-SOM to initiate ‘ASEAN 
Vision 2020’ were examples of attempts to intensify cooperation that could prove 
compatible with another theme from the 13th APR calling for the construction of an 
ASEAN-10/ASEAN Community. The key basic concept was ‘Unity in Diversity’.   
 
East Asian Community: Boosting networking activities 
 The concept of ‘community-building’ in the region was not new. The attempt 
could be traced back to the Trilateral Commission’s report entitled ‘Community 
Building with the Asia Pacific’, published in 1997 before the Asian financial crisis. 
The Commission’s concept of community still had an economic factor as its main 
driving force. The existence and development of APEC were its evidence of a loosely 
de facto community in the region. The balance of power and deepening economic 
interdependence among states were the Commission’s priority, followed by social 
aspects comprising shared interests in the ongoing process of developed norms and 
rules. The report aimed at changing perceptions of regional societies and people in 
order to eliminate violence as an option for solving disputes. Good governance was 
regarded by the report as the glue to binding would-be participating countries and 
promoting political will. The Commission’s report also enshrined the concept of 
global partnership and enhanced the existing institutional building process (Morrison, 
Kojima and Maull 1997). Parts of the ideas were adopted by the Japanese government 
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in terms of the previously mentioned FTA promotion, and more intellectual 
cooperation in the region supported by the Japanese government. 
 Tokyo had a fair share in turning the financial crisis into a binding process of 
constructing a community; from this angle, the crisis could be regarded as fortuitous 
(Acharya 1999). The Commission’s definition of community as ‘groups of people, 
countries or state linked by close ties of interdependence and a sense of shared destiny 
through mutual vulnerabilities’ was highly promoted by the Japanese government 
(Morrison, Kojima and Maull 1997: 2). When Ryutaro Hashimoto (1998), the 
Japanese Prime Minister, joined the celebrations marking the 30th ASEAN 
Anniversary in 1997, he proposed initiatives to strengthen social aspects by increasing 
dialogue and exchange. 
Hashimoto attended the first Japan-ASEAN Intellectual Exchange Open 
Symposium organised by the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), 
part of ASEAN-ISIS family, in March 1998 in Manila. There, Japan’s identification 
and strategic role were widely discussed, including its help to institutionalise a deeper 
regional cooperating framework. People-to-people contact was comprehended as a 
potential means of achieving the goal (Dao 1998, Hernandez 1998a, Rajaratnam 1998, 
Samego 1998, Snitwongse 1998). 
The Japanese government was generally energetic in community building: 
dialogue and conferences were its effective means. Starting with the Eminent Persons 
Group (EPG), Keizo Obuchi, who was then Japanese Prime Minister, proposed in 
December 1998 that on the one hand, JIIA and ASEAN-ISIS were the main 
institutions responsible for producing a report accentuating appropriate ways to 
implement the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) in order to help ASEAN newcomers 
adjust themselves to becoming part of a plan for achieving ASEAN Vision 2020, as 
mentioned in the previous section. The report was scheduled for the Japan-ASEAN 
Summit meeting in Singapore in November 2000. The recommendations from the 
report were to reinforce financial mechanisms to effectively expand and/or to create 
new mechanisms and cooperation, and social and environmental aspects30 (ASEAN 
                                                 
30
 The report cited the negative effects of the globalisation phenomenon fuelled by the Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution, especially the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
1997, as the main reason for consolidating cooperation. Most of the recommendations concerned 
financial stability and progress. Apart from CMI, other financial institutions such as the International 
Financial Corporation (IFC), World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) should lend more of a 
hand. The two sides should not lessen the significance of international economic cooperation 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 4: Strengthening, consolidating and revitalising networks 
170 
2000). On the other hand, Obuchi chose Okinawa due to its significance in terms of 
geographical position, and its historical and symbolic setting as a place for regional 
intellectual cooperation that the Japanese government should highly promote, as 
suggested by the Trilateral Commission’s report that was initially supported by 
Hashimoto government31 (Inamine 2000, Takashima 2000).  
Okinawa’s most important qualities were its political and security aspects, 
both domestically and internationally32 (Gabe 2000). The Naha G-8 Summit meeting 
in 2000 in Okinawa presented it with an opportunity to be a hub for regional 
intellectual exchange. Before the summit, there was an intellectual dialogue titled 
‘Community Building in Asia Pacific: Dialogue in Okinawa’ (Hernandez 2000b). 
Common topics included: seeking a greater Japanese contribution, and questions 
about the existing institutions’ relevance and efficiency. The existence and efficiency 
of regional institutions, ASEAN, APEC, and ARF in particular appeared to be 
unsatisfactory for solving problems related, inter alia, to domestic and regional 
financial issues, security in East Timor, and the environmental haze that drifted from 
the Indonesian archipelago (Hernandez 2000b, Tay 2000).  
The most significant result of networking activities and intellectual exchanges 
supported by the Japanese government was the on-going exchange of ideas and 
                                                                                                                                            
institutions (namely the WTO, APEC and AFTA). They should also generate other cooperative areas 
such as generating the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme 
(AICO), the development of the Mekong Sub-region, and support e-commerce. Facilitating 
mechanisms such as establishing common cyber law, consolidating the rule of law for social and 
human development should not be ignored. Moreover, they should reinforce attempts to reform the UN 
system as well as to improve the efficiency of the ARF. Last but not least, people-to-people contact, 
particularly via the establishing of the linkage of an ASEAN University system with that of a Japanese 
system, the existing exchange programmes for journalists and editors via global and regional 
environmental issues were also mentioned. 
31
 Imamine Keichi (2000), who was then Okinanwa’s Governor, claimed that due to its Pacific-
crossroads position and beautiful environment setting, his prefecture was perfect to be Japan’s and the 
Asia-Pacific’s ‘Wellness Island’. His meaning was to propose Okinawa to be a hub for personal, 
physical and information exchanges via establishing various communications, financial and physical 
distribution system and facilities and training people to run them. In addition, Okinawa’s Cornerstone 
of Peace, the monument devoted to the fallen at Okinawa’s battle fields in World War II, no matter 
whether they were on the side of the Imperial Army or the Allies, can be regarded as non-biased 
symbolism that should be the basis for creating an inclusive community. 
32
 It goes without saying that the most significant feature of Okinawa is its security aspect as the main 
base for US forward deployments. Thus far, it is regarded as the backbone not only of Japan’s security 
but also as an important means of stabilising the Asia-Pacific region. Its position was jeopardised due 
to the 1995-rape incident (a 12-year-old Japanese school girl was raped by three American service 
men). The fire was increasingly fanned when the locals understood that both Tokyo and Washington 
ignored their difficulties, in terms of their safety and environmental problems. Both wanted cheap 
commitment at their expense. Choosing Okinawa as a prestige-summit location could be understood as 
another way of buying off the locals. 
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experiences of engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, as the driving 
force and spearhead for more regionally institutionalising processes. It was difficult to 
deny that success of conveying and transmitting their ideas under the coverage of 
regional engaging agents’ preferred concept of comprehensive security could not be 
achieved unless political commitments and leadership were ready to pave the way 
(Estanislo 2000, Soesastro 2000). In other words, compliance from official 
counterparts, non-engaging agents in particular, was an important factor for the 
flourishing of engaging/networking activities. A senior ASEAN security scholar 
pointed out that only close cooperation - specifically between ASEAN and Japan - on 
a regional basis could lead Japan out of its long period of recession (Wanandi 2000b). 
Again, it is useful to note that these proposals had a chance to become policy for 
implementation by the intellectual linkages available in the region: ASEAN-SOM for 
ASEAN-ISIS and the foreign ministry for JIIA in particular (see Chapter 5). 
The Okinawa-based scholars, Kurayoshi Takara, Tsuneo Oshiro and Morisada 
Maeshiro (2000), responded by proposing the ‘Okinawa Initiative’ intending to 
transform the prefecture into an internationally intellectual-exchange, based upon 
ways to merge the Japanese with the international society and to think of themselves 
in universal terms. The inclusive concept of Okinawa’s Cornerstone of Peace was a 
case of expressing the Japanese support for universal values (Takashima 2000). Civil 
societies, covering non-governmental organisations and movements in the region 
were urged to become more seriously engaged in order to find a shared definition for 
human security. It could be achieved through less-cost communication, namely, the 
Internet world could open up such a chance (Evans 2000). 
The concept of security had never been more criticised, especially that of the 
relationship between gender and war and peace-building was ignored, after a massive 
trend of trans-national migration specifically after the 1997 financial crisis and the ’11 
September 2001’ attack on the US (Dupont 2003, Griffen 2003, Martin 2003, Rico 
2003a, Tingo 2003). Retaliating in the name of the 'war on terrorism', American 
leadership and its ‘moral clarity’ were the big questions raised at the 16th APR (2002) 
in Kuala Lumpur. Many states joined the attempt either to counter terrorist acts or at 
least to sweep them 'under the carpet', in line with their efforts to link terrorism either 
overtly or covertly with illicit acts. Numerous scholars voiced the opinion that such 
tactics could prove useless unless their root-causes (domestic/international problems 
related to people’s mental and economic statuses) were treated (Badawi 2003, 
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McFarlane 2003, Morrison 2003).  The more explicit problems causing terrorist acts 
were poverty, religion and nationalism, religion in this context meaning an 
understanding between Muslims and others, in particular Christians (Berthier 2003, 
Solomon 2003, Sopiee 2003). The APR scholars tried to insist that whatever 
happened should not be considered a result of the two religions’ differences. In order 
to tame the harsh perception linking Muslims and terrorism, they also tried to find an 
acceptable path to promote Islam as a true religion of peace, moderation, openness 
and democracy. Rather, they should be regarded as emerging from the same roots and 
sharing the concept of human happiness (Falaakh 2003, Marui and White 2003, 
Wanandi 2003). In other words, engaging scholars emphasised that the promotion of 
democracy and human rights was the appropriate way to suppress the causes of 
terrorism (Bunbongkarn 2003).   
Apart from the scope and content for further consideration regarding 
terrorism, engaging/networking agents participating at the 16th APR also voiced their 
concerns regarding regional states’ interactions relating to the American ‘war on 
terrorism’. At the regional level, there were diversified viewpoints on matters of 
Southeast Asia as the second front of anti-terrorism, due to the linkage between 
regional Islamic fundamentalist activities and the Al Qaeda network. The arrests of 
extremist activists Ramzi Ahmed Youseef and Abdul Hakim Murad in the Philippines 
in 1995 was a case of undeniable linkage with the Al Qaeda. A controversial 
diversified opinion was whether countries in the region should be more cooperative 
with the US policy against terrorism. The resurgence of the US military and economic 
strength urged regional governments agree to accept the Declaration on Joint Action 
to Counter Terrorism adopted in November 2001. On the one hand, not only did it 
strengthen their national mechanisms to combat terrorism, but it also discussed and 
explored practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN’s role in the international 
community (Kraft 2003, Naukim 2003, Sukma 2003). On the other hand, the ARF 
was questioned by critics specifically outside the region as to whether it should 
become more institutionalised and de-linked from ASEAN33 (Desker 2003, Shigeie 
2003). 
                                                 
33
 The ideas were not only to re-emphasise CBMs and to deepen preventive diplomacy but also to 
enhance and/or engage defence ministers for more effective problem-solving. 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 4: Strengthening, consolidating and revitalising networks 
173 
What could not be avoided was that the spread of arms to the region gave rise 
to a fear of a regional arms race (Ball 2003). The trend decreased and/or marginalised 
what had earlier been regarded as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and anti-
nuclear movements (Hawke and Cozens 2003, Ogawa 2003). The result was either 
uncertainty or a reluctance to strengthen national defence policies, especially those 
related to maritime Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsular)34 (De Los Santos 
2003, Hartfiel and Job 2003, Prasetyono 2003, Ramarkrishna 2003). 
Amid threatening uncertainty, trans-national crimes prospered and were 
understood as potential linkages to terrorism despite there being many domestic and 
international frameworks to counter them. Apart from ARF and CSCAP, the 
Transnational Organised Crime Conference (Hong Kong, March 2002) and the 
attempt by the Asia Pacific Group on Money-Laundering were set up to find a way to 
solve the problems (Lock 2003, Salvador 2003).   
In the same month (November 2001) ASEAN and China reached an 
agreement to set up a free trade area that would serve as a locomotive to turn their 
combined economies into the world’s largest free trade zone after China paved the 
way to becoming a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO).35 From the 
engaging agents’ points of view, this agreement might enhance a chance to 
significantly expand their preferred concept of comprehensive security. At least, 
China appeared to be heading in that direction, albeit emphasising only economic 
matters. Yet, what should not be overlooked was that economic aspects and their 
related matters had been the main driving forces for regional engaging/networking 
activities since the 1960s (see Chapter 3).  Although others outside the region, who 
feared the combining of forces in particular, viewed the attempt with some scepticism. 
Chinese scholars tried to convince other counterparts, that catching up was a natural 
means to commensurate and contribute to Chinese modern civilisation and other 
countries, such as Japan, could also benefit from the movement (Garnaut 2003, Pham 
2003, Fukushima 2003, Tay 2003, Wang 2003, and Yuan 2003). 
The intellectual networks, specifically those residing in ASEAN and Japan, 
thus far, paved the way for transmission of ideas regarding comprehensive security. 
                                                 
34
 The result was apparent in terms of budget increases and weapons acquisition, fighter aircraft and 
submarines in particular. 
35
 They announced the plan at the 2000 ASEAN Summit, promising to create a market of more than 
1.7 million people.  
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Judging from the end result of networking activities alone might not be an appropriate 
way to comprehend such a region-wide on-going process of networking activities, as 
this project intends to do, although it is hard to deny that such a perspective should be 
included. Viewed from the process-driven (or Habermasian procedural) perspective, 
engaging/networking agents at least widened or at most generated paths to present 
their ideas and/or concerns covering regional security matters and architecture. 
Nevertheless, they might be viewed as inclined to be absorbed into the pre-existing 
order, scholar-bureaucrat as Jones and Smith (2001, 2006) term them, owing to 
funding problems and getting official chances to publicly air their concerns and ideas. 
What should not be easily stepped over is that the pre-existing order of the 1990s 
onwards resulted from long-term on-going processes of regional-environment 
alteration that engaging agents under investigation here have had their share of 
participating in. 
At that point in time, those trans-national comprehensive security ideas 
included traditional areas like terrorism, and economic well-being, and marginalised 
issues, such as gender-war and environment. Practically, the APR and the ASEAN-
SOM were the main channels for traditional issues, mainly due to parts of reality that 
engaging agents were governmental agents, acting on their private capabilities, from 
ASEAN countries and ASEAN-ISIS scholars did play a significant part in 
establishing the channel to present their ideas to ASEAN-SOM before the AMM. Yet, 
the SOM from the country that chairs ASEAN at that time will decide whether it 
needs ASEAN-ISIS service. For the Japanese side, JIIA and JCIE, including the 
Trilateral Commission, approached marginalised issues as their main areas.   
 As time passed, the more the characteristics of East Asian regionalisation 
based on the market-driving force became accentuated. It may not have emerged as a 
political project as it did in Europe, but economic projects were becoming inter-
linked.  The emergence of the ‘Economic Partnership’ between Japan and ASEAN 
was an effective case of cooperation developed from market-driven forces covering 
all aspects under the umbrella of the concept of comprehensive security.36 Their free 
trade agreement was anticipated to promote far-reaching co-operation in areas of 
                                                 
36
 The successful blending formula came from using the relationship of horizontal international 
specialization between Japan and Singapore as a stepping stone. The reason was they could agree to 
find an acceptable sine qua non: whilst the former wanted to avoid agricultural products, the latter 
wanted to put aside petrochemical products.  
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investment, agreement, standard certification and intellectual rights. Yet, it could be 
viewed partly as the Japanese response to China’s perceived offensive steps over 
regional activities, particularly the establishing of an FTA with ASEAN within ten 
years.    
Junichiro Koizumi, the incumbent Japanese Prime Minister, proposed an 
‘Initiative for Development in East Asia’, emphasising that structural reform in both 
Japan and ASEAN was needed.37 What should not be overlooked is that Japan tried 
hard not to lose its regard for multilateralism by encouraging the expansion of a 
regional community to cover Australia, New Zealand and India in order to try to 
counter-balance China in the APT (Otsuji and Shiraishi 2002, Shiraishi 2002). He 
emphasised in Singapore that cooperation on education and human resources 
development should be the foundation, announcing that the year 2003 would be the 
‘Year of Japan-ASEAN Exchange’, the year to showcase and highlight Japanese 
intentions, from governmental and non-governmental agents, that they should not 
only be economic and political aspects (Koizumi 2002). 
The ‘Tokyo Declaration for Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan 
Partnership in the New Millennium’, issued at the end of the ASEAN-Japan 
Commemorative Summit in 2003, was another document for engaging agents. Not 
only was it regarded as another milestone signifying Japan’s more assertive approach 
to its active international role, but it could also prove a good framework for Japan and 
ASEAN acknowledging each other, as crucial pillars of the emerging East Asian 
Community and for deepening cooperation within it (Yeo 2006). JIIA, together with 
the Okinawa Peace Assistance Centre (OPAC), followed the lead by co-organising 
another international conference.38 The conclusion was that Japanese contributions in 
terms of experience, knowledge and finance for regional poverty reduction were more 
than welcome. It was anticipated by regional engaging agents that it would lead to the 
enhancement of communities and civil society in the region, as well as improve 
                                                 
37
 It aimed to better regional well-being, stability and security (covering non-traditional issues such as 
terrorism, piracy, energy security, infectious diseases, the environment, narcotics and human 
trafficking). 
38
 More concrete proposals including sensitive issues were presented so that an accepted stance could 
be found on various issues. Again, enhancing governance capability was given priority, specifically by 
those countries severely affected by the negative side of the flooding globalization.  
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regional countries’ governance and public administration for achieving (regional) 
social stability (Kikuchi 2003, Sayasith 2003, Tingo 2003). 
It was also expected to be a helpful means of lessening the so-called ‘ASEAN 
Divide’, a digital divide39 particularly derived from different levels of economic 
development between the Associations’ old and new members. ASEAN as a whole 
would adopt both centralised and decentralised systems to suit their population 
profiles: the former for rural populations, the latter for the urbanised populations (Lim 
and Wi 2005). Japan’s serious participation in the ‘Initiative for ASEAN Integration’ 
(IAI) was crucial, especially through numerous programmes in the Greater Mekong 
Sub-region (GMS). In order to accentuate its role, the Asia Pacific Agenda Project 
(APAP), under the aegis of the JCIE, sponsored a regional research project titled 
‘Vision of Asia Pacific in 2020’ to illustrate the region after the 1997 financial crisis, 
September 11, and the rapidly spreading severe acute respiratory syndrome known as 
SARS. It was a cooperation aimed at regaining the confidence of regional scholars 
from six countries in the region. At the end of the process was a regional projection 
titled ‘Pacific Asia 2022: Sketching Futures of a Region’ (Tay 2005c, Yamamoto 
2005). 
These numerous conferences, which were convened to reduce the tendency 
towards severe nationalism in the region, provided innumerable chances for people-
to-people contact ranging from face-to-face to the Internet, as shown by conflicts 
specifically regarding ethnicity, race, and religion derived from unsettled nation-state 
building processes and the continued lack of good governance (Tangsupvattana 
2005). From these numerous conferences, engaging agents, whether governmental or 
non-governmental, reiterated the significance of the revision of security concept and 
its broadening to cover demographic changes, due to a burgeoning aging population, 
trans-national migration, and environmental changes in the region (Lebel 2005, Yu 
2005). They paid more emphasis on cross-border issues. Although these issues could 
prove problematic, they seemed to highlight the idea that people and states were not 
                                                 
39
 The gap has been so wide that the developing countries cannot easily catch-up with the advance 
developed countries. While Hong Kong drew up the Digital 21-IT, Singapore has had the ICT 21 
master plan. Japan has gone further to have a Global Information Infrastructure plan aiming to 
implement a nationwide optical fibre network by 2010 (Jamus Jerome Lim and Yap Ching Wi (2005) 
‘Digital Dreams and Divergent Regimes: The Impact of ICT on Pacific Asia’ Pacific Asia 2022 (2005), 
p. 75) 
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threatened by military attack from external powers, but rather from issues directly 
affecting human survival (Miyagawa 2003, Prasetyono 2003, Yin 2003).   
It is worth noting that although the regional agents are categorised here as 
governmental and non-governmental, behind their functions as intellectuals and their 
statuses as agents they were people likely to perceive and transmit their experience of 
cooperation.  Put simply, the more regional institutionalisation became a requirement, 
the easier would be the emergence of the ‘East Asian Community’ (Chanto 2003, 
Cheow 2003, Yanagihara 2003). On this point, non-governmental agents' demands 
were more explicit. Scholars from both sides proposed that the aim could be reached 
via support for human resources and social development, such as, establishing 
University links and helping to train judges, solicitors, and the police about matters 
related to human rights and the environment (Ali 2003, Morada 2003). It is within this 
orbit that Okinawa could play a decisive role by highlighting its universal character to 
express the significance of ‘word power’. The Japanese government seemed to agree 
that this should be the true meaning of the Okinawa Initiative’ as an interesting means 
to deliver Japan’s non-military power (Oshiro 2003). 
In order to clarify suitable and commonly accepted means to cope with 
security challenges, and to encourage more regional cooperation and partnerships, 
track II conferences continued. In 2004, a seminar was convened entitled ‘Toward 
East Asian Community Building’, at which matters raised looked little changed from 
previous topics. However, there was more emphasis on traditional security concerns 
returned as potential challenges. Although this forum opted to pay more attention to 
institutional political actors, such as, parliamentarians in the region, it reiterated that 
the existing economic-cooperation frameworks should be deepened and extended as a 
strongly threaded foundation for further steps to be taken. There was a common idea 
that difficulties could be overcome using a functional approach, which meant 
gradually increasing and deepening cooperation in some areas and incrementally 
spilling over cooperation from one area to others (JCIE 2004: sections I&II). The 
reiteration told us that engaging agents’ preferred concept of comprehensive security 
was still relevant. Not only did the intertwining relationship between economic and 
political aspects still play significant parts in numerous regional fora, the intertwining 
relationship encouraged broader scope to cover social, cultural and environmental 
issues such as trans-national migration, people-to-people exchange and environmental 
degradation respectively.   
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Strengthening intellectual exchange was anticipated by participants and 
networking agents alike, not only to reinforce the functional approach, but also to 
provide knowledge and policies designed to overcome potential difficulties.40 Sharing 
knowledge and/or interpretations of various kinds of phenomena (including the 
spreading of popular culture) was understood by engaging agents as a decisive way of 
generating a commonly accepted regional identity (JCIE 2004: sections III & IV). 
‘The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation’, co-
sponsored and organised by the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and ASEAN-ISIS in 
2005, presented a clearer image and direction for constructing the community.41 
Generation upon generation of a successful middle class was cited by participants as a 
crucial ingredient for the success of community building and deeply transplanting 
Western-oriented universal values. The reason was to some extent they had grown 
and familiarised themselves with democracy concepts, specifically liberty and 
freedom in terms of voicing one own opinions and exchanges of ideas and activities 
derived from them (Hernandez 2005, Ito 2005). There were activities and processes 
that engaging agents promoted since the 1960s. These activities nurtured multilateral 
exchange and acceptance of differences in the region. On this point, Simon Tay’s 
(2005a) conclusion was that Asian culture could be perceived in the streets of 
Shanghai, Singapore and Tokyo (Shibuya). It was merged with the influences of J-
pop, films directed by Ang Lee, and California's sushi rolls. New technology allowed 
them to communicate their similarities, differences and interdependencies. And 
although they communicated in English, their own particular accents would prevail. 
In addition, engaging agents from track II anticipated, due to closer 
cooperation with their official counterparts after the 1997 financial crisis, receiving 
more cooperation from track I in order to boost the functional approach. It is this 
approach based on the functionality of interlocking and/or overlapping regional fora. 
The familiarity (whether positive or negative, emphasising more on the former) which 
was quintessential for socialisation emerged out off these interlocking cooperative 
                                                 
40
 That time saw the rising of nationalism, difficult historical legacies, the emerging China and its 
difficult relationship with the US, and the potential to normalize Japan. They were viewed as 
obstructing the path to constructing the community.  
41
 It should be an open community comprising universal values (albeit with a scent of Western 
concepts) including rather controversial human rights. It was a result of the widespread regional 
economic prosperity, telecommunication and transportation technology, and increasing education and 
mobility of people.  
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structures. The facilities to breed familiarising processes were there to be employed, 
the result was up to how those facilities (regional networking architectures) were used 
and what kind of content (which varied according to different space and time) was put 
into the processes. At that time, regional cooperation was on the rise. The changed 
environment required changed knowledge. Diversified trans-national problems that 
governmental agents encountered required diversified knowledge from various 
academics that non-governmental agents and their networks could supply more easily 
than governmental agents. Whilst non-governmental agents accepted that 
governmental support in terms of funds and receiving their consultation was essential 
for their flourishing. Put differently, let the process of community building grow 
naturally and incrementally and become a 'coalition of the willing' (Tay 2005b) which 
might be termed ‘Community of Willingness’.  
The experience of these socialising processes, the explicit and mutual receipt 
of economic exchanges in particular, could cultivate a sense of confidence and trust, 
which are essential values for establishing regional community that have grown from 
engaging agents’ preferred concept of comprehensive security. Without agent 
intention/willingness to engage in cross-border cooperation, numerous conferences 
and international fora would not materialise. Without these fora, engaging/networking 
activities, regional socialising processes, and regional architectures, economic and 
political/security in particular might not be able to be what they have been since the 
1960s. Put otherwise, what should be emphasised is that these conferences and fora 
help to provide a more ample, fertile foundation upon which to construct the regional 
community. A recent example is ASEAN’s Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) to guide the 
process of building a caring community in 2020 (Lim 2005, Takeuchi 2005).  
It has been difficult, thus far, to deny that  engaging agents (particularly from 
Japan and ASEAN) have been rather active in organising and arranging conferences 
and workshops, which are helpful means of expressing their ideas and concerns over 
regional matters within the scope of comprehensive security. They are also good 
supporters of their respective governments’ policies (covering international and 
regional cooperation for this project). There were two related reasons here: the 
relationship that those policies had to topics within the scope of their preferred 
concept of comprehensive security; and their realisation that supporting and fostering 
governmental policies related to regional cooperation not only helped in constructing 
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regional cooperative structure, but also encouraged broader regional socialising 
processes that might pave the way for a truly peaceful and inclusive region.  
To sum up the last period concerning engaging agents’ structure for thought 
and actions, specifically their networking activities (see Figure 7 on p. 219), the 
situation in the region at the dawn of the 21st century was still uncertain due to the 
9/11 incident and the bomb blasts in Bali, Indonesia, all of which were regarded as 
‘terrorist’ acts by the US administration and its supporters. The spread of trans-
national crimes was added to the equation. Yet, regional networking movements and 
the content of their activities showed positive signs and received good support from 
their respective governments, the Japanese in particular due to their increasing trend 
of being a more responsible non-military power in the region. From Ryotaro 
Hashimoto via Keizo Obuchi to Junichiro Koizumi, Japanese agents emphasised the 
significance of social aspects to the strengthening of positive cooperation in the 
region. ASEAN intellectuals agreed on the point which could enable them to 
construct the caring society they (particularly those from track-I) had promoted in 
ASEAN’s Vientiane Action Plan (VAP). 
It is important to emphasise that during the Koizumi period (2001-2006) at 
track-I level, Japan and ASEAN cooperated more closely. This included the 
announcement of the ‘Year of ASEAN-Japan Exchange (2003)’, the setting up of 
‘Initiative Development in East Asia’ and ‘Economic Partnership’ followed by 
numerous FTA proposals. The governmental cooperation encouraged and facilitated 
more non-governmental engaging activities. At track-II level, apart from the Japanese 
GFJ’s conference entitled ‘Prospect for East Asian Community Building and Regional 
Cooperation’, JIIA and JCIE were energetic. As regards the former, close cooperation 
with ASEAN-ISIS encouraged it to propose a report accentuating diverse ways of 
effectively implementing the Hanoi Plan of Action to actualise ASEAN Vision 2020, 
projecting a concept of ASEAN as a ‘caring society’.  
JCIE was more focused on regional community building when it closely 
coordinated with ASEAN-ISIS. On the one hand, participants encouraged a more 
integrative path for uniting ASEAN, specifically in the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
(GMS). On the other hand, participants, specifically those from JCIE via APAP, tried 
to predict the regional future on two stages: Vision for Asia Pacific in 2020 and 
Pacific Asia 2022 Sketching the Future of the Region. One of JCIE’s conference 
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themes summed up regional efforts (from both track-I and track-II) nicely in the title 
‘Toward East Asian Community Building’.  
 
Summary 
The narration for this chapter was constructed by having the following questions as its 
guideline. From the first group of research questions: who were those 
engaging/networking agents, especially those relating to the expanded networks from 
earlier periods and to what extent and under what circumstances did they join their 
networking activities. The questions from the second group included the following: 
whether their socialising processes had any impact on their networking activities and 
their perceptions on these activities; whether they were capable as changing-agents to 
transmit their ideas; and how their ideas and discursive activities were 
transmitted/translated into concrete fora. Additional question were as follows; to what 
extent and in what ways did ASEAN-ISIS closely engage with its/their Japanese 
counterparts? In addition, how successful were they in persuading ASEAN, and other 
governments and non/like minded individuals to get on board? 
 The followings are answers to the aforementioned questions in brief. The end 
of the 1980s brought a new environment for engaging agents, who had tried hard to 
accommodate the uncertainties and even harder to channel the tide into a    direction 
preferred by all, namely, multilateralism fashioned after the success of CSCE in 
Europe. Many agents effectively persuaded others to accept their various proposals. 
This resulted in the Nakayama Proposal from the Japanese government and a proposal 
called ‘A Time for Initiative’ from ASEAN-ISIS. Their efforts were incrementally 
crystallised in the first half of the 1990s in two forms: the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), the only official security forum in the region; and the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the most region-wide track II forum made 
for ARF.  
Together, CSCAP and ARF, encouraged engaging agents, both governmental 
and non-governmental, to practice confidence building measures (CBMs), as the 
Japanese agents preferred to regard them as 'procedures for reassurance'. ASEAN-
ISIS with its connections with ASEAN-SOM played a mediating role with support in 
terms of information and opinions from numerous regional conferences and 
workshops such as the APR, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-China. The focus of the 
engaging agents is upon reaping the right moment for their initiations through the on-
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 4: Strengthening, consolidating and revitalising networks 
182 
going momentum of cooperation. Numerous conferences and workshops have been 
both participatory to and revolved around ASEAN-ISIS: their invitations to senior 
officials to participate on various occasions are the useful and resourceful means they 
employ. Fortunately, the numerous officials they have invited have continued to play 
prominent roles in supporting multilateralism and even a concept of constructing 
international communities: ASEAN Community and East Asian Community, for 
example.    
These cooperative experiences thus far indicate that engaging agents’ favoured 
concept of comprehensive security (covering economic/developmental as well as 
what used to be regarded as marginalised issues in particular) is still relevant. 
Experiences from previous cooperation show how the interplay between economic 
and political dimensions can come together.  Moreover, the intertwining relationship 
between economic and political aspects that encourages networking activities in the 
region also acts as a structure for thought for all engaging agents; networking has 
become prevalent in the region.  
Whilst new ideas take time to become formalised, the engaging agents are 
utilising the intervening time to sharpen their thoughts about what they have done 
thus far, and what topics should be played down in order to make room for much 
more needed and urgent topics. The APR in Kuala Lumpur still provides a significant 
venue for such a re-evaluation.  
The characteristics of East Asian regionalisation have been accentuated with 
the passing of time. It may not emerge as a political project as was the case with 
Europe but there is a trend towards increased political cooperation. It is within this 
framework that engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, from ASEAN 
and Japan have cooperated closely and fruitfully. Other engaging agents from China 
and South Korea have played their parts, particularly in the abundant activities 
derived from APT’s framework, apart from many previously existing fora in which 
ASEAN-ISIS has had a significant role to play such as the APR and CSCAP. There is 
a general push towards the idea of more regional institutionalisation. Thus, ultimately 
an easier emergence of the ‘ASEAN Community’ and/or the ‘East Asian Community’ 
might occur.  
The next chapter will present two things. The first is to assess and reflect 
whether the agents’ expanded networks have had any impact on their social function 
and status. The second, which is the bigger part of the chapter, is to review and assess 
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the set up framework in order to propose further alteration to make it more responsive 
for reality in the field. 
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Part III: Assessment and Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5: The East Asian (Security) Intellectual Network – A Critical 
Assessment 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 that this thesis was conducted by attempting to balance the 
relationship between theoretical concepts and methodology in an interactive way, 
reflexivity was crucial for two related aspects. Firstly, reflexion from engaging 
agents’ own experiences can be regarded as a litmus paper for assessing their social 
functions and status; whether they are as expected by set-up concepts in Chapter 1. 
Secondly, reflexion in terms of experiences after analysing the collected data can 
indicate to the researcher, as this one, whether the applied theoretical concepts need 
alteration. If so, what should the remedy be? 
 This chapter, therefore, consists of two related sections. The first one indicates 
whether the agents’ expanded network have had any impact on their function and 
status, particularly whether they are independent enough to take a critical leading role 
in bringing about change in security concepts and activities. In other words, can they 
put into practice the lessons learned during their decades of interaction? The second 
section illustrates the strong and weak points of a fabricated framework set-up in 
Chapter 1, which part should be altered and what concepts should be added. 
 
Critical Reflection and Assessment of Networking Experiences 
It is worth noting that networking activities based on the East Asian experience 
showed that the more track-II agents engaged with track-I agents, the less the former 
show signs of being independent. Their conferences and workshops had to receive 
good support and cooperation from their respective governments in order to produce 
effective impacts. Yet, the success of their long-term engaging experiences with close 
co-operation from governments in the region make the characteristic of these 
networking activities appear like ‘track 1/track2 symbiosis’ as Charles E. Morrison 
(2004) terms it. This concept of symbiosis leaves room for engaging agents to express 
their persuasive capabilities since their track I counterparts did not manoeuvre 
everything, albeit sometimes having upper hands particularly in times of regional 
crisis like that of the 1997-financial crash. In other words, this concept is closer to that 
which this project found out than the Jones and Smith (2001, 2006) observed track 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 5: The East Asian (Security) Intellectual Network  A Critical Assessment 
185 
II’s characteristic as ‘scholar-bureaucratic’ (see also Introduction, Chapter 4). The 
cooperation between non-governmental engaging agents in ASEAN and Japan and 
their respective governments to construct ARF and their commonly accepted idea to 
construct regional community such as ASEAN Community and East Asian 
Community is a case in point of non-governmental engaging agents not becoming 
independent (as illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4). Most of them still relied on funds and 
resources including information from their track-I counterparts.1 The reason why 
track-I agents showed less interest in track-II’s activities was that regional track-II 
agents’ skills were limited, specifically before the establishment of the PECC process. 
Their expertise was clustered around economic development policies and market-
driven economies that they regarded as part and parcel of their preferred concept of 
comprehensive security. Yet, they could not clearly forecast even a domestic 
situation2, let alone a regional situation when their region and respective countries 
were hit hard by the financial crisis in 1997.  
In other words, what track-II agents could do in the area of taking the lead was 
at best minimal unless the track-I agreed to comply with their ideas which could turn 
out to be successful proposals such as in the case of establishing ARF and ASEM. 
Yet, what should be remembered here is that track-II agents also comprise 
governmental agents acting in their own capacities and interests. The significance of 
these agents is that in reality it was not difficult for them to convey what they learnt 
from the need of non-governmental agents to the respective governments if they 
decided that it matched with what their government wanted. The roles played by 
Kojima and Satoh from Japan were good examples for this point before the inception 
of APEC and ARF. The mediating role played by ASEAN-SOM, specifically 
regarding AMM, ASEAN-PMC and ARF, and its connection with ASEAN-ISIS 
networks of scholars was also in the same direction (as explained in Chapter 4). 
Nevertheless, it was difficult to deny that the significance of governmental engaging 
agents could not be easily actualised without facilitating paths such as numerous 
informal fora organised by non-governmental engaging agents. Experienced track-II 
                                                        
1
 Interviews on July 5th 2006 at IDSS, Nanyang University, Singapore, and at SIIA, Singapore, on 
September 7th 2006 at the Royal Thai Embassy, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan and on October 2nd 2006 
at the (Thai) Foreign Ministry, Bangkok, Thailand 
2
 Interviews on September 7th 2006 at the Royal Thai Embassy, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan and on 
October 2nd 2006 at the (Thai) Foreign Ministry, Bangkok, Thailand 
Wararak Chalermpuntusak 
Chapter 5: The East Asian (Security) Intellectual Network  A Critical Assessment 
186 
agents accepted that the best they could do would be to actualise their 
intentions/deliberations and know how to utilise what domestic and regional chances 
were left open for them.3  
However, Tay argues that although track-II had no power in itself to 
implement the generated ideas, it was free from the constraints of implementation and 
free to consider what may be possible and desirable, no matter how marginal it may 
be (Soesastro, Joewono and Hernandez 2006, Tay 2006). Although they might accept 
that the basic agreement should be to reach a mutual understanding about bettering 
regional security and regional well-being in general, their means to achieve these ends 
could be varied in line with the socially engaging processes. As a result, historical 
contexts as structure for agents’ thoughts and actions are important both in enabling 
or constraining the content and procedures of their engaging/networking activities. 
In order to be successful agents in the region, regional engaging agents, non-
governmental agents in particular, have to know how to be either politicising 
intellectuals or intellectual politicians (particularly those who have had direct formal-
political experience). To act as politicising intellectuals, they have to know how to air, 
exchange and/or even trade their ideas/intentions effectively by utilising every means 
that they can find. Similarly, to act as intellectual politicians, they have to know how 
to intellectually present themselves, their ideas/intention, and their activities as part 
and parcel of the shared and accepted regional good, to better regional security for 
this study. In addition, they have to know how to negotiate and compromise with 
other engaging agents in order to make their ideas widely accepted, no matter how the 
idea had to be changed, and adopted by policy makers. In other words, they may have 
to be more strategic than they expected before getting involved in the discursive areas 
of networking activities. They could be both on some occasions.4  
The theoretical observation regarding being a successful agent is that ‘time 
and space’ really does matter, not only as conditions for agents’ perception towards 
their surroundings, but also as conditions for cultivating their intentions and actions. 
Put otherwise, global/regional/domestic environments in various periods, from the 
1960s to the dawn of the 21st century, not only provided materials for agents’ 
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 Interview on July 19th 2006, at SIIA, Singapore 
4
 Interview on July 19th 2006, at SIIA, Singapore 
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structure for thought and actions, networking activities regarding the aim to better 
their regional security, but also enabled and constrained agents’ structures vital to the 
delivering of their actions. In other wards, it confirms that the ideational factor is 
significant in agents’ dialectical processes of thinking and taking action. 
In response to whether they can achieve a common identity as expected by 
networking and constructivist literature, their answers varied according to how long 
and how close they had been engaged in the networking processes. Senior agents, 
whose experiences date back to the late 1960s - mid 1970s, see themselves as having 
some common functional identity. This means that they see themselves as a group of 
intellectuals who act as components of a mechanism employed to better their societies 
(both domestic and regional).5 At best, they see themselves as a group that can 
compromise their differences, mainly due to due to different economic, historical and 
cultural backgrounds of nation-state building processes, in their attempts to reach a 
mutual understanding of the vision for the region. Yet, this sharing perception is less 
evident in agents who have not engaged with the networks for more than a decade. A 
decade might be too short for cultivating a young generation whose interests and 
concerns nowadays are much more diversified, according to various domestic and 
regional issues, than in the past through the hi-speed information technology and 
flashing media coverage. They could contact each other so much more easily after the 
Cold War that they saw no necessity in putting hard effort in to doing so. There was 
no more basic obstacle, namely an ideological conflict that they commonly see as a 
big hurdle obstructing their path of bettering the regional security. Although their 
areas of interests could be better connected than the past, their networks for each 
interest look smaller and have lesser impact. In addition, the younger generation 
incline to be more insular, in terms of giving their priority to domestic issues.6 
It is worth pointing out that geographical identity - whilst roughly perceived -
was not particularly strong. Indeed, in line with the domestic difficulties that 
developed after the 1997-financial crisis, younger agents placed higher emphasis on 
domestic concerns, particularly those directly engaged with more traditional security 
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 Interviews on October 3rd 2006, at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand, October 20th 2006 at CSIS, 
Jakarta, Indonesia, and on October 27th 2006 at Thai-ISIS 25th Anniversary, Bangkok, Thailand  
6
 Interview on July 5th and July 6th at IDSS, and on July 14th 2006 at NUS, Singapore, Interviews on 
October 3rd 2006, at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand, and Interviews on October 18th 2006 and 
October 19th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia 
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concepts. The most popular concern was their respective countries’ sovereignty, 
specifically in terms of national economic policies. The Indonesian younger 
generation of engaging agents were at the forefront, mostly due to the harsh policy 
from the IMF that their country had to comply with in order to receive financial 
support.7  So here the generation gap is discernible. Moreover, the observation from 
the perceptions and activities of the younger generation of non-governmental 
engaging agents presented a different picture from the overall picture that 
governmental engaging agents presented. For governmental agents, more serious 
regional economic cooperation did emerge from the ashes of the financial crisis; the 
APT was an explicit example. For non-governmental agents, there were two pictures. 
On the one hand, for the long-term engaging agents, their activities went along with 
that of track-I. On the other hand, the younger non-governmental engaging agents 
were less concerned with the broader cooperative aspect, although they accepted the 
significance of it.8 Nevertheless, regional engaging agents, governmental and non-
governmental, shared a belief in the efficacy of a functional approach starting from 
economic cooperation, then spilling over to other co-operation, specifically political 
and security co-operation of the efforts of agents under investigation here. 
ASEAN-ISIS book entitled ‘Twenty Two Years of ASEAN-ISIS: origin, 
evolution and challenges of track two diplomacy’ reflected on how their networking 
activities should be revitalised (Soesastro, Joewono and Hernandez 2006). The first 
thing to determine would be whether they are really as inclusive as they say. Both 
young and new members voiced this concern. There were calls for ASEAN-ISIS to be 
able to accept criticism, feedback and critical comments either from internal or 
external sources, specifically the latter (Sotharit 2006: 123).9 This meant that 
perceptions of ASEAN-ISIS networks may have been that the networks were unduly 
exclusive, a characteristic that may have made potential engaging agents doubt their 
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 Interviews on October 18th 2006 and October 19th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, and on 
November 2nd 2006 at ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
8
 Interviews on July 10th 2006 at IDSS, and on July 14th 2006 at NUS, Singapore, Interviews on 
October 18th 2006 and October 19th 2006 at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, and on November 2nd 2006 at 
ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
9
 Interview on July 5th 2006 at IDSS and SIIA, on July 6th 2006 at IDSS, on July 10th 2006 at IDSS, 
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criteria to invite other agents to join their circles, whether there be any other criterion 
apart from personal familiarity.10  
The aspect that should be seriously considered here is the dominance of the 
personal characteristics of senior agents. In a positive sense, it is a quality of 
leadership. Take for example Noordin Sopiee and Jusuf Wanandi’s substantial 
contribution to track-II diplomacy in the region, which demonstrates how heavily 
these processes rely on personal linkages and intellectual inputs that individual 
participants are willing and able to provide (Ball and Taylor 2006: 116, Evans 2006: 
103). Yet, it also has a negative side. The younger agents felt ignored, that they were 
not part of this somewhat exclusive club, partly because of the generation gap as 
previously mentioned and partly because of the too established characteristics of the 
networks based on a regional economic aspect that was less appreciated by the 
younger ones.11 A solution to the problem could be that a process of leadership 
election should be adopted to replace the practise of leadership rotation of the member 
institute in order to render the process more open and transparent regarding agenda 
setting for conferences and workshops (Bunbongkarn 2006: 143). In other words, 
personal characters and interests of the long-term engaging agents affected how the 
networking activities and agenda emerged out of the socialising activities were 
formed.  
The other point that agents should pay attention to in order to revitalise their 
networks according to long-term engaging agents is a decision regarding their own 
future direction. Their networks, thus far, have neither been clearly based on 
professional expertise nor on a common world view. Rather, they are rather grounded 
in an ad hoc and shifting constellation of interests and perspectives that sometimes, 
but not always, find a common theme. Nevertheless, these engaging/networking 
activities, thus far, have guided them to nurture regional communities based on 
agents’ interests and concerns to reach their mutual understanding of improving their 
regional security environment. Firstly, they preferred an economic aspect as a spear-
head for spill-over effects of functional approach. For them economic stability and 
                                                        
10
 Interviews on July 4th 2006 at SIIA, and on July 10th 2006 at IDSS, Singapore, and on October 28th 
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 Interviews on October 3rd 2006 at Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand, October 20th 2006, at CSIS, 
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growth are part and parcel of their concept of comprehensive security. Later, on-going 
networking activities from the mentioned spill-over effects paved the way for 
engaging agents to breed familiarity through numerous conferences and workshops. 
This is the way of socialisation that helps them hand on to their nurtured concepts of 
comprehensive security. In other word, what they have in common is a broad concept 
of comprehensive security with no precise and pre-designed definition. Sometimes 
that might cause them some clumsiness particularly when regional security faces 
difficulties, such as what happened after the 1997-financial crisis.  As a result, 
consensual knowledge reaches less than its preferred destination via the path of 
discussion and socialisation (Evans 2006: 1000).  
Their clumsiness is both their weak and strong point. As regards the weak 
point, it takes quite a long time to achieve commonly perceived goals. The strong 
point is that compromising attitudes will help them to overcome short-sighted 
difficulties. Although it is difficult to consolidate diversified interests at a wide level 
such as CSCAP and CAEC, it might prove beneficial to seriously start more 
institutionalising processes at the sub-regional level. ASEAN-ISIS should have a 
more precise plan relating to ASEAN integration and ASEAN’s external relations in 
terms of policy research and seminars addressing political-security, economic and 
socio-cultural issues (Bunbongkarn 2006: 142). 
 
Reflection on the setting-up of a framework 
The agents examined here include those who know and accept that they are 
both enabled and constrained by their surroundings (specifically regional and global 
environments), which are not static but dynamic. They also know about - and consider 
taking part in and even taking the lead in - activities that help to maintain, shift, 
change and/or totally [re]construct their surroundings. It is worth accentuating that 
emphasis is placed more on the input side (how they construct and transmit their 
ideas) than on the output side (how their ideas are implemented in this thesis, for 
reasons as explained in Chapter 1). More space was saved to the study of agents’ 
ideas, intentions/deliberations, and knowledge that make them capable of 
implementing change.  
This project reaffirms that the process that helps agents to construct their 
ideas which in turn constructs their intentions/deliberations and actions is a 
dialectical one. Based on this process, agents construct their knowledge and then take 
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the normative step towards reaching their goals, namely to self-consciously set the 
purposes and goals which ought to govern the future course of history (Benhabib 
1986: 157). They aim for a mutually reachable understanding to improve their region. 
Dialogues, workshops, and conferences are their main socialising venues for 
encouraging consensus. The practice of engaging in dialogue is their strong point; in 
fact, it is regarded as the sole possible procedure through which they can discover 
whether they can recognise both the norms and interpretations of their needs that 
predominate the networking of dialogues (Wellmer 1990: 311). Getting involved in 
this process per se signifies their ethical concern that the dialogical concept of 
dialogue is more important than their a priori designed concepts and interpretations. 
This is the way they construct and nurture their preferred and commonly accepted 
ideas on regional security, in terms of broadened and without any pre-designed of 
comprehensive security. 
Taking account of the definition of these agents as being ‘intellectuals’, one 
may encounter more constraints, particularly within the scope of the output side 
(implementing agents’ ideas, and intentions/deliberations). Although many agents 
have diversified backgrounds, based on their training for substantive knowledge 
(economics, political science and law in particular), they all share the philosophical 
notion of improving their region. Their individual consciences pledge them to be part 
of this on-going socialising process. This is also linked to their intentionally engaging 
in transmitting that ability into concrete social activities by participating either 
directly or indirectly as mediators in public affairs. This process can be regarded as 
their external dialectical process of socialising, undertaken through conferences and 
workshops as the discursive space of their networking activities. It is within these 
discursive spaces that their output-side activities may be observed.  
However, the result of this study does not clearly signify the agents’ focus on 
their own domestic concerns, which could have widely concrete impacts. The themes 
(of conferences, workshops, and publications) specified here concern comprehensive 
security, which engulfs domestic and social well-being as well as that of their region 
as significant ingredients of both domestic and regional security. Although there 
might be a slightly different emphasis on the meaning of comprehensive security 
between engaging agents from ASEAN and Japan, who were the main agents for this 
study, their comprehensive concept had a rather similar origin that was to encourage 
more space for the agents, governmental and non-governmental, to be more relevant 
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in order to tone down the hostile feeling in the region.  The gradually conceptualised 
concept (from discursive to a more concretised idea) can be regarded for this study as 
the concept of ‘national and regional resilience’ within their engaging/ networking 
processes (see Chapter 3 for the origin of the idea and Chapter 4 for the development 
of the idea). With reference to their ability to organise and forge networks, it might 
not be an exaggeration to regard this part as indicative of their success. It is this 
concept, commonly accepted by engaging agents within and without the region 
(namely those outside ASEAN in particular), that helps them to form a core of 
discursive networks in the earlier periods. Later, this sprouting core was developed 
into ASEAN-ISIS networks.  
In addition, their networking efforts also affect the content of discussed 
security matters. Security discussions have been both broadened (to cover all aspects 
of their preferred comprehensive security concepts) and [re]focused (either on what 
used to be traditional taboos or on topics picked out from the comprehensive concept). 
Their networking and socialising encouragement has effectively changed the 
economic (since the 1960s), political (apparent since the 1970s) and security, in a 
more traditional sense (since the 1990s), contours of the region. What should not be 
overlooked is that the regional social contour, people demographic regarding trans-
national migration in particular, has also changed. This is attributed to the 
interactively mingling effects of the three previous changing contours, specifically 
after the hard-hit they received from the financial crisis in 1997.  
The thesis has discussed that the concept of networking (reviewed in Chapter 
1) is generally helpful for comprehending knowledge-bound engaging activities. Yet, 
the result does not totally fit with concepts of an ‘epistemic community’ and a 
‘coalition advocacy framework’, because of their ad hoc characteristics, particularly 
in terms of concrete policies. Nevertheless, provided that a revised networking 
concept is applied under the broad concept of constructivism, the result will appear 
more appropriate, because it specifies how socialising processes can lead to co-
operation. It accepts that the historical context of the explored subject is essential for 
studying the content of the interactively socialising processes.  
Unfortunately, this broad concept is still not enough to offer insight into how 
such processes could have emerged and been prolonged in different places and times, 
particularly when they are not totally similar (see Chapters 3 and 4). All networking 
literature reviewed here presupposes that ‘trust’ will flourish as a result of the 
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socialising process (more discussion later). On this point, the results of the study are 
mixed. On the one hand, there is a notion that the more agents engage with the 
socialising process the more they might generate trust for further cooperation, though 
they may have to overcome some difficulties.  
On the other hand, many agents notified their own observation that the more 
they get to know each other, the less they want to become closely engaged. The 
progression of getting to know each other was a rather diminishing return in some 
areas, according to their experiences. Some engaging agents gradually played down 
their networking activities when they thought that the activities were too static, as 
happened after the inception of ARF and CSCAP (see Chapters 3 and 4). They might 
resume or even help to expand the networking relationship when they saw chances for 
changing, such as the changing global/regional/domestic environment after the 
financial crisis in 1997, the 9/11 incident, and a trend from governmental cooperation 
to boost free trade areas in the region (see Chapter 4). Yet, some long-term engaging 
agents even used a metaphor that too close cooperation might generate a relationship 
like that of the relationship between the tongue and the teeth. The former could get 
hurt by the latter, if they are too close.12  This is the reason why they opt not to 
wander into diverse fields that could enhance the content of their networking 
activities: closer acquaintance could be seen as a regressive step in attempts to 
construct a common identity such as the unsettled geographical identity of the region 
in the case of ARF and the East Asian Community. For the former, non-governmental 
engaging agents for ASEAN countries in particular wanted the forum to be more 
inclusive, as much as possible. For the concept of East Asian Community, whilst 
engaging agents from Japan in particular wanted it to be more inclusive to include 
India and Australia, other engaging agents wanted it to be more focused around East 
and Southeast Asia region (see Chapter 4). 
Chapter 1 proposed that Habermas’s theory of communicative action might 
prove a remedy to the difficulty that mainly lies in the inclination of networking 
literature to place too much emphasis on the means-end paradigm. Networking 
literature tends to decrease the significance and impact of agents’ surroundings upon 
                                                        
12
 Interview on July 5th, July 6th, and July 19th 2006 at IDSS, Singapore, on October 3rd 2006 at 
Seranee Holding, Bangkok, Thailand, on October 20th 2006, at CSIS, Jakarta, Indonesia, on October 
27th 2006 at Thai-ISIS 25th Anniversary, Bangkok, Thailand, on November 2nd, ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia 
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their understanding, not to mention their decision-making. It also lacks enough 
provision for comprehending how agents form the perceptions and intentions that lead 
them to co-operate with each other on an equal basis. What is still not clear 
theoretically is what makes agents think that they can cooperate despite their different 
backgrounds? Habermas’ theory of communicative action offers a procedural view to 
scrutinise their internal logic, which acts like an a priori (universally) understanding 
that helps their engaging processes and dialogues to actualise and flourish within a 
discursive sphere, such as a socialising process. Theory of communicative action also 
offers the possibility of (internally and externally dialectical) uniting knowledge and 
interests for efficiently functioning as intellectuals (as defined in this project). Social 
integration and socialisation can also emerge out of, and be reproduced by, discursive 
networking activities.  
This study also reaffirms what David Ingram (1987: 22) observes – that 
Habermas tries to establish linkage within the division of (socialising) argument: 
linkages between logic, rhetoric and dialectic. The first refers to the consistency of 
argument – comprehensive security leading to domestic/regional resilience and to 
constructing a broader community. The second suggests that the procedural 
judgement of arguing is the key, as expressed through numerous conferences and 
workshops. The last one is the agents’ interaction with their geographical and social 
surroundings, albeit with more emphasis on the latter.  In other words, the study 
accentuates what Habermas attempts to imply - socialisation acts as a mediating 
process between individuals’ psyche and society (meaning their networking fora in 
this study), although it may not be totally mediated (d’ Entreves 1997: 22).  
Agents’ experiences inform us that it is difficult to have a pre-established 
harmony in an already (generally communicative, for this project) unconscious and 
inter-subjective social world of diversifying agents (whitebook 1997: 185). Be that as 
it may, the Habermasian discourse model does not show any sign of submerging 
individuality into collectivity. On the contrary, according to Benhabib (1992: 111), it 
not only presupposes but also defends individual autonomy and consent. This is also 
the reason why a collective identity could not be easily achieved by engaging agents. 
For example, the informal procedure preferred by regional engaging agents, such as 
the PECC process, provided the fertile ground for the flourishing of track I and track 
II activities since engaging agents, specifically the governmental agents who acted in 
their own capacities, enjoyed no obligation without their consent. Yet, when the 
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engaging/networking activities encountered identity questions as in the case of the 
inception, directly related to governmental activities in particular, such as APEC, 
ARF, ASEM, and even the construction of East Asian Community, the reference of 
the collective identity was not easy to be sorted out (see Chapter 4 and the first section 
of Chapter 5).   
However, this does not suggest that Habermas’s ‘ideal community of 
communication’ is of little use, specifically its counterfactual conceptions of rational 
consensus functioning as regulative ideas guiding (local) practices in which persons 
possess equal communicative competencies (Ingram 1987: 187, Apel 1990). The 
result from this study shows that the consensus of engaging agents in the broad sense 
of comprehensive security has been usefully applied as a regulative guideline for 
networking activities in terms of procedure and content. The consensus is also useful 
to identify in which areas that socialising process should be added and/or increased. 
Theoretically, on this point this study agrees with Dietrich Bohler (1990), that 
(procedurally) a transcendental pragmatic can be regarded as a criterion of a validity 
of pure argumentation of agents’ moral philosophy signifying that argumentation and 
ethics presuppose each other. This can be demonstrated by the regional engaging 
agents who preferred to imitate the characteristics of PECC process that has been a 
model for both formal and informal fora in the region.13 Engaging agents, ASEAN-
ISIS scholars in particular, accepted that without the PECC model of inclusiveness, 
specifically meant without prejudice about different backgrounds, and no precise pre-
designed outcome, regional architectures might not be structured as they have been. In 
other words, the inception and existence of ARF, CSCAP, ASEM, and CAEC as parts 
of regional architectures are theoretically attributed from the intertwining process that 
argumentation and ethics presupposes each other. 
The abundant conferences and workshops initiated by the APR in particular 
are examples of discursively socialising space in which agents can ‘talk it out’ 
through the universally non-coercive dialectical and dialogical process of critical 
discourse14 (Heat 2001: 308). It is a process underpinning dynamic regional change 
                                                        
13
 The ethics acts as the basic means while the argumentation acts as a consistency way of testing and 
solving differences. 
14
 The process helps to reveal particular mistakes and particular insensitivities in order to reconsider 
by engaging agents without coercion.  
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in terms of economic, political and security aspects. The persistence of engaging 
activities, particularly based on the experiences of engaging agents with networking 
processes since the earliest period when differences were viewed as alienated and 
hostile should be considered as the agents’ expression of their ethics and morale, 
especially in terms of their social responsibility (Hoffe 1990: 216).  Examples from 
empirical findings are continually long-term efforts of regional engaging agents 
recognising their opened dialogical and dialectical networking activities through 
numerous conferences, either supported by governments such as ASEAN-Japan 
dialogues, or supported by non-governmental organisations like APR, or supported by 
both governmental and non-governmental organisations in the case of attempting to 
construct regional community.  
Theoretically, these activities might not be actualised as they have become 
unless these engaging agents have an ideal situation of what their region should be in 
their mind. In other words, their activities expressed that they accept the principle of 
universal moral respect, being broad minded and inclusive for the interpretation of 
this study, and the principle of egalitarian reciprocity, which are regarded as basic 
elements for theory of communicative action by Seyla Benhabib (1990: 337). The 
principle of universal moral respect can be reconciled well with the agents’ inclusive 
principle accepting even those from hostile countries, specifically during the Cold 
War period; otherwise, the inception of ASEAN and its derivatives such as ASEAN-
PMC and a series of conferences such as APR and ASEAN-China dialogues could not 
come into being from the initial stage. The second can be seen in the preference that 
agents give to the dialogical process of communicating without a priori designed 
results. The result from the study complies with Benhabib’s (1992: 9) idea that 
communicative ethics is ongoing (procedural open end) moral conversation for a way 
of life, meaning regional affairs for this project. Examples for procedural open-end 
conversation networking activities are numerous conferences and workshops, 
fashioned after the PECC process, supported and attended by regional engaging 
agents. 
From the observations of this study, socialising and networking consolidation 
has become denser with passing time, particularly in terms of nurturing 
familiarisation, whether or not it is positive. Specifically after big events such as the 
end of the Cold War which brought about the inception of ARF and CSCAP, the 
consolidation of European projects generating the EU and begetting ASEM and 
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CAEC, and the impacts from the 1997 financial crisis that gave birth to the APT and 
the concept of constructing regional community (see Chapters 3 and 4).  There are 
three main factors relating to the consolidating process: how strongly agents believe 
in their own ideas, actions/interactions; how they are able to seize the chance for 
change, or even create the chance if need be; and how they can generate the social 
quality called ‘trust’ in order to pursue objectives based on their shared perceptions. 
The last factor cannot be clearly deduced from TCA. With reference to this point, Jay 
M. Bernstein (1997) rightly points out, if indirectly, that communicative reason 
expresses only intersubjective recognition; it cannot ground it. Examples are reflexion 
from their experiences from long-term engaging agents who pointed out the negative 
side of too closely networking activities and perception from both long-term and 
young-generation engaging agents who pointed out that different ways of perceiving 
social environments were keys to their decisions regarding networking activities, not 
the other way round (see the previous section). 
Before scrutinising more the concept of ‘trust’ that might act as a helpful 
supplement at worst - or glue at best - connecting the result of the study to networking 
literature and to theory of communicative action, it is worth clarifying the usefulness 
of Habermas’s strategic and communicative action for this study. These modes of 
action are not matters of free choice. They will be chosen through three (related) 
processes: cultural tradition, social integration and socialisation (Habermas 1990: 99. 
This research shows that they cannot only be separated: they can also be 
complementary.  
Communicative action, aimed at reaching mutual understanding on 
constructing a better, more open and stable region and based on a comprehensive 
concept for regional security, should be treated as a foundation (ultimate objective). 
From what was illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, what should be mentioned regarding 
this point is that engaging agents since the initial period, the 1960s, came to join their 
efforts without a high anticipation for any pre-designed outcome. They regarded 
conferences and workshops, whether or not supported by governments in the region, 
as potential social space that they could jointly thread their intentions and actions to 
improve their region, firstly in an economic aspect and later in a communicative way. 
Their communicative action proved useful by generating gradually concretised 
cooperation with minimal anticipation above reaching mutual understanding for every 
period of cooperation, no matter how small it might be. In addition, communicative 
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action should also be regarded as a mediating glue for whatever subordinate or 
substantive objectives prevail (economic, political and security cooperation). 
Communicative action aiming at reaching mutual understanding to improve the region 
within the broad scope of the concept of comprehensive security and encouraging the 
ongoing cooperation is at the core for regional engaging agents who express their 
preference of gradual but incremental steps of closer networking activities. Without it, 
their cooperation could not reach the stage of trying to construct regional community 
as in the case of ASEAN Community and East Asian Community.  
Mutual understanding of ultimate and/or detailed objectives should precede 
success-oriented strategies. Reflection on this intermingled process reveals that 
agents’ cooperative strategic actions are derived from their shared beliefs and 
discursive commitments, asserting more the significance of ‘how to do’ (signifying 
their bargaining and compromising) over ‘what to do’ (Schnadelbach 1990: 281, 289). 
The analysis in Chapters 3, and 4, and the previous section, confirms that no matter 
how global and regional environments have changed, agents’ networking activities 
still prevail to achieve what regional engaging agents intended to do to improve their 
region under the broad concept of comprehensive security. In other words, 
networking activities of engaging agents exist and flourish, although they could be 
regarded as agents’ reflexion to global and regional changes at some periods, such as 
their action after the 1997 financial crisis (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, their 
networking activities could also be considered as their means to bring changes that 
were more positive to improve their region. An example of which being when 
regional engaging agents (non-governmental in particular) tried hard to organise 
conferences and workshops by firstly highlighting the significance of economic 
aspects that could help them reach mutual understanding more easily than other 
aspects. The famous PECC process emerged from this, then engaging scholars from 
ASEAN countries established their networks of institutional links, followed by the 
APR and other conferences and workshops, supported by governmental and non-
governmental organisations, which even led to the idea to construct a regional 
community such as the ASEAN and East Asian Communities. In other words, if 
agents had given priority to ‘what to do’ over ‘how to do’, things might not turn out as 
they did.   
However, should there be different ideas derived from different interests, this 
can be overcome by encouraging agents to find a single appropriate answer (at a time) 
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drawn from the intrinsic characteristics of their accepted norms.  A transcendental 
pragmatic necessity underlies this process (Heat 2001: 308-311). In other words, 
emphasis on agents’ rational insights shows that their mutual understanding of their 
shared interests makes compromise reasonable. Informal characteristics of the PECC 
process and the long-term APR forum helps engaging agents to compromise their 
differences, specifically regarding global/regional/domestic environment in order to 
reach absolute gains for all.   
In addition, they help develop mutual understanding to improve the region 
within a broad concept of comprehensive security rather than partial gains of some 
individual engaging agents and/or the interests of their respective countries (Heat 
2001: 135-165, 248-253, Apel 1990: 40). Empirically, economic well-being based on 
economic development (expressed sense of liberalism) and comprehensive security 
(expressed in a more neutral sense) plays a role in agents’ expected absolute gain to 
improve their region. For economic development, engaging agents preferred market-
driven economies under the sponsorship of their respective governments that could be 
seen from the attempts of engaging agents, ASEAN scholars and the Japanese agents 
covering governmental and non-governmental, who helped to construct the PECC 
process generating APEC and supported the APT and its derivatives such as the CMI. 
For comprehensive security, the APR could be considered as a social space that 
engaging agents gave their priority to gradually play down interests of their 
individually respective states. As a result, they could have more space to pay attention 
to the well-being of the people. 
By all means, all the mentioned concepts and activities, supported and/or 
generated their activities could not have existed unless regional agents showed 
positive attitude towards each other. This study regards that attitude as ‘trust’. Yet, 
literature employed in Chapter 1 did not give much account on the concept. The next 
section, therefore, tries to illustrate theoretically how collective intention as trust 
could be considered as the way to reflect on what has been missing from a threaded 
framework constructed in Chapter 1. 
 
Trust: social qualification to unite networking activities 
Piotr Sztompka (1999: 147) proposes that trust not only helps us to speak but 
also to listen. Conferences and workshops, either formal or informal, function 
appropriately in this sense, even if they are satirised as mere talk-shops. According to 
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Sztompka, trust is an expected conduct derived from two kinds of agents’ qualities of 
actions: instrumental qualities (regularity, reasonableness, and efficiency); and moral 
qualities (morally responsible, kind, gentle, truthful, authentic, straightforward, fair, 
and just). From a narrow perspective reliant upon agent’s subjectivity, they could be 
observed as rational calculations of agents’ actions in order to maximise utility under 
risk and to minimise loss in a risky situation (Sztompka 1999: 60-62). From a wider 
perspective, they encourage sociability and tolerance, overcome the pluralistic 
ignorance syndrome, increase chances for more cooperation, strengthen bonds 
between individuals, and contribute to feelings of collective solidarities (Sztompka 
1999: 105). The mingling of the results of these two groups of qualities is at the core 
of understanding outcomes of networking activities perceived in the region as early as 
the 1960s.  
It is worth noting that being a capable agent requires knowing how to utilise 
these qualities effectively in order to deliver her/his intentions/deliberations. The 
informal and inclusive characteristics as appeared from the PECC and the APR 
processes were keys to two groups of qualities needed to generate trust. Theoretically, 
there is a trend towards feelings of collective solidarities, although long-term 
engaging agents perceived them at a minimal level as functional identity as explained 
in the first section of this chapter. Yet, empirically there has not been any clearer 
evidence than attempts from engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, 
to construct collective regional identity such as ASEAN Community and East Asian 
Community. Without these two groups of qualities, these initially collective identity 
constructions might be difficult to form and receive attention from the engaging 
agents and the general public. In other words, constructing the ‘Community’ as a 
uniting unit, whether in a narrower sense like the ASEAN Community or in a broader 
sense as an East Asian Community, has a long and uneasy path on which engaging 
agents have to wander. Trust, as a necessary social quality for constructing a 
community, might be consolidated from familiarisation. Yet, as a result of this 
project, it points out that familiarity does not necessarily generate trust specifically in 
a positive sense that is required to lay the foundation for constructing a uniting 
Community. Unfortunately, the scope of this project did not cover the question of 
how to generate and pamper that positive trust. Be that as it may, what engaging 
agents can anticipate for the time being is that their networks of communicative 
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communities aimed to improve their regional comprehensive security could provide 
them nourishing venues to construct the Community.  
Keith Hart (1988: 186), who proposes a rather neutral and (actively) 
mechanistic concept of trust, suggests that human relationships, activities and actions 
are the source of collective intention and action. There is also a rather passive concept 
related to earlier discussion derived from human rationality, namely, that it is related 
to a sensitive way of adapting to environmental conditions, vulnerability and even 
penalty (Bateson 1988: 27, Lorenz 1988: 197).  
In line with the results of this project, it is likely that trust generated along the 
socialising process might be grounded on reputations accumulated from the past, 
manifest in a sense of confident expectation of the intention of another free agent 
(Dasgupta 1988: 53, Dunn 1988: 83). According to Niklas Luhmann (1988: 99), 
familiarity is the key to establishing trust and confidence, the asserting of expectations 
of self-assurance and self reference. It is worth notifying here that empirically, for this 
project, familiarity, from long-term engaging agents in particular, has not presented 
only a positive side of generating trust, but also presented a negative side of 
potentially breeding contempt due to too long and too close familiarity.   
However, a summed up trend from long-term engaging/networking activities 
is that familiarity does breed friendship more than contempt. As Diego Gambetta 
(1988: 217) argues, networking – followed by socialising processes - is the key to 
dissolving an extremely restrictive sense of human subjectivity and to encouraging 
progressive and positive intersubjectivity of human beings. Gambetta (1988: 229) is 
correct insofar as agents’ intentions to do good make them choose ‘trust’ as their 
choice. Examples from this study are that engaging agents persuaded each other and 
their respective governments to trust each other’s good-will to improve the region 
after the end of the Cold War and after the occurrence of the 1997 financial crisis. 
ARF and CSCAP were established as results of their attempts after the end of the 
Cold War. The APT and the idea to construct regional community were attributed 
from their efforts after the 1997 financial crisis. 
Thus agents’ ideas and intentions/deliberations have encouraged East Asian 
(security) intellectuals’ networks to grow up, even though they have had to overcome 
global, regional and domestic difficulties before differences among diversifying 
agents could be accepted as normal. 
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Summary 
Lessons learnt from more than 40 years of regional engaging agents’ networking 
activities told us that non-governmental agents alone might not effectively deliver 
significant changes to improve their region. The establishment of official regional 
architectural fora such as APEC, ARF, ASEM, and APT told us a story of cooperating 
activities between governmental and non-governmental engaging agents. Yet, what 
should not be overlooked here is that their explicitly successful cooperation, the 
construction of APEC, ARF, and ASEM in particular, initially came from informal 
networking activities and processes. These activities came into being through the  
intention and creation of engaging agents, both non-governmental and governmental 
agents who acted in their own capacities and who shared perceptions regarding 
improving their region. 
 The informal characteristic of engaging agents’ networking activities, 
specifically the PECC process and other processes fashioned after it, makes them free 
from constraints of implementation, and makes them free to desire considerable 
change, because the informal characteristic itself lacks concrete power to implement 
engaging agents’ ideas. This project regards engaging agents’ positive freedom 
(freedom to) as more important than negative freedom (freedom from) due to the 
significance it gives to ideational factors in engaging agents’ dialectical processes of 
think and taking action. It is within this discursive dialectical space that engaging 
agents express their discourse ethics in term of giving priority to ‘what to do’ over 
‘how to do’. That means they have to be strategic agents in order to cultivate and 
transmit their ideas to the general audiences outside their conference-and-workshop 
environments. They might express amorphous ideas on how to improve their region 
but they presented no precise pre-decided improvement plans.  
Socialising processes play a significant part as their means to learn and 
mitigate their differences and to share and strengthen their common values.  What 
they have shared, thus far, is that their mutual understanding to improve their region. 
The reflection from this understanding is that they also have their intersubjectively 
accepted ideal regional situation in their mind. Within this ideal situation, everyone 
can become potential engaging agents. In other words, they are open to uncertainty in 
terms of regional environment and engaging agents’ perception. The PECC process 
and the APR process are socially dialectical engaging processes that they learn to act 
as components of mechanisms employed to improve their region. 
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As shown in Chapters 3 and 4 and the first section of this chapter that when 
regional fora derived from their efforts came into existence, they would become part 
and parcel of engaging structures for thoughts and action/interaction. That means with 
passing time, engaging agents have to take more regional architecture, economics, 
politics and security, into consideration. Some fora, such as ARF and ASEAN-SOM 
might ignore or constrain their progressive changes if governmental agents, whether 
they are engaging agents or not, see that those changes might hinder their respective 
governmental policies. Yet, some fora such as APR and CSCAP are more positive 
due to their more informal characteristics. Informal characteristics, together with 
being inclusiveness, make engaging agents’ activities expressing their potentiality to 
construct socially common identity among engaging agents. Theoretically, 
specifically drawn from constructivist literature, it should be along that line of 
thought. Although, East Asian engaging/networking activities provide a different 
picture; experiences from engaging activities, whether derived from long-term or 
young generation of engaging agents, show no clear signs of submerging individuality 
into collectivity as Habermas proposes in his discourse model (see Chapter 1 and the 
first section of this chapter).  
 Although engaging agents are not totally capable of altering their regional 
environment as they see fit, along the lines of their preferred concepts of 
comprehensive security, they render help in terms of ideas more than actions, to 
construct the region as it has become. Unfortunately, this project cannot indentify 
trust as social necessity, emerged out off socialising processes, for binding all 
engaging agents to join, consolidate and expand their engaging/networking activities 
as literature employed in Chapter 1 expected. Yet, after trying to remedy what the 
fabricated framework set up in Chapter 1 missed out, by adding literature regarding 
trust, this project concludes that socialising processes breed familiarity that leads to 
friendship. It is friendship that makes the history of East Asian (Security) Intellectual 
Networks possible as illustrated in details in Chapter 3 and 4. 
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Conclusion 
 
This project was originated by the interest in the vibrant movements of track II 
diplomacy, which are regarded here as networking activities of engaging agents, 
including non-governmental as well as governmental agents acting in their own 
capacities, in order to improve their region, with particular focus on the 1990s.  Their 
activities increasingly render the changing of regional contours, specifically in terms 
of politics and security. The inceptions of ARF, CSCAP, ASEM and CACE (along 
with their engaging processes), together with robust fora, the PECC and the APR 
processes in particular, for comprehensive security discussion at which agents could 
meet, exchange, and discuss security related issues in order to better their regions and 
contribute them more inclusive, resulted from these movements.  
 In order to systemise the scrutiny of this project, two related groups of 
questions have been set out.  Within the first group, the first question asks ‘Who are 
those active agents who have helped construct and sustain the existing networks that 
engage comprehensive security matters?’ The second question asks ‘To what extent 
and how have they constructed said networks?’ which is termed here as the ‘East 
Asian Security Intellectual Network’. Within the second group, their capability and 
impact(s) are assessed. Regarding capability, the project is concerned with their 
ability as changing agents that specifically derived from their ideas related to the 
concept of comprehensive security. This area of concern also covers the assessment of 
their social function, whether they are independent enough to initiate an emancipating 
change, or are just part of their society and serve to reproduce the dominant order. For 
the impact, this project aims at assessing the impact(s) of their activities and ideas 
upon their own networks rather than upon their societies, domestic or regional, as 
mostly shown in Chapters 3 and 4 and the first section of Chapter 5. In other words, 
this project also looks at assessing the theoretical speculation as to whether their 
respective identities have changed to become more collective as the communicating 
process has progressed. 
 Qualitative methods, comprising data collection including from field work and 
interviews, fashioned after the ‘research wheel’, emphasising the essentiality of 
dynamics and on-going process procedures in order to redefine ideas and techniques, 
were employed to conduct this project. The advantage of this research style for this 
project is that the researcher can permanently reflect on the whole process of 
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conducting research, started with specifying, then collecting and analysing collected 
data. At the beginning, this project was defined and redefined both the scope, in terms 
of periods and region, and redefined research questions before being focused on and 
modifying the concepts of being engaging agents, their capacities and social 
functions.  
Proceeding on, the research-wheel technique reminds this researcher not to 
ignore the process of internal falsification, particularly meaning value judgement 
regarding normative concern, specifically related to the concept of being agents 
employed here for this project. The research has to be aware that agents’ structure for 
thought and action for every period of study can both enable and constrain their ideas 
and actions. In other words, agents’ aspiration to improve their region might not meet 
with their real capability, no matter how strong a deliberation they possess. Yet, it is 
difficult to deny that their ideas and actions regarding the concept of comprehensive 
security affecting the improvement of regional security help to construct regional 
security architectures such as APR, ARF, and CSCAP in particular. 
Moreover, the essence of this project is to assess the engaging/networking 
agents and their activities. As suggested in Chapter 1 that as they are being regarded 
as intellectuals, they have to be assessed on the basis of two premises: ideas and social 
functions. Therefore, how agents perceive and interact with their surroundings, then 
consolidate, construct, and translate these experiences into networking activities were 
this project’s main concerns. Yet, networking activities based on the East Asian 
experience showed the trend of less independent engaging agents due to lack of 
enough independent funds and less reliable information, specifically regarding states’ 
policies and their impacts.  That means experiences from the engaging agents show 
that the best they could do would be to actualise their intentions/deliberations and 
know how to utilise what domestic and regional chances were left open for them.  
This project illustrated agents’ attempts to change their social environment in 
a time slot covering the early post-World War II period to the first decade of the 21st 
century with the specific focus on the 1980s and the 1990s. At the early periods, 
particularly from 1950 to 1960, engaging agents’ structure of thought and action was 
a mixed result of territorial skirmishes, ideological conflict and a sense of cooperation 
and geographical inclusiveness. Seeds of networking activities could be discerned. A 
rough concept of regional community (presented as Asia-Pacific) was evident. Japan, 
whose position was now better than some, was headed in an economic direction 
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(under the banner of ‘Yoshida Doctrine’) encouraged by non-governmental agents, 
particularly from the mid-1960s onwards. The Southeast Asia region remained 
dominated by respective governments’ military and political issues.  
Prominent figures included Saburo Okita and Kiyoshi Kojima, whose links 
within and outside of Japanese territory were energetic and helpful for more precise 
non-governmental agents’ networking activities in the later periods. Additionally, the 
regional atmosphere, particularly in Southeast Asia, was about to change partly due to 
the inception of ASEAN, which adopted and broadened the Indonesian concept of 
‘national resilience’ to ‘regional resilience’. This meant that Southeast Asia was 
preparing to embrace a security concept broader than the traditional concept based on 
a military aspect alone, the basic concept for ASEAN intellectuals’ comprehensive 
security. 
From the 1970s to the early 1980s, global and regional environments both 
inspired and helped to shape governmental and non-governmental networking 
activities stemming from economic hardship including two oil crises, global and 
regional economic stagflation, and an un-consulting Nixon Doctrine. By contrast, 
there was a discernibly cooperative atmosphere in Europe and Southeast Asia. 
Regarding the latter, the emergence of CSCE in Helsinki, the announcement of the 
ASEAN ZOPFAN, ASEAN Concord and TAC were cases of generating cooperative 
atmosphere. The rapidly changing global and regional atmosphere influenced Japan to 
declare the following three related policies: the ‘New Pacific policy’; the ‘Fukuda 
Doctrine’; and the ‘Comprehensive Security Policy’. The last mentioned was initially 
– and continues to be - favoured by agents from within and without the region; the 
reason being that the concept broadens and indirectly engages not only political and 
economic but also cultural and environmental aspects.  
Within this period, Tadashi Yamamoto from Japan initiated the JCIE whose 
intellectual networking activities, particularly concerned economic and political issues 
with Asia, Europe and America. His connections with the latter two saw the creation 
of the renowned ‘Trilateral Commission’. His links with European intellectuals 
helped close the distance between Japan and the EU; the ‘Hakone Meeting’ flourished 
along the way. Okita was still engaged in activities from the previous period which 
became extended and received more attention when he assumed the post of Foreign 
Minister in the late 1970s. His intellectual networks with Australia bore fruit in terms 
of a proposal to construct an Asia Pacific economic community. The explicit result 
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was the inception of the PECC, famous for generating an informal procedure, 
consensus, and the spirit of inclusiveness. APEC was initiated by the PECC process. 
Through these years, networking activities flourished due to agents’ intentions 
to improve their regional atmosphere. Although they may have had different origins 
(participating agents came from different countries across the region) their cross-
regional activities showed that they held commonly shared visions about their regions. 
The engaging agents accepted that only through economic development would their 
societies (domestic and regional alike) become stable and strong enough for political 
development leading to threat-free regional security. Although their favoured concept 
of comprehensive security, based on the concept of national/regional resilience 
rendered by economic development, was viewed by critics within and outside the 
region as rather hollow, due to it not directly engaging with regional states’ security 
problems, it was helpful to mitigate potential conflicts derived from different 
ideological inclination.  
For ASEAN, intellectuals from Indonesian CSIS were the most energetic, 
specifically Yusuf Wanandi, whose effort to link academic activities within and 
outside of the region generated and strengthened ASEAN-ISIS. What should also be 
emphasised here is that Wanandi and Noordin Sopiee of Malaysian ISIS developed 
close connections with their respective governments. This proved useful for ASEAN-
ISIS engaging agents and their Japanese counterparts for the establishment of 
significant fora for security discussions initiated in the 1990s after the end of the Cold 
War, the breakdown of the USSR, and a trend of more intensive consolidation of the 
European countries. These fora are: ARF, CSCAP, ASEM, and CAEC. ASEAN-ISIS 
through its renowned APR was a centre for discussing security issues within and 
outside the region. Malaysia-ISIS, with good support from CIDA, the Sasagawa Peace 
Foundation (Japan) and its own government, mainly organised the forum. Yet, not 
only did the outcomes derived from the governmental agents’ performance affect non-
governmental agents – they themselves were also affected by them. 
Theoretically and empirically, what this project presented is that the historical 
context of the explored subject, engaging agents under investigation here, is essential 
for studying the content of the interactively socialising processes. With the passing of 
time, agents absorbed socialising experiences (whether from governmental or non-
governmental fora) that could foster their networking activities. These experiences 
could be summarised as follows: homogeneity and harmony; mutual trust; and 
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consensus.  These characteristics may be regarded as ‘positive perceptions that 
enabled the fostering of networking activities’, and were carried on as common assets 
to deeper cooperation.  
Dialogues, workshops, and conferences, specifically through the PECC and 
the APR processes, have been their main venues for encouraging consensus 
(paralleling and sometimes converging with track-I preferences).  
The practice of engaging in dialogue has been their strong point; in fact, it has 
been regarded as the sole possible procedure through which they can discover whether 
they can recognise both the norms and interpretations of their needs that predominate 
the networking of dialogues. Getting involved in this process per se signifies their 
ethical concern that the dialogical concept of dialogue is more important than their a 
priori designed concepts and interpretations.  
However, whether or not trust could be generated along the socialising 
processes as anticipated by literature reviewed in Chapter 1 was analysed. The results 
of this study are mixed. On the one hand, there is a positive observation that 
socialising process might generate trust for further cooperation. Otherwise, how could 
engaging agents prolong their networking activities amid the changing environment? 
Yet, many agents, specifically the long-term engaging ones, claim that the more they 
get to know each other, the less they want to become closely engaged. This idea 
obstructed them to wander energetically into diverse fields that could enhance the 
content of their networking activities, a traditional aspect of security.   
With reference to their ability to organise and forge networks, without a priori 
designed outcome, it might not be an exaggeration to regard this part as indicative of 
their highest success. The convening of numerous international economic and security 
fora in the region can be cited as the result. In addition, their networking efforts also 
affect the content of discussed security matters. Security discussions have been both 
broadened (to cover all aspects of their preferred comprehensive security concepts) 
and [re]focused (either on what used to be traditional taboos or on topics picked out 
from the comprehensive concept).  
Increasingly traditional security concerns were receiving more attention, 
particularly at the two main ASEAN-ISIS fora. At the APR, panel presentations called 
for the reconsidering of whether ASEAN should be regarded as the Second front for 
anti-terrorism in the region and whether ARF should respond more rapidly to regional 
crises. But comprehensive security issues were still relevant. For example, the APR 
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called for papers appropriately dealing with root causes of terrorism and the 
promotion of Islam as a religion of peace. Additionally, CSCAP’s activities showed 
signs that comprehensive security issues were regarded as closely linked with 
traditional issues. The support it gave to the ‘Transnational Organised Crime 
Conference’ and ‘Asia-Pacific Group on Money-Laundering’ provided good 
examples. 
Nevertheless, their success could not lead to a common identity as expected by 
literature reviewed in Chapter 1. Senior agents, whose experiences date back to the 
late 1960s - mid 1970s, see themselves as having some common functional identity, 
meaning that they regard themselves as a group of intellectuals who act as 
components of a mechanism employed to better their societies (both domestic and 
regional). At best, they see themselves as a group that can compromise their 
differences in their attempts to reach a mutual understanding of the vision for the 
region/s (a stable and better region for all). In other words, they shared a belief in the 
efficacy of a functional approach starting from economic cooperation, then spilling 
over to other forms of co-operation, specifically political and security co-operation of 
the efforts of agents under investigation here. Unfortunately, this shared perception is 
less evident in agents who have not engaged with the networks for more than a 
decade. The younger generation of engaging agents, specifically those who joined the 
networks in the 1990s and had the slow movements of the engaging networks as their 
environment, did not feel that they were part of the exclusive engaging club. 
In addition, agents’ sense of a geographical identity (as an ASEAN or an East 
Asian) - while roughly perceived – was not particularly strong. The only clear concept 
of collectively geographical identity is the concept of constructing the ASEAN 
Community that flourished from the concept of ‘One Southeast Asia’, strongly 
supported by engaging agents, governmental and non-governmental, in ASEAN. 
Whilst the concept to construct the East Asian Community was encouraged by the 
Japanese engaging agents to even cover Australia and India, there were questions as 
to whether they should become part of the plan. 
Although trust might not be clearly perceived among the socialising processes 
of engaging/networking activities, two principles that should be the basic elements of 
Habermasian ideal speech situations could be discerned. The first principle is the 
universal moral respect perceived through engaging agents’ inclusive principle 
through the PECC and the APR processes in particular. The second is the principle of 
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egalitarian reciprocity perceived through the preference that agents give to the 
dialogical process of communicating with a priori designed results. Yet, socialising 
and networking consolidation has become denser although not evenly. There are three 
main factors relating to the consolidating process: how strongly agents believe in their 
own ideas, actions/interactions; how they are able to seize the chance for change, or 
even create the chance if need be; and how they can generate the social quality called 
‘trust’ in order to pursue objectives based on their shared perceptions.  
Although trust is still a problematic concept, this project indicated that it could 
be generated as long as engaging agents’ intention to do good made them choose 
‘trust’ as their choice. This chosen path is essential for the success of Habermas’ 
communicative action, understood here as aiming at reaching mutual understanding 
on constructing a better, more open and stable region which should be anchored on a 
comprehensive concept of regional security. Only through this prism of trust as a 
foundation for communicative action, could communicative action, applied here as 
complementary internal logic of agents’ networking cooperation, be perceived as a 
glue to bind strategic and communicative actions. Reflection on this intermingled 
process reveals that agents’ cooperative strategic actions are derived from their shared 
beliefs and discursive commitments, asserting more the significance of ‘how to do’ 
(signifying their bargaining and compromising) over ‘what to do’.  
 
Final Remarks 
The main focus of this project is based on agents’ - defined as intellectuals - 
ideas and social functions. The concept of idea (their interactively social product) 
helped to reconstruct their surroundings in order to illustrate to what extent and how 
they generate and participate in their networking activities. Their ideas and 
intentions/deliberations relevant in their initial periods helped them to bring change, 
and to express the significance and impact of ideational factors upon the alteration of 
East Asia’s economic, political, security, and social contours.  
Regarding agents’ social function, it is interesting to point out that the more 
the region is liberalised in terms of political ideology, the less their role and function 
is independent of their fund-givers and their respective governments’ policies. This is 
not because they are subservient to higher authority, rather, it should be appropriately 
viewed as a result of global and regional changing environments being more open and 
less hostile to accommodating differences and competition in the region. On this 
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point, it is worth noting that those changes resulted from their engaging/ networking 
activities.  
After applying the set-up framework, most of the definitions have helped an 
understanding of how agents construct and transmit their ideas among diversifying 
agents across time and space. The difficulty one encounters when defining them as 
intellectuals comes to the fore when their impact on their wider audiences is taken 
into account. What should not be forgotten is that despite their familiarity, it is 
difficult to exert influence over their track-I counterparts unless they know how to 
seize the opportunities as they occur as a result of environmental change and utilise 
them to deliver their ideas and their derivatives.  
This interactive procedure is a dialectical one that can be observed in the 
relationships between agents and their changing surroundings and among agents 
themselves. The combination of networking literature and Habermas’s TCA is helpful 
on this point. It provides an elaborate conception about how diversifying agents can 
communicate and project change. While the former provides the external aspect of 
networking activities, the latter signifies the internal aspect. It is necessary to add that 
the dialectical relationship between these aspects is the key to understanding how 
Habermas’s TCA might be applied to real situations. Strategic action and 
communicative action should be blended, letting the latter have privilege in order to 
construct the fertile conditions that lead to the emancipation of the human being. The 
result of this research suggests a need to propose that trust should be more seriously 
treated as an important ingredient in encouraging the smooth changing and sustaining 
of networks with good intentions/deliberations. Only in this way can presuppositions 
regarding trust in networking literature and Habermas’s TCA be remedied.   
Agents’ ideas and intentions/deliberations to improve their respective regions 
not only help them forge networks, but also help them to provide an experimental 
space in which to create a culture of trust which, in turn will enable them to overcome 
difficulties and differences and sustain and expand their networks.  
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Economic, Political and Security 
Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s 
Noted attendants: 
  Narongchai (Thailand) 
  Noordin Sopiee (Malaysia) 
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  Jesues Estanislao (The Philippines)                 Project 
ASEAN and Pacific  
Economic Cooperation 
Non/governmental networking activities in term of both politics and economics  
(for more clarification please link with figure1 by using PBCC as a connecting point) 
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- Japans New Pacific Policy,  - CSCE in Helsinki 
     Fukuda Doctrine, and  - ASEAN Concord, TAC 
     comprehensive security  - 2 oil crises 
- ASEANs ZOPFAN   - economic stagflation 
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Figures 2: mapping of regional networking activities 1970s to early 1980s 
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APEC 
Figure 3: regional networking activities and the origin of ASEAN -ISIS 
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Figure 4.1: The initial networks proposing and accepting the emergence of ASEAN Regional 
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Figure 4.2: The inception of a Council for security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Extended networks from Figure 4.1 and the re-emergence of regional community building  
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Figure 5: The construction of an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM, and a Committee for Asia-Europe Co-operation (CAEC), non/governmental networking agents and their issues of concerns 
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Figure 6: The inception of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and regional activities (from both track I and track II) including ides to construct regional communities 
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Figure 7: networking activities from non/governmental agents and main content from the activities 
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